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Abstract
The Preexistence of the Soul in the Early English Enlightenment: 1640-1740
Clay Paul Greene
2021

This dissertation assesses the English revival of the metaphysical Platonic
doctrine of the soul’s preexistence against the backdrop of the philosophical, cultural,
and religious changes that defined seventeenth-century intellectual life. The
reemerged doctrine of preexistence was the last important gasp of strict metaphysical
dualism, and through the writings of its defenders, the idea became incorporated into
the primary philosophical innovations of modernity, scientific materialism,
democratic equality, and what Charles Taylor calls exclusive humanism. But
preexistence did not persist in seventeenth-century life only in philosophical
argument, but in literary creations and ideas with practical human import. Between
1640 and 1740, Henry More, Anne Conway, Thomas Traherne, and the anonymous
author of Præexistence (1714) express the idea of preexistence in poetry,
philosophical and scientific prose, and even social polemic. This dissertation thus
looks at the affective content of ideas, understanding William James’s point that
behind all philosophy are affects and feelings, not merely logical sequences.
Henry More (1614-1685), the Platonist author who introduced the doctrine of
preexistence to England, in his texts negotiates the gap between Christian orthodoxy
and his own belief in the soul as a spiritual entity equivalent to God. Chapter One
“Henry More and the Possibility of Metaphysical Poetry” analyzes how this
negotiation appears through More’s strategic deployment of allegory modeled on
Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene and his explosive metaphor of the soul as a
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“ray” of the divine sun. Lying between the sociopolitical poles of high and very lowchurch Protestantism, More’s metaphorical praxis promotes preexistence to convey
the individual’s power to save herself without the intermediaries of church hierarchy
and scripture, a radical position his most perceptive Calvinist contemporaries
criticized and his most radical followers expanded and developed.
Indicative of the growing influence of materialism—promoted by Thomas
Hobbes and Margaret Cavendish, More’s immediate student Anne Conway (16311679) departs from More’s strictly immaterialist version of preexistence and envisions
a composite spirit-matter soul, most similar to the animist materialism of John Milton.
Chapter Two “The Very World: Early Modern Metempsychosis as Proto-secularism”
examines Conway’s semi-material soul and the complex process of soul
transmigration that expands human identity from an individual and anthropocentric
singularity to a composite non-human entity that shares a deep kinship with all
physical nature, living and otherwise. In Conway’s account, the soul is not separate
from but a part of physical nature.
At the same historical moment when preexistence theology incorporated
materialism, the poet and Anglican divine Thomas Traherne (1636-1674) envisions a
version of preexistence verging on philosophical idealism. Chapter Three “Visions of
Eternal Being in Thomas Traherne’s Writing” examines the idealized conception of
an eternally self-existing soul in Traherne’s Centuries of Meditation. Unlike the
previous authors who define their terms with metaphysical precision, Traherne falls
back on the appearance of eternality—the transcendence of time—that characterizes
certain perceptive and meditative moments of consciousness. Patiently describing
such moments when the soul becomes subject and object of mental experience
simultaneously, Traherne displays a human soul incapable of non-existence, harm, or
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distraction, a position that transcends individual interest and embodies aesthetic
universality.
Immateriality confronts materiality in the works of the Deists who believe in
preexistence, as shown in Chapter Four “Gnostic Deists: Preexistence after Milton.”
The author of the Milton imitation, Præexistence (1714), paradoxically combines a
metaphysical belief in the preexistent soul with hostility toward Christian theology.
Displaying the shipwreck of spiritual humanism upon the shores of skeptical
materialism, the author of this poem and other contemporary Deist authors present life
as unredeemed suffering, emblematized by the preexistent soul as a hapless divine
entity stuck inside a permanently suffering body. This paradox exemplifies the
spiritual crisis of Enlightenment modernity, one that cannot justify the spiritual
aspirations of human beings but simultaneously cannot abandon those aspirations.
Complexly expressed in literary images, metaphors, paradoxes, and new ideas
and affects, this mythology draws human life to the absolute center of cosmic import
and transforms the individual from a subject of the creator God into a semi-divine,
self-authorizing figure, born in eternity and unlimited in scope and agency. Seen in
historical perspective, the revival and dissemination of the doctrine of preexistence
is thus both a refuge from Enlightenment and an espousal of Enlightenment
principles. Preexistence theology inaugurates affects and ideas, such as materialism,
individualism, nihilism, and pessimism, that are nevertheless anti-secular in the
etymological sense, unlinking human experience and identity from the saeculum, the
Christian age between Incarnation and Last Judgment. As an
emergent theology without religious mediators, the preexistence theology of the
seventeenth century anticipates similar spiritual revolts in Romanticism and the New
Age movement.
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Introduction
The Platonist World-Picture

“Philosophy is really homesickness. It is the urge to be at home everywhere.”
–Novalis1

While their contemporaries looked through microscopes and measured the
distances of the stars, Henry More, Anne Conway, Thomas Traherne, and the
anonymous author of Præexistence began thinking of themselves as heavenly
creatures. As the intellectual scene of seventeenth-century Europe changed around
them, moving toward materialism, equality, and skepticism, these four thinkers, all
philosophical poets of different kinds, came to believe in the stridently metaphysical
Platonic theory of the preexistence of the soul. Their religious, not merely
philosophical, worldview is epitomized in the idea that human beings come from and
maintain a connection to a transcendent realm. This dissertation explores, critiques,
and contextualizes this idea at the moment when it was beginning to become an
impossibility for serious philosophers and engaged, ambitious poets. These last of the
Platonists have something to teach us not because they created modernity, but because
modernity uncreated them, and therefore they offer an alternative—perhaps an
unavailable alternative—to our central assumptions and values, as well as the central
beliefs of their own literary, religious, and philosophical culture.
Though this project focuses on the writings of these four thinkers, preexistence
was a wider phenomenon in English intellectual culture. The revival of this viewpoint

1

Quoted in Georg Lukacs, Theory of the Novel, A Historico-philosophical Essay on
the Forms of Great Epic Literature, Boston, MA: MIT P, 1974, 1.
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was the project of a specific era in early modern England. In Emmanuel College,
Cambridge in the early 1640s, Charles Hotham delivered a series of sermons on the
soul’s preexistence at the same time Henry More composed his poems on the same,
later published in the Psychodia Platonica in 1642 and the Philosophical Poems in
1647.2 This revival occurred in the context of a larger set of theological discussions
conducted by Benjamin Whichcote, the aforementioned More, George Rust, John
Smith—all the authors, preachers, and teachers called by the name “the Cambridge
Platonists” since John Tulloch’s 1872 Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in
England in the Seventeenth Century.3 Not all discussion of preexistence during the
century flowed specifically from these actors and their sources; Jewish Kabbala and
the alchemy of Jean-Baptiste van Helmont influenced the Christian Kabbalists of the
1670s and 80s, who had their own theologies of preexistence.4 Yet the Cambridge
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Charles Hotham, An Introduction to the Teutonick philosophie being a
determination concerning the original of the soul, viz. whether it be immediately
created God and infus’d, or transmitted from the parent, London, 1650.
Henry More, Philosophical Poems, New York, NY: Chadwyck-Healey, 1992.
The Immortality of the Soul, ed. A. Jacob, Dordrecht, Nethlerands: Martinus Nijhoff,
1987.
3

John Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the
Seventeenth Century, v. 2 “The Cambridge Platonists,” William Blackwood and Sons:
London, 1872.
[George Rust] A Letter of Resolution Concerning Origen, London, 1661.
Joseph Glanvill, Lux Orientalis, or, An Enquiry into the Opinion of the Easter Sages
concerning the Præexistence of Souls, being a Key to unlock the Grand Mysteries of
Providence, London, 1662.
4

Two Hundred Queries Moderately Propounded Concerning the Doctrine of the
Revolution of Humane Souls: and its Conformity to the Truths of Christianity.
London, 1699.
Seder Olam, or The order, series or succession of all the ages, periods, and times of
the whole world is theologically, philosophically and chronologically explicated and
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Platonists opened the discussion, especially More, by arguing forcefully in print for
the doctrine of preexistence and by being received by an audience, if not always a
welcoming one, of Europe’s leading intellectuals.5
This moment of debate expanded beyond Cambridge largely through More’s
publications. More was a person of some controversy almost entirely because of this
belief, but he was nevertheless followed in it by his students, principally Anne
Conway, the bedridden aristocrat and philosopher who entertained the leading radical
intellectuals of Europe and converted to Quakerism in her last days. Her Principles of
the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy argues for preexistence and
metempsychosis, the periodic revolving of souls of all created things, from human
beings to rocks.6 The Herefordshire divine and poet Thomas Traherne flirted with the
idea of preexistence in his metaphysically speculative poetry and visionary prose, all
unpublished at his death.7 Though different authors published defenses of
preexistence in the years 1640-1680, it was More who drove the debate, and when the
ideas fell out of all but underground form through the 1740s, it was almost certainly
for lack of More’s hand on the rudder of the conversation he effectively created.8

stated also the hypothesis of the pre-existensy and revolution of humane souls
together with the thousand years reign of Christ on earth, London, 1694.
Carolyn Merchant, “The Vitalism of Anne Conway: Its Impact on Leibniz,” Journal
of the History of Philosophy 17.3 (1979): 255-269. Steven Schroeder, “Anne
Conway’s Place: A Map of Leibniz,” Pluralist 2.3 (2007): 77-100.
5

6

Anne Conway, Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, ed.
Allison Coudert, Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1996
7

Thomas Traherne, Centuries, Poems, and Thanksgivings, 2 vol., Oxford, UK:
Oxford U P, 1958.
More’s last publication on preexistence came in 1682, his commentary on the work
of his students George Rust and Joseph Glanvil, the Annotations upon the Foregoing
Treatises, Lux Orientalis, or, An enquiry into the opinion of the Eastern sages
concerning prae-existence of souls, and the Discourse of truth, London, 1682. More
8
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Ernst Cassirer called this phenomenon the “Platonic Renaissance in England,”
an appellation indicative of the unusual, and also short-lived, nature of this moment of
theological renewal and innovation.9 While the history of philosophy has taken notice,
the field of early modern literature has not significantly studied these authors, which
is all the more important given the uniqueness of the Platonic theological mood in
early modern religious writing. The great religious poets of the period are by and
large the religious and philosophical opponents of the authors in this dissertation.
John Donne is a fixed, almost absolutist Calvinist, George Herbert a soft Calvinist
loyal to the Elizabethan Settlement emblematized by church writer Richard Hooker.
Richard Crashaw is a high churchman tending toward Counter-Reformation iconic
spiritualism. John Milton is an Arminian and Christian libertarian with an orthodox
belief in the Fall. Against all of them, the writers examined in this dissertation believe
in deification, the absolute free will of human beings, the extreme power of the human
mind, and a moral revision of the doctrine of Original Sin, all pointing in radically
different spiritual directions than these writers more familiar to students of early
modern literature.
Despite the existence of this quiet tradition, there is no book on preexistence
and literature during its period of flourishing in the late seventeenth century, and only
one book in English on preexistence and literature at all. That book is Terryl Givens’s
When Souls Had Wings: Pre-Mortal Existence in Western Thought (2009). As its title
suggests, Givens’s book is wide-ranging (covering roughly three thousand years).

died five years later, and no further works on preexistence in More’s tradition were
published until Præexistence (1714).
9

Ernst Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in England, trans. James P. Pettegrove,
Edinburgh, UK: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1953.
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While Givens’s chapter “The Cambridge Platonists and the Miltonic Heritage”
provides some introduction to the relevant issues of seventeenth-century life and
thought that informed the revival of preexistence, those issues are too numerous,
complex, and subtle to be clarified in his admirable chapter of thirty or so pages. This
is understandable: Givens is not primarily a scholar of the seventeenth century, and
despite its length and breadth, When Souls Had Wings is (no doubt intentionally)
spare and forceful in its argument that preexistence has always featured significantly
in Western thought. The book’s limitations are however apparent in its treatment of
the seventeenth-century context of preexistence and in the occasional lack of
substantive analysis of primary texts.
The topic of seventeenth-century preexistence theology has been discussed
more thoroughly in article form, especially by historians of philosophy. D.P. Walker,
Allison Coudert, Sarah Hutton, Robert Crocker, Rhodri Lewis, and Christian
Hengstermann have intelligently treated preexistence in its seventeenth-century
context, but this analysis so far has not added up to a broader thesis explaining why
the idea was revived and why it lasted in the forms it did.10 D.P. Walker explains the
rise of preexistence as a corollary of the rise of the belief in universal salvation,
though More’s defense of preexistence explicitly denies universal salvation. Historian
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Allison Coudert, The Impact of the Kabbalah in the Seventeenth Century: The Life
and Thought of Francis Mercury van Helmont, Leiden: Brill, 1999. Robert Crocker,
“Henry More and the Preexistence of the Soul,” from Religion, Reason and Nature in
Early Modern Europe, ed. Robert Crocker, Springer Netherlands, 2001: 77-96.
Christian Hengststermann “Pre-existence and Universal Salvation—the Origenian
Renaissance in Early Modern England,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy
25.5 (2017): 971-989. Sarah Hutton, “Henry More and Anne Conway on Preexistence
and Universal Salvation,” from Mind Senior to the World, ed. M-L. Baldi, Milan:
Franco Angeli, 1996. Rhodri Lewis, “Of ‘Origenian Platonisme’: Joseph Glanvill and
the Pre-Existence of Souls”, Huntington Library Quarterly 69 (2006): 267-300, and
D.P. Walker, The Decline of Hell: Seventeenth-Century Discussions of Eternal
Torment, Chicago, IL: U of Chicago Press, 1964.
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Robert Crocker comes the closest to a satisfying account, though only for Henry
More, explaining the important role anti-Calvinism played in More’s formulations of
preexistence. These studies focus mostly on mostly questions of abstract Christian
theology, and while they play some part in the explanation for preexistence, they do
not account for the spiritual, literary, and ideological factors that emerge in these
authors’ works.
First, it must be understood that preexistence is a religious belief, not only or
primarily a philosophical position. Wherever it appears, the idea plays a major part in
religious theodicy, or vindication of God’s ways. Preexistence is, like karma, an
explanation of the problem of evil, one that hews closely to an ideal of human
freedom. Our life circumstances are the result of our actions, and if our current actions
do not, then some past act of will explains our good and bad outcomes. This action
must be ours, not God’s. For God’s vindication to be complete, human beings must
own their actions, and nothing beyond acts of will may affect human character or
destiny. Preexistence is therefore first a way of justifying God, of upholding the
religious worldview.
This view is not the closet eccentricity of a theologian who read too much
Plato, but an idea that has been believed by whole societies and rehearsed in public
rituals. Scholars frequently speak as if the idea of preexistence began with Plato’s
Myth of Ur from the Republic, but in fact the idea originated in the ancient, perhaps
prehistoric religious beliefs of Greece. Plato was not an innovator in this respect but a
philosophical transmitter of a well-known belief, even if at his time that belief was
approaching the status of a fable. In the classical age, Pythagoras was held to be the
creator of the idea, but this attribution is mythical. Whoever first conceived the idea, it
survived through late antiquity through Plato’s dialogues, inspiring the Egyptian
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philosopher Plotinus in the first century CE. Through Plotinus’s influence, it came to
be believed by many generations of Christians, pagans, Jews, and Muslims, and is
believed today by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Church of
Scientology, and the Nation of Islam. Plotinus created a school, called since the
nineteenth-century by the unfortunate name “Neoplatonism,” and through this school
inspired the early Church Fathers, Clement of Alexandria and Origen, each of whom
fitted the idea to Christian doctrine.11
Second, and this point needs much elaboration, the influence of Plotinus on
the seventeenth-century Platonists has been underestimated. Immaterialist in
worldview, hierarchical in his aesthetics and politics, Plotinus is the metaphysician
whose impact on the spiritual and religious lives of Western Christians is, besides
Saint Paul, perhaps the greatest. Through Plotinus’s influence on the Church Fathers,
particularly Augustine, his deeply metaphysical version of a “world picture” became
the default source of religious and mystical orientations toward this world from his
time to the present, so much so that theologians of the modern church are still battling
his influence.12 That worldview is dualistic, hierarchical, and governed by the
mysticism, not to say the mystification, of an idea of spirit. The mystic aura about the

11

Since Friedrich Schleiermacher distinguished the thought of Plato himself from his
later interpreters, scholars have used the term “Neoplatonism” as indicative of the
chain of individuals who kept the ideas of Plotinus, as opposed to Plato, alive.
12

The literature, old and new, on the Neoplatonic influence upon Christianity is vast.
A modern trend in Christian theology has been the attempt to find the “Eastern”
biblical perspective in contradistinction to the “Western” influence of Neoplatonism
and Stoicism, a tendency that conjoins both Christian Fundamentalists and academic,
social justice-minded theologians for different reasons.
W. R. Inge, “The Permanent Influence of Neoplatonism Upon Christianity,” The
American Journal of Theology 4.2 (1900): 328-344.
Ramelli, Ilaria. 2009. “Origen, Patristic Philosophy, and Christian Platonism ReThinking the Christianization of Hellenism.” Vigiliae Christianae 63 (3): 217-263.

8
Plotinian soul prompts a largely negative view toward the world as a whole. C. S.
Lewis exemplifies how this view can be expressed in terms of the Christian afterlife
when he writes that “If I find in myself a desire that nothing in this world can satisfy,
the most probable explanation is that I was made for another world.”13 Plotinus would
add that we have already lived in that other world; the good transcending the badness
of this world is already experienced and, perhaps, can be recalled.
In the mid-seventeenth century, More, Traherne, Conway and others enjoyed
fresh editions of the Enneads and through the study of Greek, either their own or in
translation, they came to know Plotinus deeply. This new availability led naturally to
deeper study and capacity for comparison with the other philosophical-religious texts
they possessed. Henry More (1614-1687) is perhaps best understood as early modern
England’s best and most lasting source for the worldview of Plotinus. With the
exception of John Colet in the previous century, More and his compatriots were the
first English philosophers to dedicate themselves to the exposition of Plotinus’s
philosophy, mostly from Marsilio Ficino’s Latin translations. They sought carefully to
understand how Plotinus’s thought had been interpreted by pagans like Proclus,
Porphyry, Julian, and Iamblichus. More and his compatriots came to know the
Neoplatonic Plotinus, a figure long hidden by Augustine’s Plotinus, and this fact
allowed them to inhabit the original Neoplatonic worldview from the inside and see
the world freshly through its lens. Naturally enough, they focused on his version of
the preexistent soul, or rather they focused through the imagistic point of view created
by Plotinus’s writings on it. They took on the lens of Plotinus’s metaphysical
protagonist and considered the world from its point of view.

13

C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, London, UK: Geoffrey Bles, 1952, 75.

9
They latched onto the soul’s fall to darkness as his foundational philosophical
myth. For Plotinus—the ascetic who disliked to eat in front of others because of the
gross materiality implied by consumption and digestion—the simultaneously literary
and philosophical image of a transcendent soul orphaned in a thoughtless materiality
is the anchoring point of view of ethics, religious practice, and philosophical thought.
Seen from this view of a stranger in this world, the world achieves the shape of a
“vale of tears” to be transcended. This story is heartbreaking, as a poor soul is jolted
from its perfect experience in heaven and thrust into darkness. It is also isolating, for
it leaves the soul alone and naked in this world, without compatriots or family.
“Stranger to this world” means also stranger to everyone in it. The best description of
this Neoplatonic viewpoint comes from the nineteenth-century Unitarian minister and
Neo-Kantian theologian William R. Alger in his massive intellectual history, The
Destiny of the Soul, A Critical History of the Doctrine of Future Life, (1880). Alger
describes the protagonist souls of Neoplatonic preexistence as “pathetic waifs drifted
to these intellectual shores over the surge of feeling from the wrecked orb of an
anterior existence.”14 With Romantic exaggeration, Alger expresses the pathos of
Plotinus’s vision of what it means to be a person in the world. For Plotinus, the soul is
“a partial thing, isolated, weakened, full of care.” Once a member in good standing of
the cosmic unity, the soul in the modern world is “severed from the whole,” but in its
confusion, becomes a fragment “intent upon a fragment,” missing the cosmic
wholeness for the many broken particles that should lead back to unity, of which the
soul itself is one. The poor soul “nestles in one form of being; for this, it abandons

14

William Rounseville Alger, The Destiny of the Soul: A Critical History of the
Doctrine of a Future Life, Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1880, 9.
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everything else.”15 Isolation, lack of connection, and alienation are the entailments of
this cosmic worldview, which can be transcended only for instants when the soul
comes into alignment with its sublime subjects, the One and God. For Plotinus, these
moments of transcendence are moments of recall, an idea from Plato’s dialogues to
which he gives a richer aesthetic rendition. While for Plato this recollection was the
ordinary experience of thinking, for Plotinus it is a state of psychological unity
experienced alongside the emotions of sublime furor but also spiritual contentment. In
this state of experience called contemplation, the soul achieves a state of recall,
experiencing for a brief instant the life it lived in the heavenly realm. “[O]ur human
soul has not sunk entire,” he writes, but “something of it is continuously in the
Intellectual realm.”16 This is the abundant recompense of Plotinus’s metaphysics, the
escape from a miserable cosmos, when the protagonist soul reconnects with its past
and future as a sempiternal, bright spirit, achieving the moment of glory and
knowledge. Gnosticism’s complete hatred of the physical world lies close at hand,
despite Plotinus’s energetic visions of sublime contemplation and temporary
realization of intellectual truth. In fact, the very sublimity of this earlier world is
dualistically opposed to this place we are “thrown.” The beauty of the imagined world
casts a shadow over this one.
The story of these two elements, gross materiality and sublime transcendence,
achieves in Plotinus the character of a struggle between higher and lower elements of
the soul, a psychomachy. Plotinus adds in the Enneads that “if that part, which is
[the]sphere of sense, holds the mastery…it keeps us blind to what the upper phase

15

Plotinus, Enneads, trans. Stephen Mackenna, 4.8.4.
http://classics.mit.edu/Plotinus/enneads.mb.txt
16

Enneads, 4.8.8.
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holds in contemplation.”17 Though his soul drops down the ladder of being, a piece of
it remains intact, and thus he tells how in transcendent moments “beholding a
marvellous beauty” he became “assured of community with the loftiest order,” and
finally “acquir[ed] identity with the divine.”18 Plotinus’s thought dramatizes a conflict
between a strongly negative, almost Gnostic, view of the material world and a
Platonic optimism about God’s creation. This internal conflict between optimism and
gnosticism is the dialectic of preexistence, with each trading places as the dominant or
recessive gene in a thinker’s work. This dialectic emerges inside literary texts as a
struggle between conflicting affects—optimism and pessimism, hatred of the physical
world and exultant expectation for a world to come. These affects are not merely
feelings, nor simply propositions of philosophical logic, but conjoined feelings and
meanings. Like Raymond Williams’s idea of “structures of feeling,” the worldview of
preexistence functions as a system of thought that produces explanations on both
emotional and rational or at least semi-rational terms.19
Alongside philosophical argument, an aura follows the doctrine of the soul’s
preexistence, a spirit and mindset combining ancient reverence—which the Greeks
associated with the piety of ancient Egypt—with violent, enthusiastic inspiration. This
aura is altogether distant from the primary affects of most Christian religious poems
of the seventeenth century. Where Puritans savor the “sweetness of grace” and
contemplate the bitter tears of Christ at the cross, the Platonic philosopher follows
Socrates up the soul’s instant flight to the upper heavens, redolent of the rush of

17

Enneads, 4.8.8.

18

Enneads, 4.8.1.

19

Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature, Oxford: Oxford U P, 1977.

12
insight and the mind widening. Shakespeare captures this mood in a short speech that
begins “the poet’s eye in a fine frenzy rolling.”20 This mood, evinced first in Plato’s
logical disquisitions, comes more to the surface in the writings of Plotinus and the
theurgists Iamblichus and the emperor Julian. In these authors, the soul can rise above
itself in moments of contemplation, as in Plotinus, or perform magical acts, as in
Iamblichus and Julian.
The combined feelings and meanings characteristic of preexistence derive
from the conceptual landscape of Plotinus’s worldview. Neoplatonism is always also
a theory about itself, how its knowledge came to be, how it relates to cosmic unity,
who the philosopher is and why. It locates itself in a particular point of view, that of
the “philosopher,” whose clarity of mind and objectivity are trusted upon
metaphysical grounds. This internal wholeness, to say nothing of the wholeness of the
cosmos it imagines, locates human beings as protagonists of an immortal story and
sole perceivers of the entire universe. For this reason, it comprises an internal
“affective structure;” as it strives to hew to its truth, its answers are prewritten, as are
the emotions it conjures forth: grief at a fall, the pathos of a broken and blinded world,
the singularity of the self, the blinding rush of truth, the satisfaction and glory of
perfect recall, and the bliss of a return to God. Moreover, under the Platonist
dispensation, cosmic inequality—both the metaphysical inequality of higher and
lower forms of being but also the social and political inequality of human
civilizations—constitutes a universal work of art. Plotinus announces that when we
complain about the existence of high and low,

20

William Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream Act V, Scene 1, 18, 1841.
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We are like people ignorant of painting who complain that
the colours are not beautiful everywhere in the picture: but the Artist
has laid on the appropriate tint to every spot. Or we are censuring a
drama because the persons are not all heroes but include a servant and
a rustic and some scurrilous clown; yet take away the low characters
and the power of the drama is gone; these are part and parcel of it.21
Like God making a new world, the human maker sketches the world of her
own mind, searching for proportion, harmony, and beauty. Ernst Curtius call this
figure the theologus poetus, the arch-Platonic sight and voice of God.22 The
handiwork of the theological poet is the world-picture. The very metaphysics of that
world-picture announce the conclusion of moral questions before they are asked.
Aesthetic questions, too, can be answered in moral-political terms. A moral aesthetics
applies here not to individuals but the world as a whole, a whole created with
intention by the artist-God, or by God the artist. The key term of that aesthetics is
theodicy. The success or failure of the cosmic artwork depends upon the justice of the
system undergirding it, but even justice is subordinate to the higher principle of
beauty. Justice is what a beautiful world would look like. Theodicy then is not so
much an argument on behalf of God’s justice, but the ability to occupy a point of view
that sees the world as beautiful, just or unjust. Once the suffering and death of the
world-picture can be accepted, even loved, the theodicy is complete.
My dissertation reflects the challenges to this world picture put forward by the
seventeenth-century thinkers and responded to by them. Some, like Anne Conway and
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the author of Præexistence, press forward a critique against Platonism itself. Henry
More responds to such critiques by reformulating Plotinus’s moral aesthetics of high
and low through poetic images, while Traherne repurposes preexistence for his private
theory of poetic vision. It is not enough, therefore, to note one or another nicety of the
theological struggles in which each of these authors engage, but to see how their own
world pictures collide with those of others. For each author, new considerations and
philosophical challenges entail that the world must be weighed and measured, not just
with the rational calculation of desert, justice, or mechanical coherence, but with “the
instinctive human reaction of satisfaction and dislike” as William James describes the
subterranean affective springs of all philosophy. Philosophy, as put forward by these
authors, is a reflection on “the total character of the universe as [they] feel it,” a
speculation about and judgment upon on all life and the whole world across its every
dimension.23
In my first chapter, I argue that More encounters a political challenge in
Calvinist theology, one that he struggled to overcome in his long poem The
Præexistency of the Soul. The French reformer preached both the depravity and
equality of all souls, a theological regime antithetical to the optimistic Pelagianism of
the Platonic viewpoint. Against this equality, More indulges in a fantasy of being one
of Plotinus’s superior souls. While describing the soul in metaphor, More’s poetry
unexpectedly grasps the idea that the soul is an aristocratic “babe,” left to the care of a
“sorry salvage wight.”24 On his philosophical scheme, all human beings have souls
with divine lineages, and More struggles to reconcile the Plotinian hierarchy of souls
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with the strict theology of Calvinist equality. This struggle, strangely, resulted not in
More being appropriated by the theological conservatives, but in his being criticized
by them, and then favorably invoked later by the radical Unitarian Richard Roach.25
The singularity of More’s soul, its self-authorization as possessing a divine nature,
makes possible a connection between More’s enthusiasm and religiopolitical
radicalism.
My second chapter, “The Very World: Early Modern Metempsychosis as
Secular Theodicy,” examines how Anne Conway’s version of theodicy critiques the
Plotinian version of her teacher, More. Under the growing influence of materialism—
promoted by Thomas Hobbes and Margaret Cavendish—More’s student Conway
departs from More’s strictly immaterialist version of preexistence and envisions a
composite spirit-matter soul, most similar to the animist materialism of John Milton.26
Conway’s semi-material soul transcends individual identity and anthropocentric
singularity. This soul is a composite non-human entity sharing kinship with all
physical nature, living and otherwise. A leveling Quaker and a believer in the
politically freighted doctrine of monist materialism, she also believed that
metempsychosis liberated human beings from unnatural beliefs in human inequality
and offered the true religion that would unite Christians, Jews, and Muslims. Who can
believe in spiritual inequality when we have all been everyone? In Conway, a protodemocratic politics, a regard for the immanent world rather than the transcendent one,
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and a materialist ontology emerge from, not in spite of, the metaphysical doctrines of
preexistence and transmigration.
My third chapter, “Visions of Eternal Being in Thomas Traherne’s Writing,”
shows how Traherne uses his visionary writings on the subject of preexistence in
order to challenge the metaphysical solidity of the Platonic world-picture. Traherne
invokes another explanation for his higher states of consciousness—those moments of
recall that enthused Plotinus—that does not the recreate the logic of high and low, or
the need of special inspiration for the individual. For Traherne, the appearances of
objects in themselves present themselves as the highest form of being. Thus, for
Traherne, the world, merely existing on its own terms, occupies the privileged place
in an ontology that can no longer be called metaphysical. Patiently describing such
moments when the soul—what that is Traherne does not say—becomes subject and
object of mental experience simultaneously, Traherne reaches toward an ontology of
immanence and a view toward reality that can best be called aesthetic.
In Chapter Four “Gnostic Deists: Preexistence after Milton,” we shall see that
the author of the Milton imitation, Præexistence (1714), combines a metaphysical
belief in the preexistent soul with hostility toward Christian theology. The author of
Præexistence takes up the Deist conclusion that Christianity is a myth, but he does not
therefore abandon his Platonic metaphysics. Confronted with the Deist challenge to
authority, the author reformulates his own theology based upon the poetry of John
Milton. By challenging Milton in his search for a more just theology, the author also
applies skepticism toward the most basic Christian claim about the resurrection of
Christ, on which the whole Church is based. By presenting life as unredeemed
suffering, emblematized by the preexistent soul stuck in a body, the author approaches
something like the Gnostic critique of the Platonic world-picture. Ancient critics of

17
the Christian Church, the Gnostics offered an alternative theology that, without
changing the metaphysical architecture, flips the Platonic world-picture and looks at
the “high ones” from below. After Milton, and after Deism, preexistence becomes a
form of Gnosticism, a challenge and not a ballast to the Christian worldview.
An archaic survivor of pagan and early Christian theology, preexistence
represents the worldview of the old metaphysics par excellence—upholding a strict
dualism, belief in supernature and the spiritual transcendence of historicity. But in the
work of the thinkers studied in this dissertation, it can be seen struggling with and
against a large array of successors, including the worldview of materialistic natural
science and a theory and practice of poetry from which the possibility of divine
inspiration is excluded. The metaphysical defenders of preexistence are by no means
the engine of these intellectual changes, but they attempt to reconcile the old
metaphysical dualism with the cutting-edge of scientific and philosophical thought. In
the process, they demonstrate both the possibilities and limitations of dualistic
spirituality in a world driving increasingly toward materialism. Moreover, through the
image of a semi-divine spirit orphaned in a dark material world, these authors
articulate in nascent form a reckoning with the disenchantment of the human world,
the sense that the world has no respect for human meanings. In this respect,
preexistence approaches something like modern existentialism, the goalless and
perhaps hopeless striving of a creature that has no choice but to create its own
meaning in a meaningless world. Preexistence is the last ember of the philosophical
and literary dispensation of Platonism, and by the early eighteenth century, that light
was finally squelched, but not before leaving a subterranean mark upon what became
the secular theological imaginary. Metaphysical though they are, these ideas are
deeply human means of contextualizing our lives into narratives of cosmic importance
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that do not require us to abandon human freedom in favor of divine authority. The
stories we tell light our ways into the future; these authors lit themselves a bright
candle.
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Chapter One
Henry More and the Possibility of Metaphysical Poetry

The Mind, then, is not separated off from God’s essentiality, but is united unto it, as
Light to Sun.
This Mind in men is God, and for this cause some of mankind are gods, and their
humanity is nigh unto divinity.

-The Divine Pymander1

Introduction
Philosopher Henry More (1608-1674) introduced the doctrine of the soul’s
preexistence to England during the latter half of the Civil Wars, a time when Calvinist
religious leaders set the theological tone for More’s native Cambridge and the country
at large. More’s commitment to preexistence has been read as an attempt, in Robert
Crocker’s words, to offer a challenge to the doctrinaire Calvinism of his period. Built
with assumptions about the goodness of God, the free will of the human soul, More’s
theology of preexistence challenges much of what seemed frightening and oppressive
about Calvinist theology to the young philosopher.2 Yet More’s resistance to the
orthodox Calvinism of his period is not a clerical disagreement about God’s essential
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attributes or even about controversial points of theology like predestination. More’s
heterodoxy of preexistence is stranger and more radical than scholars have yet
realized. It is also more textured, since More presented the idea not in abstract
treatises but in poems and literary dialogues, genres that display, beneath their
relatively orthodox surface, more complex, compelling, and even blasphemous
messages that reached their audience of religious enthusiasts and radicals. More’s
theology of preexistence indeed challenges Calvinism, but moreover contains a
deeper resistance to Christian principles of salvation by Christ and the created, limited
nature of the human soul. Behind the veneer of a clerical quibble about the attributes
of God, More expresses a spirituality of human apotheosis, in which the soul of the
philosopher is the equal of God himself.
More’s enormous collection of poetry called the Psychodia Platonica, or The
Platonick Song of the Soul, is almost unknown to literary scholars and for good
reason. It is a dense, careful, slightly eccentric exposition of the metaphysics of soul
recounted in Plotinus’s Enneads, comparable to Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology
of the Immortality of the Soul and to the much earlier work of the same title by
Proclus. One comprehensive treatment of this work exists, together with a critical
apparatus. This work’s author, Alexander Jacob, is almost as good a student of
Plotinus as More, and his exposition of More’s poem is itself towering and difficult
for the student of literature.3 For the interested reader, More’s poems, while difficult,
reward reflection on their several memorable moments of energy and spontaneity.
When More pauses from exact explanation and draws an image or invokes a muse,
the writing concentrates close to its subject. William B. Hunter first drew attention to
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More’s best image in The Præexistency of the Soul. At this moment in the poem,
More has been arguing the soul’s preexistence on the basis of the soul’s indivisibility;
making one soul out of two, he explains, requires a little piece of each breaking off,
which is impossible. He writes that “who thinks from souls new souls to bring /
Should grasp the sun and squeeze out drops of light.”4 This image is no doubt
memorable, but more than that, behind it presses the need for metaphysical exactitude
that governs all More’s thought in his explicitly philosophical statements. Somehow
the image is meant to link to the thought.
The best comparison for More regarding the relation of philosophical and
poetic practice is Lucretius, a philosopher he quotes in the addendum to his long
poem.5 Like More, Lucretius makes a poem out of an argument—incidentally the
opposite argument, for materialism rather than dualism—but the poetry emerges in
the examples, analogies, and images of his great poem. It is no less a philosophical
argument for that. The weight of metaphysical reality accompanies Lucretius’s
statements, poetry as both argument and example of his materialist ontology. Though
More’s poems are much more uneven than Lucretius’s, comparable images burst
forth, like the sunlight image. Moreover, images link together, because More again
conceived of the entities involved as metaphysically real. What is “like” is
mysteriously close to its ideal. Fire is like the soul, and neither is more or less real,
nor from the proper standpoint, more or less tangible. More believed he could capture
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the soul in Robert Boyle’s vacuum tube, and when he writes about the soul, his words
crawl with a sense of its nearness and presence.6
The internal landscape of his poetry reflects a complete metaphysical
worldview, largely that of Plotinus, and this consistency is an explicit and obvious
goal of his writing. The assumptions behind the ideas and images remain stable, even
“static,” as Ryan Netzley has called Neoplatonism.7 More misses no important
Neoplatonic principle.8 This stability and cohesiveness make every deviation from the
worldview of Plotinus of crucial importance. The moments of interruption break this
explanatory frame and make an image that should be an example into a counterexample, even a wild aberration. These moments require literary analysis to break the
images from their static framework and turn this internal Neoplatonic furniture on its
ends. Such moments of excess become in More a secret, something kept away from
the main argument, even violently excluded from it, or repressed.
Gerard Passannante believes in a repressed element in More’s philosophical
poetry, but he thinks the repressed element is a secret inclination toward Lucretius’s
materialist metaphysics, which More believed atheistic.9 There is support for this
view in his quotation from Claudian recalled from his time as an adolescent full of
doubt
John Henry, “Henry More versus Robert Boyle: The Spirit of Nature and the Nature
of Providence,” from Henry More (1614-1687) Tercentenary Studies ed. Sarah
Hutton, Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990.
6
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Oft hath my anxious Mind divided stood;
Whether the Gods did mind this lower World;
Or whether no such Ruler (Wise and Good)
We had; and all things here by Chance were hurld.10
The very presence of this quotation, however, indicates that More believed
Lucretius’s materialism to be a depressing likelihood. While Lucretius is what More
feared becoming, there was also something he repressed because he knew he wanted
it too much. That something could have many names, prophet, seer, even magus. The
most precise name for this desire is “enthusiast.” More wanted to be filled with God
and to speak with the divine voice. An indication of his prophetic intentions is his
report of smelling sweetly at all times, a sign of medieval saintliness. More was
always pushing the boundary of prophecy, pressing ever further toward the possibility
of being an agent of the supernatural. In later life, he admitted to having “a touch of
enthusiasm,” an admission that would have seemed mild to his polemical opponents.11
Hovering at the edge of the gothic Plotinian cosmic architecture of his poems is a
spirit of deliberate madness, the chanting prophet filled up by God. This ambitious,
wild spirit takes the form of the soul’s preexistence and crystallizes in exactly the
chain of images that disrupt the stability of the internal landscape of his poems.
More based all of his Philosophical Poems on the model of Spenser’s Faerie
Queene. In The Prӕexistency of the Soul, More borrows Spenser’s narrative of
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romance entrelacement, and this narrative enriches the story of the soul More found in
Plotinus. In this enriched version, More populates the poem with metaphors and
images drawn in Spenserian style, and these literary devices in turn express the ideas
and tendencies of Hermes Trismegistus’s Divine Pymander. While Plotinus’s
Enneads provides the poem’s explicit content, the Faerie Queene provides the poem’s
literary style, and More’s borrowings from the Faerie Queene cloak his deeper
borrowings from the Divine Pymander. By a set of metaphorical alignments, More
coordinates the soul’s nature with the “very essence” of God. Contrary to the sense
maintained by scholars, and contrary to More’s own explanations, More’s belief in
preexistence testifies to his unformed inkling that the soul is indeed a divine agent,
that it communes eternally with divine truths, and that in its proper aspect it needs no
intermediaries furnished from the social or religious order. While the poem presents
itself as a rational account of the soul's preexistence and descent into matter, its
exuberant and sexualized “imaginations” betray More as having sympathies with an
enthusiastic interpretation of the soul as a divine agent. The Prӕexistency of the Soul
shows that More maintains sympathy with the Hermetic doctrine of the soul’s divine
nature, a doctrine that drew More near to enthusiasm. More’s special relationship with
enthusiasm—defined in the period as self-authorization through direct divine
inspiration—emerges from this belief in a divine soul. The soul of the philosopher,
like the soul of the enthusiast, is touched with divine fire to speak the highest truths.
This extravagant role for the philosopher culminates in what More’s contemporaries
called “Philosophical Enthusiasm.”

I. More’s Enthusiasm and the Nature of the Soul

25
Henry More distinguished himself from so-called “philosophical enthusiasm”
partly because his own philosophy, an esoteric syncretic Neoplatonism, invited
unflattering comparison with it. With its image of the solitary philosopher communing
with divine truths, Platonic theology appeared to bypass hierarchy and orthodoxy and
focus on a deified personal soul, an implication More sought to deny by attacking
other Platonists whose philosophical interests bordered on the occult. In the 1650s,
More found himself in a polemical debate with Thomas Vaughan (1621-1666),
brother of poet Henry Vaughan and a Platonic philosopher with magical aspirations.
More criticized Vaughan for sullying the name of Platonism by confusing his
“intemperies of bloud and spirit” with a genuine Platonic inspiration, thereby
encouraging the belief that Platonism and enthusiasm meant the same thing. For
More, Vaughan is an enthusiast, a magician, and one who flirts with enthusiasm by
his extreme claims to personal divine knowledge and his acknowledgment of no
legitimate authority except God himself.12 More later bound his two polemics against
Vaughan into his Enthusiasmus Triumphatus (1656), a work that synthesizes More’s
distinction between his own philosophical art, grounded in reason and a purified
mind, and the mystical, supposedly inspired thinkers whom More criticized as
enthusiasts and mystics.
“Philosophical enthusiasm” was an explicit concern of More throughout his
career. In his Enthusiasmus Triumphatus, More defined “Philosophical enthusiasm”
as the result “Melancholy” and “Philosophical complexion” leading to a personal
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belief on the philosopher’s part that he or she has “so special an assistance and
guidance” from God “that every fine thought or fancy that steals into their mind, they
may look upon as a pledge of the Divine favor, and a singular illumination from
God.”13 Though More carefully tried to disentangle his own philosophical Platonism
from Vaughan’s, to Meric Causabon Platonism seemed almost synonymous with
“philosophical,” or as Causabon called it, “Contemplative enthusiasm.” Causabon’s A
Treatise concerning Enthusiasm (1655) critiques the entire “Mystical Theology,”
Platonic in origin, as “the invention of Heathen Philosophers” and incompatible with
Christian theology.14 Causabon further describes “Philosophical Contemplation,” by
which he means “intellectual pleasures and contentments, proceeding from the
elevation of the mind above ordinary worldly objects” toward contemplation of things
natural, and supernatural” as a kind of enthusiasm.15 His critique, however, is mild,
and he suggests that the feeling of rapture comes from the powers of philosophical
writers, especially Plato, who possesses “some excesse of natural wit and vigor,
beyond ordinary men.” At its worst, contemplative enthusiasm leads to the
propagation of “the abortive fruits of [] depraved phansies, unto others.”16 To
Causabon, Platonic contemplative enthusiasm consists in a tendency to trust one’s
own fancy, though it is naturally inspired by the beauties and sublimity of Plato’s
language and thought.
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This high-flown rhetorical style certainly appears in More’s writing, but
moreover More’s philosophical theology redefined the nature of the soul, on the
definition of which associations with enthusiasm turned. For More and his
contemporaries, the nature of the soul was the nature of the human person, and
defining that nature meant scoping out the soul’s goodness or evil, its capacity or
incapacity, and its reliance on mediators such as church and state. Key and contested
philosophical texts opened the question of whether the soul is of the very same nature
as God or is a subsidiary, created being an infinite distance below its creator. The
influential French reformer Jean Calvin called the soul “an immortal though created
essence,” carefully distinguishing the nature of the soul from the nature of the God
who created it. The soul is made in the image of God, but has no relationship to God
in essence: “To lacerate the essence of the Creator, in order to assign a portion to each
individual, is the height of madness.” For Calvin, the soul is not a “piece” of the
divinity, but a created, limited essence.17 Thus, the soul could be “depraved” and
require, as much as the body, the salvific power of Christ through the sacraments.
Through Calvin’s influence on the English Church, this idea formed the orthodoxy
against which writers like More responded.
By contrast, the ideas found in the Hermetic corpus, especially the Divine
Pymander, acclaimed the soul in terms that for Calvin and his followers would have
bordered on blasphemy. The legendary divine philosopher Hermes Trismegistes
declared the soul to be “of the very essence of God, if yet there be any essence of
God…not cut off or divided from the essentiality of God, but united as the light of the
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Sun.”18 In this influential image, Hermes appropriates the language of emanation—the
idea that creation flows naturally from the creator’s nature—to the idea of God’s
essence as sunlight. As philosophers of the period realized, sunlight is not “an image”
of the sun, but the sun’s very essence extended through space. Thus, for Hermes, the
soul was divine. Hermes’s claim, which could hardly have been put in stronger terms,
generated a negative response from Presbyterian preacher John Flavel in 1685: “An
high-born creature [the soul] is, but no particle of the deity.”19 Though many
philosophers in the period borrowed freely from the Hermetic corpus, they often
tempered or diluted his extravagant claim about the soul’s divine nature. The
philosopher Nathaniel Culverwell saves Hermes from blasphemy by maintaining that
the great philosopher only meant for the soul to be a “dilation and diffusion” of God’s
essence, not the divine essence itself.20 Unusual among seventeenth-century
interpreters of Hermes, Agricola Carpenter, in his appropriately named
Pseuchographia anthropomagica: or, a Magicall description of the Soul (1652),
shows willingness to follow Hermes’s metaphor to its conclusion: since Hermes
“conceives the Soul a drop of Gods essence and an invisible Ray of the first
Luminarie,” he “thereby imagin[es] a divine soul, since a drop of the infinite divine
essence must itself be infinite.”21 Such forthright declarations of the soul’s divinity
were daring, scarce, and controversial.
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This Hermetic encomium for the soul’s divine nature resembled the
enthusiasm of More’s polemical enemies. If the soul is “of the very essence of
God…not cut off or divided” from the divine nature, then it is unclear why the soul
should need the salvific help of Christ, the institutions of the church, or even the
external Scriptures to live a full or holy life. The soul need only commune with its
own nature, which is “of the very essence” of the God before which Christian
theology demands the soul must humble itself. Mediators of all kinds, social, political,
and religious, become unnecessary, and the soul resembles a kind of surrogate God.
Admirers of Hermes defused his provocative image of the soul’s nature precisely
because it strayed into the realms of enthusiasm where, if the text were not handled
carefully, one’s orthodoxy and submission to authority became suspect.
Unsurprisingly, the magician Vaughan showed no compunction about claiming and
elaborating this divine nature of the soul. In his Anthroposophia Theomagica he
extravagantly describes the soul’s progress from premortal birth into the world: “I
look on this life as the Progresse of an Essence Royall: the Soul but quits her court to
see the countrey. Heaven hath in it a Scene of Earth; and had she been contented with
Ideas, she had not travelled beyond the map.”22 In this metaphor borrowed from
Donne’s First Anniversarie, Vaughan depicts the soul as a sovereign who ventures to
the earth not because of punishment but to better know the lands already under its
dominion.23 With his aspirations to magic, Vaughan envisages a soul with a
monarchical lineage, “royal blood,” and a substantial divine knowledge from its
preexistent birth in heaven. Vaughan’s concept of the soul needed no accommodation
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from priest or text, and he acknowledged as his spiritual authorities only Cornelius
Agrippa and God, a bold claim in the polemical, heretic-seeking environment of midcentury theological debate.24
Though he shared Vaughan’s belief in the soul’s preexistence, Henry More did
not explicitly claim this divine lineage of the soul, likely for the inevitable
associations with enthusiasm it would provoke. His arguments for the soul’s
preexistence avoid the Hermetic, “royal” language, with its associations with
blasphemy and enthusiasm, and instead focus on the nature of God and his
motivations in creating human beings. More consistently couches his argument for the
soul’s preexistence not primarily in the soul’s nature, but in the nature of God. Since
God always does what is best for his creatures, he must have created them first in the
most perfect imaginable state, which for the Platonist More meant as pure spirit. More
rehearsed this argument for preexistence in several works throughout his life, starting
with The Prӕexistency of the Soul. Existence being better than non-existence, a
perfectly good God must have created humans at the earliest possible date. “If it be
good for the Souls of men to be at all, the sooner they are the better,” More writes in
his magnum opus, The Immortality of the Soul (1659), “[w]herefore the Præexistence
of Souls is a necessary result of the Wisdome and Goodness of God, who can no more
fail to doe that which is best, then he can to understand it.”25 Unlike Vaughan, More
presented this argument without further implications about the soul’s powers or
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lineage; in so doing, he erred on the side of caution and attempted to establish his own
border between heterodoxy and heresy.
Scholars discussing More’s doctrine of preexistence have suggested other
explanations for More’s strange belief.26 Most of these reasons are nevertheless
compatible with the argument offered by More himself. Cassandra Gorman has said
that More’s early poetry reflects a desire “to reconcile oneself…to human and cosmic
conditions.”27 The phrase “to reconcile” is telling, for the poetry has been read as
emerging directly from More’s own “skeptical crisis.”28 In his biography of More,
Robert Crocker has argued that More’s “conversion” to Platonism came from this
crisis of knowledge and the fear of annihilation at death that More described later in
his general introduction to his complete works.29 In Crocker’s account, this
conversion to Platonism is really a conversion to the religio-philosophical thought of
Plotinus, whose influential metaphysics assumed Christian orthodox coloring by the
writings of Saint Augustine. These interpretations fix More’s thought in relation to
relatively orthodox figures and common trends in mid-century philosophical thought,
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and while they play down his most important influence, they also defang his esoteric
blasphemy.
Contrary to other scholars’ suggestions, More’s belief in preexistence flowed
from his investment in the conception of the divine soul by Hermes Trismegistus, the
great magician and prophet of his esoteric sect. More’s Platonic turn of the late 1630s
should equally be seen as a conversion to Hermes. One simple proof of this lies in
More’s regular list of famous believers in preexistence throughout history, which
notably features Hermes and the other apocryphal Egyptian sages: “In Egypt, that
ancient Nurse of all hidden Sciences,” he writes in his Immortality of the Soul, “that
this Opinion was in vogue amongst the wise men there, those fragments of Trismegist
doe sufficiently bear witness…of which Opinion not onely the Gymnosophists and
other wise men of Egypt were, but also the Brachmans of India and the Magi of
Babylon and Persia.”30 More was an admirer of Hermes, even after the latter’s
exposure as a composite of several 1st century writers rather than an authority older
than Moses. As seen in the above quotation, More’s appreciation for Hermes was part
and parcel of his unique, and unfashionably late, belief in a prisca theologia. Prisca
theologia is the belief in a long tradition of philosophers, poets, and religious writers
that together pass down a set of beliefs common to Judaism, Christianity, and
paganism. For More, as for others, Hermes sat at the head of this tradition, along with
Moses and Zoroaster, and in his writings More frequently borrows Hermetic ideas and
images.
The Divine Pymander is a particularly important piece of the Hermetic Corpus
for More. Believed to be the work of Hermes Trismegistus, a mythic philosopher-
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king, it was really a production of first-century Platonists, as the polymath Isaac
Causabon exposed by philological research in the early seventeenth century.31 In
1650, John Everard offered the most important translation in early modern England,
but More knew the Pymander in the larger Latin corpus translated first by Marsilio
Ficino. Like several of the other Hermetic works, the Pymander is an oration,
presumably from Thrice-Great Hermes himself, to his son Tat, who occupies a place
with Socrates’s interlocutors as one of the great yes-men of philosophical dialogues.
In this work, the author lays out the Hermetic philosophy, especially the nature of the
soul, or mind, and its relation to God. It is better to say, its identity with God, for as
Hermes expresses
The Mind, O Tat, is of God’s very essence—and what that is, it and it
only knows precisely.
The Mind, then, is not separated off from God’s essentiality, but is
united unto it, as Light to Sun.
This Mind in men is God, and for this cause some of mankind are
gods, and their humanity is nigh unto divinity.32
“Some of mankind are gods,” because “the mind…is united” to God’s
essence, as “Light to Sun.” This metaphor of a ray of light striking out from a sun
directly connects the essence of the human soul to the essence of the divine creator—
unites them, in fact. Exposing the logic of this metaphor, More’s contemporary
philosopher Nathaniel Culverwell writes “[H]e that thus termes [the soul] a ray of
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Divinity may as well call it a Sun, for there are no particles in essentials.”33 In The
Præexistency of the Soul, More exactly reproduces this Hermetic metaphor about the
soul. After asking the “Divine Plotinus” what we are, More responds, “A spark or ray
of the divinity.” The reproduction of the Hermetic metaphor indicates More’s debt to
the long tradition and his adherence to Hermes’s most extravagant claim about the
soul’s divine nature. In his poem on preexistence, More takes up exactly that image
that marked his enthusiastic enemies as beyond the pale, and in the process, he
ambiguously commits his philosophy to a version of their philosophical enthusiasm.
While the Divine Pymander influences the imagery of the Prӕexistency of the
Soul, Plotinus’s Enneads IV. 8 “On the Descent of the Soul” provides the narrative
More follows.34 Plotinus’s narrative of incarnation is simultaneously a metaphysical
and moral account, a story of the soul’s descent to matter simultaneous with a
narrowing of its moral focus and capacity. In heaven all the created souls remain with
“the universal soul” and “share in its government, like those who live with a universal
monarch and share in the government of his empire.” When the souls begin to slip off
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from their original created state, “they change from the whole to being a part and
belonging to themselves, and, as if they were tired of being together, they each go to
their own.” The souls separate and narrow their intellectual focus on merely their own
experience, their own pleasure; thus, as he says famously, the soul “has become a part
and is isolated and weak and fusses and looks towards a part and in its separation
from the whole it embarks on one single thing from everything else.” The soul
becomes a fragment looking at a fragment, rather than a whole sharing in a whole. A
moral fall becomes a physical fall, as the soul acquires corporeality as a result of its
focus on the individual. Even so, “our soul does not altogether come down, but there
is always something of it in the intelligible; but if the part which is in the world of
sense-perception gets control…it prevents us from perceiving the things which the
upper part of the soul contemplates.” Interestingly, Plotinus’s conception of a soul
descending to matter corresponds to the descent from intellectual contemplation when
the philosopher saw “a beauty wonderfully great and felt assurance that then most of
all I belonged to my better part,” such that he came “to identify with the divine.”
From this height, Plotinus felt himself to descend from “Intellect to discursive
reasoning,” a practice that images in microcosm the soul’s original journey from
bright creation in heaven to material existence.35
The Præexistency of the Soul fleshes out the narrative given by Enneads IV.8.
In Spenserian stanzas, the poem narrates the cosmic journey of the soul from heavenly
creation to corporeal life, followed by a considerable digression on the nature of
immaterial substances and magic, before offering a series of arguments on behalf of a
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belief in the preexistence of souls. As in Plotinus’s narrative, the souls of human
beings are created as pure spirit, but as they become both more interested in the
created world and themselves, they become increasingly corporeal until they find
themselves born into a life on earth. More than half the poem is spent on More’s
descriptions of the magical spirits that inhabit the air. As Hunter points out, this
seeming digression has an argumentative thrust. Through the poem’s first half, More
has traced the soul from its earliest origins to the present world, and the digression on
magical spirits shows that the soul can indeed survive without a body, another
argument for the soul’s preexistence.36 The final portion of the poem contains abstract
arguments for More’s position, and in these arguments, just as in the narrative of fall
to corporeal life, More borrows characteristically Hermetic imagery that points to
More’s belief in the divine soul. These metaphorical images are drawn not merely
from Hermes himself but from the Faerie Queene, a text that helped More interpret
and combine the rival depictions of the soul he found in the Enneads and the Divine
Pymander.

II. Romance and the Soul
Fellow Platonist Peter Sterry remarked that More’s theory of the preexistence
of the soul involved human life in a narrative of birth, exile, and renewal much like
those depicted in the epics of Homer or Virgil, or in the romance epics of Tasso,
Ariosto, and Spenser, where “persons and things be carried to the utmost extremity,
into a state where they seem altogether uncapable of any return to Beauty or Bliss:
That then by just degrees of harmonious proportions, they be raised again to a state of

36

Hunter, The English Spenserians, 9.

37
highest joy and Glory.”37 Sterry’s comment is acute, for Spenser’s The Faerie Queene
played an important part in More’s conversion to Platonism and Hermeticism.38
Spenser’s poetic genre, the romance epic, provides a narrative model that enriched the
narrative of the soul’s origin that More read in Plotinus. The narrative of fall from
original state of family connection into estrangement resembles the many plots of
Spenser’s poems, drawing out that special narrative Freud called the “family
romance.” In stories of transitions to adulthood, the child fantasizes that their
biological parents actually adopted them, while their true parent is the king, the
emperor, or one of the gods. “Men are more what they are used to, than what they are
born to; for custom is a second nature,” writes More’s contemporary and mentor
Benjamin Whichcote.39 The fantasy of the preexistent soul allows More to imagine
the opposite: birthright alone matters and all the customs and nurture of parents and
community distract the soul from recognizing its true, sublime ancestry. In a
magnificent atomistic world, the soul has an umbilical connection to the birth of the
universe, even to God himself. The tragedy of life is that “we as stranger Infants
elsewhere born / Cannot divine from what spring we did flow, / Ne dare these base
alliances to scorn.”40 In More’s poem, the soul is impelled to recognize not just its
creation by an omnipotent God, but its familial relation to that God, a relation that
implies genetic similarity and that greatly ennobles the created soul.
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More carefully pursues this family metaphor. While Thomas Vaughan
imagines the soul’s descent to earth as a royal progress—“I look on this life as the
Progresse of an Essence Royall”—More imagines the same process as the loss of a
foundling raised by “foster parents” that represent the material world. Vaughan’s
explicitly royalist imagery stands in contrast to More’s Spenserian and
psychologically freighted fantasy of a family romance. In More’s cosmology, the soul
does not voluntarily leave heaven but is permitted by God to depart so that it may
return with more admiration at a later point. Nevertheless, something of Vaughan’s
extravagance animates More’s sense that the soul’s lineage is illustrious. Like the
heroic wanderers of epic and romance, the soul in More’s cosmology receives a
glorious, aristocratic pedigree, the seal of its destiny. More depicts the soul’s descent
to earth in dynastic or patrilineal terms:
Like noble babe by fate or friends neglect
Left to the care of sorry salvage wight,
Grown up to many years cannot conject
His own true parentage, nor read aright
What Father him begot, what womb him brought to light.41
Like Spenser’s Arthur, a knight of unknown parentage who discovers his
royal lineage, the soul in More’s cosmology does not know the eminent lineage from
which it descends: “So we as stranger Infants elsewhere born / Can not divine from
what spring we did flow.”42 The soul becomes involved in its new physical
surroundings, a process that More casts as an unwitting aristocrat’s choice of marriage
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with someone beneath his station; the soul does not “dare these base alliances to
scorn.”43 The term “alliance” implies a marriage of convenience or political
advantage. In the physical world, the migrant soul, a native aristocrat born to better
things, has no choice but to protect itself by entanglement with the physical, a “base
alliance” beneath the dignity of its blood. More indulges here in two separate
fantasies, a dream of being born without a mother, begot by a single Father in a womb
outside the world, while at the same imagining this material world as an intermediary
zone, a wilderness that the noble soul would and should spurn, marked as the place of
“base alliances” with unworthy mates.
There is an oedipal component in the imagery of rejecting one’s earthly
parents in favor of a divine Father. More’s allegory of mistaken parents resonates in
his own life. More’s own parents felt strange to him in some ways. Devout Calvinists,
they were distant from him in temperament as well as religious and political
inclination. To defend his belief in innate ideas, More would later assume that he
received them not from his parents but from God who had planted them there. He
added against the deniers of innate ideas, “if these cunning Sophisters shall here reply;
that I drew this Sense of mine ex Traduce, or by way of Propagation, as being born of
Parents exceedingly Pious and Religious, I demand, how it came to pass that I drew
not Calvinism also in along with it?”44 The choice of “ex Traduce” aligns More’s
rejection of traduction with his rejection of his parents’ religious faith and
temperament. In oedipal fashion, like the protagonist of Milton’s Samson Agonistes,
who describes himself as a “nursling” of God, More’s soul rejects his earthly parents
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in favor of a divine parentage.45 More describes the soul’s foster state under Rhea and
Pan, each allegorically aligned to the physical world and Pan to the cosmos through
the folk etymology of his name’s derivation from the Greek “all.” Against these false
parents, the soul should recognize its status as “the Of-spring of all-seeing Jove.”46
The soul’s recognition of its divine parentage prompts reflection on its own
nature. As the offspring of God, the preexistent soul is the expression of God’s own
desire. The soul shoots forth from God as from a light. The soul is the first created
thing in the universe, and when Moses describes the creation of light on the first day,
he means the soul’s creation: “By Heaven or Light, you are to understand The whole
comprehension of Intellectual Spirits, souls of men and beasts, and the seminal forms
of all things which you may call, if you please, The world of Life.”47 In a striking
image, More dares his philosophical opponents, those who believe in the propagation
of souls by traduction, to imagine themselves capable of that first creative action of
God: “who thinks from souls new souls to bring / The same let presse the Sunne
beams in his fist / And squeez out drops of light.”48 More’s dare is not the utter
contradiction it appears, for he suggests that God himself emitted human souls as
“drops of light,” for the human being is “A spark or ray of the Divinity…spilt on the
ground, or rather sunk away.”49 Vitality is conceived as male sexual emission in the
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form of light. Following the imagistic network of the poem, the human soul is God’s
discharge, a tightly squeezed ball of light spilt on the ground like seed in
masturbation. God’s seed does not impregnate anything; living beings have no
mother, only a foster-mother “upon [whose] knees we grow.”50 We are dropped onto
the world of nature in a creative act of masturbation. Yet this seminal discharge of
light is only efficacious when performed by the supreme God: “no such use / There is
of humane Sperm. For our free sprite / Is not the kindled seed.”51 We can try to
procreate, but when we try to grasp the sun and “squeez out drops of light,” we
produce a mere nothing, a seed unkindled by the sacred fire. From “that eternall store
/ Of Lives and souls ycleep’d the World of Life…all bodies vital fire derive / And
matter never lost catch life and still revive.”52 Life is a pure force metaphorized as
light and fire, and by being like that first fire, God, the soul participates in the only
being conceived as truly alive: the fire and light of God’s creative emission. The
poem’s imagery blurs those qualities identifiable as the being of God alone and those
of its fiery offspring, the human soul.
Everything good comes from that World of Life, or heaven, which More
imagines as a seedbed. Rather than being a zone of impregnation, heaven is capable of
self-sufficient male propagation, discharging semen as living persons, trillions of
Athenas shot from the mind of Zeus.53 God is a “spring,” the soul a jet of water, but
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also a “spray,” meaning shoot, of God’s “ancient tree.”54 Human life extends in a
single line from this first creation. The image of the “ray” evokes the phallus and
seminal discharge, but also an umbilical connection to God himself. More’s attempt to
imagine a purely patrilineal creation results in a father hermaphroditically conceived
as pregnant and nurturing, a father-mother hybrid:55
the sportful love
Of our great Maker, (like as mothers dear
In pleasance from them do their children shove
That back again they may recoyl more near).56
In the comparison, the “pleasance” of the mother who shoves away her darling
child becomes the love of a Father who sends the souls of human beings into the
darkness, suffering, and finally death of a mortal life. The comparison allows More to
imagine the soul—perhaps even his own soul—exiled because of paternal/maternal
love rather than anger. Distance from God, therefore, indicates not divine disfavor but
divine trust; God sends farthest those whom he most loves and hopes to test. The
comparison between God and a mother evokes biological parents, here explicitly
feminized, transcended by recourse to the divine Father, who also assumes the traits
of a mother in the role of child-rearer rather than progenetrix. The creator/heaven is a
woman’s bosom, the warm space of the original birthplace aligned with maternity.
The poet’s actual mother is transcended in favor of a heavenly father. The warmth
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imagined is only the feeling of the mother; it has none of the mother’s associations
with materiality and corporeality. More’s reading of Hermes Trismegistus exposed
him to this gendered strand of Platonic imagery, “What womb…is fit to bear a
soul?...what breast is able to nourish a soul? who can make sufficient provision for a
soul, but onely that pure and invisible Spirit that shoots them, and darts them into
bodies by his own Almighty power?”57 In the poem God’s unique act of propagation
is a spontaneous and almost violent pseudosexual release.
On the journey through the heavens, the soul is repeatedly attracted to
improper mates. The star-filled cosmos attracts the newly created souls to contemplate
itself rather than the creator whose echoes and glimpses permeate the creation.
Human souls pursue these orbs of light “Like evening flies that busily conspire /
Following a Jade that travail long doth tire, / To seize his nodding head and suck his
sweat.”58 One of More’s attempts at the epic simile, the comparison expresses evident
disgust at the natural world, both for the fly who foolishly seeks to suck the sweat of
the exhausted jade, but also at the jade herself, whose sweaty coat More compares to a
“vitall mire,” a swamp of fleshly life.59 The simile triangulates the starry heavens, the
flesh of an old female horse, and a swampy bed of teeming life. More reverses the
distinctions between the slimy and terrestrial over and against the astral and distant
only to insist that all created matter is repugnant to the heavenly origins of the soul’s
life.60 This repugnance extends to all things bodily, conceived as fleshy, wet, stinking:
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female sexuality transformed into an amorphous zone of derision and fear. This
attraction to the exhausted jade whose flesh the soul seeks to suck is a sin of selfreflexivity, for what the soul seeks in all these encounters with physicality is not
matter but itself. Just as Plotinus described the soul’s voluntary enmeshment in
corporeal life, for More human sin began “when we gan first t’assay / By stealth, of
our own selves something to been.”61 Discovery of individual being—being separate
from God—resulted in human separation from God and descent into sinfulness.
Given the poem’s commitment to seminal imagery, with God’s first act of
creation emitting human souls into life, this stealthy assay with matter conveys the
paranoid anxiety of personal masturbation. Summarizing More’s argument here, Peter
Sterry draws a picture of More’s soul similar to Milton’s Eve gazing like Narcissus at
her reflection in a pool, which in Sterry’s analysis becomes the soul’s body: “In [the
body], as in a clear and chrystalline Glass, the Soul, with ravishing delights, seeth her
self in all her own beauties and sweetnesses…Thus is the Soul tyed by irresistable
Charms to its body.”62 By gazing at its own sweetness, the soul delays and distracts
itself from its proper journey back to God. Whether attached to the soul’s own body
or to the physical world, all such encounters with the fleshy world must be equally
empty, for while the human soul is not quite “something,” the physical world is
absolutely nothing. Given that the human seed is not “kindled” with life-giving power
and matter is dead, even apparently procreative sex is masturbatory. The politics and
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discourse of procreative and nonprocreative sex map paradoxically onto the
contemplative and active life. The latter results only in frustration and selfinvolvement, while the former leads out of itself and to the one genuinely creative
force, God.
More’s metaphysical romance follows the soul’s wandering path from and
back to God. The narrative of the soul is not simply a line in this poem, extending
from God to earth, but a circularity, both on the cosmic and individual scale. At the
cosmic scale, the story of the soul is “A Præexistency of souls entire, / And due
Returns in courses circular,” while in the soul’s journey from heaven to the earth, it
repeatedly gets caught in the circular orbits of the magnetic planets and stars that
attract them on their eventual path to terrestrial birth: “Infinite Myriads undipt as yet /
Did still attend each vitall moveing sphear / And wait their turnes for generation fit.”63
The cosmic story is a series of dizzying (and infinite) gyres inside one of literally
boundless size. The image of circularity, of a natural cycle of soul, lies also at the
heart of More’s conception of the World Soul, in the poem figured as the celestial
“Nemesis,” the autonomous force that sorts souls to their proper places with the
abstract precision of the scientific water cycle.64 Souls do not merely travel up or out
but omnidirectionally: souls travel from heaven to the astral spaces, from there to the
earth, and on death return to circle the aerial regions of earth until such a time as the
Nemesis summons all the souls back to the heavenly realm.
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Amidst this massive cosmos, the only truly living thing is the soul itself, a
“spark or ray of the Divinity” now “Clouded in earthy fogs, yclad in clay.”65 As
noted, More’s metaphor is drawn directly from the Divine Pymander and partakes of
the variegate ambiguities of the metaphor in its context. The metaphor relates to the
precise question posed by Calvin and the interpreters of Hermes in the seventeenthcentury: is the human soul a subsidiary, created being, or a piece of the divine nature
broken off into individuality? Ambiguity persists between two divergent possibilities:
human beings as mere creations, or human beings as partakers in God’s divinity,
perhaps even in his eternity. A ray implies a common beginning, as well as a point of
departure at which the human soul diverges from its origins in the divine. The idea of
the soul as a ray suggests not just a common ancestry in God, but a common nature.
More would vociferously deny that his lineage of the soul implies a divinity shared
between God and soul, but the imagery of the poem highlights the implication. To be
a child of the Emperor in the family romance is to be the future Emperor oneself. To
be a “ray of the divinitie” is to be an extension of that divinity: an “emanation,” but
also a participant in that same first light. If the sun is made of light, the ray is made of
sun. As Nathaniel Culverwell wrote in seeming exasperation, the soul “cannot have
any of His Essence, unlesse it have all of it. He that calls the creatures a drop in such a
sense, may as well call it a fountain; he that thus termes it a ray of Divinity, may as
well call it a Sun, for there are no particles in essentials.”66 The image’s own internal
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structure demands an identification in substance of the ray with its source, the soul
with God. More’s imagery vacillates: “A spark or ray.” A spark is a flicker from a
fire, in Stoic cosmology the substance of the soul, which was fully divine. A spark is
fire writ small, the fire’s essence distilled, whereas a ray maintains an umbilical
connection to its creation.
Outside of its larger context, the image may seem like a dismissible aspect of
the poem, a Hermetic metaphor used but not emphasized to convey More’s otherwise
Plotinian perspective on the soul’s nature and its descent to matter. Context matters
here, because the image does not stand alone but is integrally connected to the other
details in the poem. The poem’s imagery is more tightly connected than one might
assume from an author better known as philosopher than poet. In the poem,
fatherhood, light, transcendence, penetration, desire, fire, and creation point toward
and confirm each other in the light that each reflects back onto the other. Fatherhood
arises from sexual desire, which is experienced as a form of fire—the heavenly father
is in turn a source of light, a creative force and the essence of human soul, a fire that
in turn spurs the soul’s desire back toward the world’s two great fires and lights, God
and itself. At the level of these images, the poem establishes a reflection between God
and the human soul, which in turn creates a struggle over the proper object of the
soul’s desire, whether God, itself, or the created world. God’s status as creator and his
being as a pure spirit dissolve into the metaphorics of a soul conceived as “a spark or
ray of the divinitie.”
This fantasy of divine resemblance permeates More’s invocation to Apollo,
which opens the poem. Like the soul, the poet’s divine inspiration traces a line from
grimy world back to essential fire. In the language of invocation that begins the poem,
Apollo’s “Treasures of heavenly light with gentle fire” recalls the “spark or ray of the
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Divinity” which we are.67 Inspired poetry uncompacts the immanent, trammeled soul
from its container body, or at least taunts both reader and poet with the possibility of
bodily rupture and the flood of light, like waters, over the entire universe. More
describes the soul as being “Like to a light fast-lock'd in lanthorn dark, / Whereby, by
night our wary steps we guide / In slabby streets... But when she's gone from hence, /
Like naked lamp she is one shining sphear.”68 This imagery makes the body appear
like a trammeling force and the soul an imprisoned energy waiting to escape. “Gods
wisedome thorough all may pierce / From hight to depth,” and as a spark from that
same fire the soul longs to crash thalassic waves of itself over everything that is.69 The
disappearance of God into man’s soul and vice versa indicates the desire to imagine
oneself as purely creative energy detached from the physical world: a floating
masculinity that penetrates everything but is penetrated (in More’s language,
discerped) by nothing, in short, God. The poem’s metaphoric structure bends toward
an identification of the human soul with everything transcendent, with God-like
capacity for vision, thought, and freedom.
For More, God’s capacity for thinking, for moral goodness, and for freedom,
are preeminent among God’s attributes.70 Rather than ultimate power, status as
creator, or eternal sovereignty, these intellectual virtues made God God. These same

67

Præexistency 8.6.

68

Præexistency 101.-3, 102.5-6.

69

Præexistency 9.4-5.

More wrote that “It is an invalid consequence...that the Idea of God does mainly
consist in Dominion and Soveraignty; which abstracted from his other Attributes of
Wisdom and Goodness, would be a very black and dark representation of him, and
such as this ingenious Writer could not himself contemplate without aversation and
horror. How then can the Idea of God chiefly consist in this? It is the most terrifying
indeed, but not the most noble and accomplishing part in the Idea of the Deity.”
(Annotations upon the two foregoing treatises, London, 1682, 42-43)
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virtues belong to human beings, especially to the rationalist philosopher who
conceives God in his own image and himself in the image of God. Deification, the
Platonist aspiration of intellectual communion with God, in More involves a blurring
of those categories such that the poem speaks about both God and the philosopher
simultaneously.71 The referential slippage creates space to imagine divine fruition as
something claimed by the philosopher but also piously deferred to God alone. The
philosopher is not God, but the best aspects of God belong to the philosopher; seen
from a distance, More could mistake himself for God. When Terryl Givens writes that
“Cambridge Platonism inevitably culminates in a recuperation of the Hellenic idea of
deification,” he means something weaker than I intend here.72 This usual sense of
deification entails that the contemplative mind by purification approaches communion
with God and a limited resemblance to him in terms of intellectual powers. As an
excerptable intellectual doctrine, the idea in More is nothing more than this, but in the
poem’s thought-world, God’s being is light and fire, pure creativity expressed as
universal penetration. The soul’s being is nothing less than God’s equal, expressed
with the same metaphors, bent on the same purposes of penetration and creation, and
equally repugnant to everything created.

Frederick C. Beiser is insightful into the importance of reason in More’s
contemporary and mentor Benjamin Whichcote in ways that apply equally to More:
“It is important to see precisely why Whichcote thinks that reason is such a reliable
criterion of salvation. Reason is not obliged to make speculations or inferences about
the divine tribunal, which exists in some heaven above us. Rather, its judgments will
be infallible because it is the divine tribunal itself.” The Sovereignty of Reason: the
defense of rationality in the early English Enlightenment, (Princeton: Princeton U P,
1996), 162. Reason is for More and Whichcote a divine faculty.
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With its Gnostic flirtations, romance structure, and epic voice, The
Præexistency of the Soul demonstrates the doctrine of preexistence’s capacity for
mythologizing in radical and idiosyncratic ways. While the poem’s mainline
argument suggests that the soul turning away from God toward itself is the source of
sin, the poem demonstrates the soul’s desirability through an essence shared with
God, its nature as creative fire and source of light. Even the created universe itself is a
network of lights, the stars, that continually offers a temptation by way of a
resemblance to God and the soul. The Augustinian orthodoxy that God is the proper
object of desire becomes a bare statement, unsubstantiated in the imagistic flesh of the
poetry, as both soul and world continue to accrue likeness to God through metaphor.
The creative force of the soul never achieves positive expression but remains a source
of anxiety and paranoia, prompting paroxysms of fear that cast human sexuality and
desire, whether directed at the outside world or at the soul itself, as an onanistic selfregard, a negative image of the love of the soul for that which is like but superior to
itself, God. The intensity of this self-critique on the soul’s part arises from the
recognition of the similarity of More’s soul to God and a reflexive turning away from
the affective drives operating at the level of image that tend toward their
identification.

III. The Hierarchy of Souls: More and the Response to Preexistence
Though modern critics have failed to recognize the radical, enthusiastic nature
of More’s belief in preexistence, his critics in his own century recognized this and
more. Several brilliant contemporary philosophical critiques, produced in the decades
following the publication of More’s poem, outline the political and religious
implications of the ideas and style of expression found in More’s Præexistency of the
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Soul. These texts show that the intellectual history of preexistence in the seventeenth
century has an unrecognized relationship to enthusiasm. As will be shown, they also
confirm my reading of More’s poetry in its spiritual aspiration and display the
hierarchical, elitist nature of More’s thought about the soul.
Written two decades after The Præexistency of the Soul, Samuel Parker’s two
texts A Free and Impartial Censure of the Platonick Philosophy and An Account of
the Nature and Extent of the Divine Dominion, characterize the orthodox response to
preexistence and recognize More’s tightrope walk with enthusiasm.73 An ambitious
Presbyterian cleric and later conformist Bishop of Oxford, Parker responded critically
to the texts on preexistence by More, as well as his students Joseph Glanvill, and
George Rust. Parker’s reading of More’s philosophy of preexistence supports my
reading of More’s Præexistency of the Soul as indicative of an enthusiastic view on
the soul and a corresponding belief in personal authorization, expressed through
romantic images and metaphors. Though Parker criticized Platonism and preexistence
in separate texts (the Censure and the Account), his arguments hover around the same
issues. Both arguments attack non-uniformity in religion and non-empiricism in
philosophy, especially philosophy that builds elaborate metaphysical schemes. For
Parker, these tendencies characterize enthusiasm, because they suggest a person is
unwilling or unable to be corrected by arguments or the conforming pressure of
society. Ironically, these are exactly the enthusiastic tendencies Henry More criticized
in his writings against Thomas Vaughan. Parker recognized in More many of the
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problems More saw in others. Parker’s criticism demonstrates how More’s
preemptive attack against enthusiasm disguises his attraction to its methods of selfauthorization and confirms that the excesses of his philosophy appeared clearly to his
most critical contemporaries.
Samuel Parker was an ambitious young cleric at Oxford in the mid-1660s,
now twenty years since More published The Præexistency of the Soul. Along with
Edward Warren, Parker responded to the growing diversity of views on psychogenesis
with a negative attack on preexistence and Platonic philosophy in general. The
Cambridge philosophers were his primary targets. His two texts, An Account of the
Nature and Extent of the Divine Dominion and A Free and Impartial Censure of the
Platonick Philosophy are not just powerful philosophical critiques but, in their own
way, astute works of literary criticism. Parker’s analysis of the connection between
romance and Platonic philosophy lays bare the hierarchical thinking that characterizes
the Platonist defense of preexistence from the 1640s to 1660s. Through his adroit
criticism, Parker recognized the enthusiastic nature of More’s philosophy and the
aspiration toward apotheosis characteristic of The Præexistency of the Soul.
Of the two, An Account of the Nature and Extent of the Divine Dominion, is by
far the more conservative and milder of the two attacks against the Platonists. Here
Parker responds to More’s philosophical arguments for preexistence, devolved
through his students Rust and More. Parker’s critique of preexistence centers on
More’s argument about God’s goodness, his necessity to always do what is best for
his creatures, and the corresponding necessity he should have created human beings at
the earliest possible date. Perceiving this belief to be the most pertinent philosophical
defense of preexistence, Parker challenged the supremacy of the goodness of God at
great length, defending the absolute freedom of God as a necessary aspect of his
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dominion over all his creation. He buttressed this theological defense with a political
argument very congenial to the Restoration religious establishment of the late 1660s,
claiming that just as every Englishman “holdeth his Estate of the King, and the right
of all Tenures being derived from his Grant with certain conditions,” so does each
individual hold their own soul and body only on the sufferance of God himself.74
Existence can and will be taken away from everyone as a result of God’s supreme
will. Parker’s argument stakes out a conservative position, Calvinist in its orientation,
by which God’s sovereignty and absolute freedom are held preeminent. Calvin
believed that “[t]he will of God is the supreme rule of righteousness, so that
everything which he wills must be held to be righteous by the mere fact of his willing
it. Therefore, when it is asked why the Lord did so, we must answer, Because he
pleased.”75 Parker adds nuance to Calvin’s extreme position on the priority of God’s
will over the good by suggesting that God’s freedom is necessary for his actions to be
good. A necessitated action being neither good nor bad, God’s freedom to be good or
not is a condition of his goodness. Thus, God is under no necessity to have created
human beings at any particular time, early or late.
While Parker pursues the more abstract arguments against preexistence with
precision, he generalizes and hides his targets when criticizing the enthusiastic
tendencies of Platonism. Parker often accuses the Rosicrucians of the worst excesses
of philosophical, enthusiastic Platonism, though many of these supposed excesses can
be found in More.76 That said, Parker’s targets could not have been mysterious. In the
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Account, he frequently quotes from the work of More’s student Joseph Glanvill, Lux
Orientalis, singling out particular passages for criticism, but does not in this text
accuse the English writers of enthusiasm, merely a failure of argumentation.
However, when Parker criticizes ancient philosophers of enthusiasm and blasphemy,
he opens a subtle line of attack against the English Platonists as imbibers of
enthusiastic writing. The list of ancient and foreign authorities Parker criticizes could
not have made more clear which English Platonists he was reading. They are exactly
those authorities More, Glanvill, and Rust held up as authors of the true theology:
Zoroaster, Orpheus, Hermes Trismegistus, Pythagoras, Apollonius of Tyre, the
Cabbalists, and Pico della Mirandola. Criticizing these writers, who feature in a nearidentical roll-call in each of the English texts defending preexistence, widens Parker’s
critique of enthusiastic Platonism to include More and his disciples.
A Free and Impartial Censure of the Platonick Philosophy more widely
critiques Platonism in terms that extend from the ancient Greek and Roman
philosophers to the modern English Platonists. Parker’s insightful critique in this text
exposes the connection between Platonic speculation about the nature of the soul, the
genre of romance, and philosophical enthusiasm. Platonic philosophers, according to
Parker, arrogate authority to describe the highest beings in precise detail, despite
having no special divine authorization or Scriptural evidence for their claims. These

circumspection or respect for More’s durable reputation as a genuine philosopher,
Parker avoids laying that charge at More’s door, though More speculated and wove
tales about the soul’s aristocratic nature in much the way Vaughan did. Part of this
circumspection may arise from difference in seniority: though eventually Bishop of
Oxford, at the time of these two tracts Parker was twenty-six. While Glanvill was near
his age at thirty, George Rust was about forty, and More (whom Parker would have
known the originator of these arguments) a respected philosopher in his fifties.
Decorum may also have prevented a public dispute, which Parker and Glanvill
considered, until dissuaded by John Beale of the Royal Society.
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philosophers “confidently take upon them to give the world exact and minute
descriptions of Incorporeal Beings” and “discourse about the Substance, Nature,
Properties, Offices, Actions, Orders and Polities of Angels” as if they had seen them
with their own eyes.77 For Parker, this tendency to describe invisible and metaphysical
entities adds up to enthusiasm, since these philosophers can cite no evidence for their
speculations either in Scripture or the authority of the senses. Their authority, Parker
claims, is entirely internal, imagination and personal speculation, rather than an
external standard that could be approved or disapproved by one’s fellows. Parker
compares Platonists both in the method and content of their theology to the
controversial German mystic Jakob Böhme, considered a heterodox if not heretical
thinker even in his own Germany. Parker jokes that to lay out the full Platonist views
“would tempt your gravity (though you were most Stoically morose) much beyond the
essay of a smile, unless perhaps your perusal of Jacob Behem may have prevented
their novelty.”78 The comparison clearly falls to the disadvantage of the Platonists,
who are considered fanciful, singular, and possibly unorthodox. To Parker, the
Platonists are a species of enthusiasts.
Platonists throughout history, according to Parker, have been liars and creators
of romantic fictions and fancies. Parker notes that the Neoplatonists whom writers
like More uphold as philosophical giants were pagans and more than pagan, they were
theurgists who inclined to “Magical Arts, or rather Jugling Tricks,” designed to
deceive the unwary and gratify their own desire for spiritual exceptionalism. Counted
among the ranks of ancient magicians are Iamblichus, Apollonius of Tyre, and all
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those “that did most Pythagorise.” Though More stopped short of commending
theurgy, believing it to be idolatry of a daemon instead of worship of God, he did
borrow the scheme of spiritual creatures from Iamblichus and, with Marsilio Ficino,
asserted that Apollonius of Tyre flew to heaven in a celestial chariot.79 His trust in
Platonick philosophers’ claims to have visited the upper heavens was matched by his
credulity of stories of witches, demons, and the living dead. While Parker had in view
the works of More’s students and More’s own later Immortality of the Soul, had he
examined More’s Præexistency of the Soul, he would have discovered the lengthy
descriptions of supernatural creatures invisible to the eye, complemented by confident
assertions about the nature, location, and history of the immaterial beings—angels,
daemons, and human souls—created by the divine mind.
For Parker, this confidence indicated a spiritual and philosophical
presumption, but also a self-authorization to generate “Romantick” fictions pleasing
to the individual mind and have them pass as true. Parker singles out preexistence for
special criticism in this regard: philosophers also arrogate spiritual authority “[w]hen
they frame particular Hypotheses, not onely of the nature of the Soul but of the
manner of its living, before its lapse into this life, and after its return home again.”80
Preexistence is a singularly “rash and unwarrantable opinion[],” produced without
evidence.81 Parker has cause to explain why these thinkers, who have no evidence to
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do so, believe in preexistence and recommend it to their fellow Christians. The
answer, Parker consistently maintains, is that these individual minds choose to believe
these fictions because they please their romantic imaginations and flatter their sense
of individual spiritual and intellectual merit. Thus, Platonist writers resort to circular
thinking to justify the fancies on which their minds have already taken hold. Parker’s
great example of this is from Plato himself, who according to Parker “abound[s] with
infinite…Circles.” Plato’s Meno “bottomes the Souls Reminiscency…upon its
presupposed Immortality, and yet in his Phaedo, he fairly argues for the Souls
Immortality from its presupposed Reminiscency.”82 If such circles proliferate in
Plato’s writing, according to Parker, they appear even more in his imitators and
admirers.
This circular reasoning leads to metaphoric rather clearly logical expression of
their ideas. “I can easily allow their Discourses the Title of Philosophical Romances,”
he announces, since they are full of “nothing but rampant Metaphors, and Pompous
Allegories, and other splendid but empty Schemes of speech.” Their tendency to write
philosophy with obscure figures of speech, metaphors, allegories, and other conceits
renders them not so much philosophers but “(to say no worse) Poets & Romancers.”83
Parker draws metaphor out for particular criticism. Since the Platonists usually are
speaking about abstract objects that no one has seen or can fully understand,
metaphors that attempt to convey that abstraction via a concrete image are creating an
imaginary object composed of disparate objects from concrete reality. These concrete
realities add up only to a chimera, not a metaphysical reality the Platonist has intuited
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and fleshed out with images, since after all, the objects of the Platonist’s attention—
souls, emanations, and other abstractions—are not observable: “such Discourse must
be Non-sence, and the matter of it must needs be nothing…they that talk thus, do but
first imagine a subject, and then imagine in it some Resemblances to something else,
that is in effect, they make a bauble, and then play with it.”84
Parker’s criticism reveals insightful truth about the nature of metaphor in
More’s writings about the soul. The unobservable nature of the objects that More
discusses means that More might compare his abstract conception of the soul to
almost anything within a range of possible resemblances. His limitations relate only to
his intentions and perhaps to his unconscious biases. When More deploys the
Hermetic metaphor of the soul as “a spark or ray of the divinitie,” he reaches for a
metaphor that intentionally ennobles the image of the soul and that further implies a
shared essence with its source in God. Comparing the soul to light is nothing new,
even outside the tradition of Hermetic writing, but the image of the ray is precise in
the Pymander, conveying the exact substantial relationship between God and its
offspring soul. As Parker recognizes, More’s metaphor connects its semantic elements
in a way that fits More’s own inclinations and tendencies, “impregnating the mind”
with “Phantasmes” that do not reveal but project. What they project is More’s own
desire, not his explicit belief about the soul and God, but his unvoiced aspiration for
the human soul, especially his own.
This self-interest on More’s part is, for Parker, characteristic of Platonism.
Plato’s followers look toward the nature of the mind itself—the nature of their own
mind, since that is the only mind available to them—and derive conclusions from it,
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as if the mind itself were authoritative. To Parker, this self-analysis is not only
wrongheaded, but arrogant and self-interested. Believing themselves to be “pure and
Seraphick Intellectualists,” the Platonists “despise all sensible knowledge, as too gross
and material for their nice and curious Faculties, and disdain to pursue any
knowledge, but what is pure and Intellectual, that is such as is sutable to their refin’d,
and as it were, separated understandings.”85 The Platonists believe their own
understandings “separated” from the rest of the human race, and their tendency to
search their own minds frees them from the dirtiness of materiality and of other, less
pure minds. Parker’s vocabulary of criticism for the Platonists is consistent. He
reverses their belief in their own “refined” and “seraphick” intellect and announces it
to be windy, airy, and mirage-like. “Instead of real conceptions and notices of
Things,” the Platonists’ metaphors “impregnate the mind with nothing but Ayerie and
Subventaneous Phantasmes.”86 The critique reaches More not only in his deeply
intellectualist philosophy, but in his high perch at the Cambridge, though the same
critique of elitism could apply to the learned academic Parker as well.
Another of More’s metaphors, already discussed, reveals this philosophical
and religious elitism Parker discerns in the Platonists. Once again, Parker’s point is
that any image might be used to describe these invisible objects, and thus More’s
choice of image bears particular weight. While describing the soul in metaphor,
More’s poetry unexpectedly grasps the idea that the soul is an aristocratic “babe,” left
to the care of a “sorry salvage wight.” The image turns on a strange contradiction
implied by the metaphorical elements. While More imagines that all souls enjoy the
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same parentage—after all “we were” this same “spark or ray of the Divinity”—he
populates the metaphorical world of his comparison with a “sorry salvage wight” who
cares for the aristocratic soul, a low-class figure drawn from the periphery of
Spenser’s society of romance. On his philosophical scheme, all human beings have
souls with divine lineages, prompting the question of why More fixates on a character
whose “noble blood” is denied. To a critic like Parker, it would have appeared that
More the Platonist is making room for a hierarchy of souls, in explicit contradiction to
Christian theology.
Once again, More’s explicit perspective contains one story, but the more
complicated elements of his imagery and poetic exploration of his ideas tells another.
As previously mentioned, The Præexistency of the Soul includes a lengthy disquisition
in its second half (stanzas 36-84) on witches, evil spirits, and salvation-denied ghosts
floating in the middle air above the world. This “Stygian crue / Of damned wights
made fast by their own bloud / To their bad Master, do his service due,” and in the
process fall by the wayside of human progress toward salvation and return to God’s
heaven.87 Despite More’s optimistic providentialism, his earnest belief that God takes
every opportunity to do his creatures good, his worldview contains a vast number of
creatures that are by their nature evil, damned, and destined for suffering. More’s
poem has the equivalents of Spenser’s Archimago, as well as his Grill, “The walking
Skeleton in Bolonia / Laden with rattling chains, that showed his grave / To
th’watchfull Student,” and “those wicked Hags…whose writhled bags / Fould feinds
oft suck and nestle in their loathsome rags.”88 More’s student Anne, Lady Conway
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pushed him on exactly this point: “How Man can be Restor'd, to what he Fell from;
And why the Devils that Fell, cannot? Why Christ's Death should [sic] Extend more
to One than to the Other?”89
Unlike Conway herself, More does not extend salvation to the Devil for
reasons arguably as much aesthetic as ethical. The belief in witches and ghosts
conforms to More’s sense of a spiritualized world, the latest setting of an episodic
cosmic romance. Every romance needs its villains, and More’s is full of unfortunate
souls destined for no bliss, as well as miscreant willful sinners. This romance began in
heaven and will finish when the soul returns to bliss. Along the way, lesser creatures,
including lesser souls, suffer worse fates, retreating into their mere bodily selves and
never achieving the spirituality that comes from contemplation of God in the inner
soul. These woe-begotten souls, destined never to reach the astral heavens of their
birthplace, appear to be a blemish in More’s otherwise optimistic providentialism, but
in reality they are the spots of darkness that make the varied picture of his romance
achieve the bright colors of glory. In his poetry, More paints a picture of a world with
spiritual haves and have-nots. This spiritual inequality expresses itself in the metaphor
of the “noble babe” through the inappropriate and sudden appearance of the “sorry
salvage wight,” a figure transposed out of Spenser’s own romance that, while
representing the world of matter, confronts the reader’s attention with a logic of high
and low, of a person transcended by the philosopher in his imagined journey toward
spiritual actualization.
More found this dual aesthetic-social vision, with a theory of a hierarchy of
souls, in his reading of Plotinus. In the critical period of the 1640s, when More wrote
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the Præexistency of the Soul, he discovered the Enneads, a text that together with the
Theologica Germanica effected his conversion to philosophical and mystic Platonism.
As mentioned in the introduction, in the Enneads, Plotinus argues that the world made
by God enjoys a variety and fullness that necessitates the mortality and low status of
some beings. The world is full of high and low, and Plotinus insists that the world’s
variety of stations and degrees constitutes a version of aesthetic unity or harmony.
Plotinus’s idea merges aesthetic theory into a cosmic theodicy that is deeply and
explicitly conservative about political and social hierarchies. Plotinus extends this
hierarchical thinking to metaphysical as well as political and social realities: “Souls
vary in worth; and the difference is due, among other causes, to an almost initial
inequality.”90 This belief in the inequality of souls is contrary to the claims of many of
More’s contemporaries, in particular Jean Calvin. For the French reformer, “the
impurity of parents is transmitted to their children, so that all, without exception, are
originally depraved,” a fact that challenges and overcomes the “Pelagian cavil” of the
personal goodness of some.91 Following both More and Plotinus, Peter Sterry
rhapsodized about the inequality of the entire universe, claiming that “[b]eing it self,
in its universal Nature, from its purest heighth, by beautiful, harmonious, just degrees
and steps, descendeth into every Being, even to the lowest shades. All ranks and
degrees of Being, so become like the mystical steps in that scale of Divine Harmony
and Proportions, Jacobs Ladder…full of all Angelick Musick and Beauty.”92 This
idea is nakedly hierarchical, providing an image of degrees of being ascending to the
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One. For Sterry, the “Angelick Musick and Beauty” is effected through a various and
stadial progress of being, the familiar idea of the Great Chain of Being acclaimed as a
positive aesthetic good.
Parker’s critique of Platonism as conveying a secret elitism resonates with this
undertone in Sterry and More of a hierarchy of souls—never stated explicitly, but
allowed as the consequence of a creator who wisely invested being with levels and
degrees. The hierarchical nature of Platonic thinking received criticism from others
who believed they could discern in Platonic aspiration a secret preference for the
souls of the Platonists themselves. More’s direct respondent Edward Warren
complained that More and his fellow Platonists “fetch their rise a great deal higher
[than the earth], and give their origin a far earlier date” and “make them coaeval with
the Angels, and tell us they were once copartners with them in their glories.”93
Spiritual arrogance was a constant complaint against the Platonists from the orthodox,
though the theologically liberal also criticized their presumption of near-divinity. In
1678, the Deist Charles Blount described the pretensions of ancient Platonists in terms
that could nearly apply to the modern English sort: “Many old Philosophers of great
eminency, especially the Platonists in their airy discourses of Human Souls first in
favour of their own, plac’d them in an higher form then those of ordinary persons, and
other Animals, pretending that by frequent Philosophical meditation, they so far
refined themselves, as that after death they remain’d in a kind of Astral, or (as term’d
by later times) Angelical condition.”94
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Blount’s criticism is incisive about the Plotinian devaluation of the souls of
many human beings in favor of the elect few. That same criticism fits More as well.
With his encomium for the soul of Plotinus, mounted on a celestial chariot and borne
out of the world to heaven, More distinguished a place for those select souls “plac’d []
in an higher form then those of ordinary persons.” More builds this sense of the soul’s
nature from his “inward Sense” of his own nature. “[E]ven in my first Childhood,”
writes a much older More, “an inward Sense of the Divine Presence was so strong
upon my Mind [that] I think it is very evident, that this was an innate Sense or Notion
in me.”95 More’s anecdotal evidence for innate ideas is unlikely to convince any but
the already-convinced, and that is precisely his point. His sense of himself is beyond
dispute, a first principle on which the remainder of metaphysics will build. The desire
for abstraction is also a desire for transcendence and penetration, conveying a sense
that the universe corresponds to More’s intuition of it. The cosmic story of the
preexistence of souls fits to More’s own desires and to his sense of himself as a
virtuous, freethinking, and deep-souled knower. More’s poetry drifts toward the literal
apotheosis of the speculative soul, a sense that the philosopher lives a life as spirit to
such an extent that he is nearly divine, above legions of inferiors. The philosopher’s
consciousness dates back almost to eternity, forming a soul that demonstrably exceeds
the created universe and resembles nothing less than the being of God.
More’s message was destined for an elite and met its target in several highlyplaced pupils and disciples, many of whom repeated his arguments for the
preexistence of souls, as well as the extension of spirit, in their own works. Unlike for
the Presbyterians, for More, writing in the Platonic tradition of Erasmus and Lefèvre

95

Richard Ward, Life of Dr. Henry More, Parts 1 and 2, ed. Sarah Hutton,
Dordrecht, Netherlands, Kluwer Academic, 2000.

65
d'Étaples, salvation is a personal matter, and human goodness consists precisely in
individual virtue. “I am above all Sects whatever as Sects,” More writes, “for I am a
true and free Christian; and what I write and speak is for the interest of Christ.”96 His
writings are attuned to the personal, individual expression of faith, neither to the
broad conformity to ecclesiastical authority nor to the radical, liberating potential of
new sects. The politically conservative imagery of The Prӕexistency of the Soul is
consonant with More’s simple, individualist theology. His idea of purification is an
elitist concept that exalts some souls over others and stresses the subjectivity of the
individual perceiver.
This focus on individual soul-formation, imaged by the deified soul in The
Prӕexistency of the Soul, points toward More’s unusual position in relation to both
the high and lower elements of his society. More is not exactly an enthusiast, but the
intellectual position he stakes out eliminates the levels of hierarchy between him and
the divine truth. In a sense, he wants both the protection and appearance of orthodoxy
and submission to hierarchy with a private fantasy of direct contact with the divinity
in his very essential nature. He seeks comfort, wonder, self-knowledge, and hope in
his philosophical vision of a soul descended from primordial bliss to matter. He also
seeks exaltation in his image of a divine soul soaring above mere matter and above
dark and dangerous human and subhuman forces, but he does so within a framework
that, from his perspective at least, preserved him from the claim of enthusiasm. Later
in life, he would admit, according to his biographer “[t]hat he had a Natural touch of
Enthusiasme in his Complexion; but such as (he thanks God) was ever governable
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enough.”97 The diminution of enthusiasm to a “touch” shows that More did not realize
how to integrate this, to him, anomalous part of himself. In The Prӕexistency of the
Soul, More’s philosophy falls into enthusiasm, and through a moment of poetic
expression, substantially merges with it.
The elitist nature of More’s spiritual thinking does not stand in contrast to his
enthusiasm. Rather, as Samuel Parker realized, his elitism and his enthusiasm are part
of the same cord that ties More’s Platonic aspiration for the personal soul. In writings
cloaked by the appearance of orthodoxy and scholarly rigor, More indulges his
fantasy of a divine soul that places human nature in a higher register than Christianity
allows and that places himself above his fellow Christians. In sympathy with Plotinus
and Hermes Trismegistus, More’s poetic expression outlines a philosophy of the
preexistent soul that expresses his own desire for fulfillment and aspiration, one he
must have found frustrated by the Calvinism that characterized the orthodoxy of his
day. His poetic philosophy crosses multiple levels of signification and reference to
become a variegated portrait of a subtle and intuitive mind at work, one that said
much more than his philosophical arguments. His soul reaches beyond the boundaries
of time and space and acclaims itself in the light of its own imagination.

Conclusion
More is something of a transitional figure in early modern intellectual culture,
bridging the old metaphysics of the scholastics and the new experimentalism and
materialism of the Royal Society. More’s philosophical identity seems to flow in both
directions, and yet The Præexistency of the Soul in fact reveals the mystical,
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spiritualist elements of his thought comparable to neither of these familiar intellectual
paradigms. Though More thought himself a rational philosopher, his poem's radical
presentation of Hermetic imagery of the soul undermines his consistent, and orthodox,
picture of himself and suggests that his reasons for believing in preexistence are as
much affective and emotional as sober and rational. More wrote in poetry the excesses
of his thought that he could not announce in prose. This esoteric radicalism should be
seen as the pattern of heterodox writing about preexistence in the period, as many
contemporary readers of More picked up on the radical elements of his thought, even
as his later exegetes have not. More’s critics anatomized his many extravagances and
blasphemies, just as his admirers discerned these and carried them further. In his time,
More was esoterically read, criticized, and interpreted. According to his followers and
critics, the picture of More received from the poem is of a philosopher who seeks to
belong to special, elect group of souls separated off from the rest of humanity by their
intrinsic goodness and higher level of spirituality. This belief in personal election
places More in an ambiguous place between the ruling Presbyterians and the
underclass enthusiasts in the late 1640s.
Moreover, the complex path More’s enthusiastic conception of preexistence
walked through genre, philosophical concepts, and cultural reception maps onto the
larger history of theology through the Civil War period and after. More’s poetic
speculation and easy borrowing from his own imagination and from literature produce
a text and set of ideas that have the cultural markers of authority and religious truth.
More’s text, like his identity as a rational but Platonic philosopher, moves along a thin
line between orthodoxy and heresy, but this line was made possible by several cultural
traditions More himself did not produce. The first was the great opening of the
theological canon authorized by Martin Luther, exemplified in transitional figures like
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the earlier Platonist John Colet. Since Protestant theological custom asserted that
Church theology went wrong at some point in antiquity, Protestant theologians and
scholars relitigated the reputation of particular authors under the cover of restoring
ancient wisdom known to the early Fathers but corrupted by the later. Second and
related is the tradition of prisca theologia, greatly in decline by More’s own time, that
attempts to recreate the prehistoric wisdom of Zoroaster, Moses, and Hermes
Trismegistus, a philosophy that supposedly circulated orally and by hieroglyphs to the
Greeks and the Jews. Contemporaneous with these backward-looking traditions of
historical recreation was the Great Instauration of Francis Bacon, the belief in a new
science and new knowledge forthcoming in the seventeenth century; though Bacon
had particular ideas about what this knowledge would look like, many philosophers
followed him in name and ambition but not in method or temperament, with the result
that a Millenarian like Joseph Mede, Henry More’s and Milton’s tutor, could believe
the new science was a kind of Messianic divine insight rather than an empirical
procedure. When More winds these threads together—along with other discourses and
traditions like alchemy and theurgy that straddle science and prisca theologia—he
asserts the reality and doctrinal orthodoxy of his essentially poetic speculations. He
can write a poem that he believes should be accepted, not merely as a wonderful
artificial creation, Philip Sidney’s golden world, but as an expression of highest divine
truth.
The story of More’s response in the later seventeenth century can be seen as
the unwinding of these divergent threads of legitimation. When More’s Calvinist
opponents Samuel Parker and Edward Warren attack him as an enthusiast, they tear
up the fabric of prisca theologia, the new science, and theological renovation and
recast More’s poetic speculation as out of cultural bounds, even as fanaticism. The
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specific attacks by Parker, the most perceptive of More’s critics, focus on More’s
singularity, his attachment to his own moods and preferences, and above all to his
belief that his own private speculation and imaginary creations could set a standard
for his fellow Englishmen and Protestants. In a wider sense, Parker’s attacks represent
the banishment from the theological mainstream of English Protestantism of
innovative and constructive theology altogether, an attack carried out in institutional
form by the Latitudinarians in the later part of the century and emblematized by King
William’s later legal declaration that no new theological terms could be invented to
describe the Trinity. William’s Toleration Act of 1688 likewise represents, like the
Edict of Nantes in France, the quasi-liberal settlement of “the religious question,” the
banishment of religion to the private realm and the end of public debate about
religious variants, not merely which are to be permitted, but which one is in fact true.
In this context, More’s public arguments, combined with his clear display of personal
inclination toward the more heretical dimension of his own belief in the soul’s
preexistence, were not received poorly by the clerical establishment as a mere
incidental fact. They were rejected because the church establishment was moving
beyond his style of speculation and proposals for innovation, and beyond his style of
writing—prophecy, mystical theology, poetic fancy melded into one. Implicit in the
reception of More’s version of the soul’s preexistence are the decline and fall of
innovative theology and the emergence of a secularized philosophy of political
economy.
Outside of Parker and Warren, the enthusiastic implications of More’s belief
in preexistence largely escaped condemnation by the church and state. More claimed
the discursive space allowed by the concept of adiaphora, or things indifferent, to
speculate and express his heterodox spiritual yearnings in poetry. As the predecessors
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of the tolerationist Latitudinarians, More’s philosophical circle at Cambridge refused
to comment on adiaphora, or things indifferent, that so violently separated the high
and low church in the seventeenth century.98 According to More’s students Joseph
Glanvill and George Rust, doctrinal latitude existed precisely to make space for
personal satisfaction in matters unrelated to the practice of religion and to allow
differing opinions, such as their own belief in the soul’s preexistence. Most of More’s
contemporaries considered the origin of the soul one of the adiaphora or things
indifferent to matters of faith. Many considered it far too speculative a point for the
church to decide.99 With the idea of the soul’s preexistence More explores a personal,
speculative faith that is all his own, through a network of images and ideas. Under the
name of poetry, More engages in speculation that some of his contemporaries felt
comfortable calling enthusiasm.100
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More’s poetry is the epitome of supernature. He is a metaphysician in the
extreme, investing his every line with the solidity of metaphysical reality. In what he
writes he absolutely believes. That said, More’s poetry is disruptive to the existing
order of theology, especially the idea that Man is differentiated in kind from his
Creator. In More instead there is a divine aspiration, an ambivalent sense that human
beings are not “middle creatures,” or simply plastic, as Pico della Mirandola asserts,
but the highest entity in the universe, especially when thinking philosophically and
most especially when writing philosophical poetry. In More therefore is an idea that
will recur among the theologians of preexistence: metaphysical humanism. No
materialist, More nevertheless displays the authority and agency of human beings in
the highest degree, especially in their creative and intellectual faculties. Poetry for
More becomes a means of creation, equal in character to the creative acts of God.
This metaphysical humanism, subterranean as it is, is his greatest contribution to
Enlightenment, and it offers a picture very different from the materialistic humanisms
of John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and Baruch Spinoza.
Like enthusiasm itself, the doctrine of preexistence creates a register for
individuals and groups to assert their relationship to the divine in terms that do not
rely on mediators—church, preacher, state, even Christ. It is no surprise that many of
the later spiritual movements in the West, particularly in America, from Hermeticism
to Theosophism to the Bahá'í and Mormon faiths, formed in isolation and under
persecution from their wider societies’ religious communities, find solace, comfort,
and direction in a theology that imagines their origins as particular individuals to be
points of contact with divinity that stand in contrast to their present state of cultural
marginalization, without recourse to existing, perhaps hegemonic, narratives of
spiritual formation. The tantalizing dream of shared essence with divinity that
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animates the metaleptic network of The Præexistency of the Soul continues to draw
new admirers, and perhaps adherents, today, seeking forms of spirituality outside the
familiar ones, as a brief survey of the interest in pre-birth memoirs reveals.101 Today’s
alienation from existing organized religion is not Henry More’s, but the fact that
many draw on the vocabulary of preexistence points toward its power as a language of
aspiration and hope.
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Chapter Two
The Very World: Early Modern Metempsychosis as Secular Theodicy

Not in Utopia,—subterranean fields,—
Or some secreted island, Heaven knows where!
But in the very world, which is the world
Of all of us,—the place where, in the end,
We find our happiness, or not at all!
-William Wordsworth1

Introduction
A small group of philosophers, meeting in a private residence, revived the
ancient doctrine of metempsychosis, with substantial consequences for their
conception of self, world, and history.2 For a period of around a decade, Ragley Hall,
the home of Anne, Lady Conway and her husband, became a zone of heightened
intellectual production. The chronically ill Lady Conway gathered to her sickbed a
circle of Christian Kabbalists, consisting of her dearest friend and onetime physician
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Lawrence Fine explains that while the transmigration of souls was never a piece of
mainstream Jewish theology, they were not either the exclusive opinions of a
kabbalistic elite: “The earliest ideas about transmigration of souls in Judaism predate
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Francis Mercury van Helmont, the accomplished Hebraist Christian Knorr von
Rosenroth, her former mentor Henry More, and the Quaker George Keith. The
relationship among these associates was broadly collaborative, though comparison
reveals the difference in their ideas, especially between More and van Helmont.3
What they all had in common was a belief in the perfectibility of the human soul, an
emphasis on personal, divine illumination, and a search for an ecumenical religion
that would limit rather than broaden differences in faith. Excepting More, the group
also shared an excitement for the metaphysics and cosmogony of the Kabbalah, as
revealed in their group production of the Kabbalah Denudata.4 Through their
adherence to Kabbalah, the so-called Conway or van Helmont circle believed in the
preexistence of the soul, the spiritual nature of all matter, the existence of four worldcycles called shemittah, the soul’s transmigration through a period of seven-thousand
years, and the universal salvation of all souls.5 Their works include von Rosenroth’s
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After an initial period of interest, More turned on the principal doctrines of
Kabbalah, thinking them materialist, pantheistic, and thus atheist. More memorably
describes his realization in a dream in which an eagle-boy, representing Kabbalistic
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Ideas, 36 (1975): 633-52.
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purpose, “the van Helmont circle” is more accurate, since Conway’s circle would
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Kabbalah Denudata, Seder Olam (1694) a description of the Cabbalistic cosmogony
and the cycle of worlds, van Helmont’s Cabbalistic Dialogue, the Quaker treatise Two
Hundred Queries Moderately Propounded Concerning the Doctrine of the Revolution
of Humane Souls, and Conway’s posthumous treatise, The Principles of the Most
Ancient and Modern Philosophy. It is often nearly impossible to determine who
contributed what piece of each idea, and their various productions are remarkably
similar in style, content, and emphasis.6 The group as a whole shares intellectual and
spiritual commitments and aims that challenge the century’s definitions of the human
and of social life.
The van Helmont circle is a unique node in early modern philosophy and
culture, representing both a forward-looking Enlightenment position and an esoteric
Renaissance tradition blazing with the energetic optimism of mid-seventeenth-century
Protestant Millenarianism. The group received most of their intellectual influence
from the Kabbalah of Isaac Luria, a sixteenth-century Palestinian rabbi who lived
most of his life in Ottoman Syria (modern-day Tsafat Israel), though substantial
pieces also came from the physico-alchemical philosophy of F.M. van Helmont’s
father Jean-Baptiste van Helmont. Further influences of their thought include Henry
More’s Neoplatonism, derived from his reading of Plotinus, and the later influence of
the intellectual and political culture of Quakerism. As Allison Coudert points out,

more largely include men like More and Jeremy Taylor, who were Conway’s
associates but not Kabbalists in the manner of van Helmont, Keith, and von
Rosenroth.
So great are the similarities between Seder Olam and Conway’s own treatise that
Daniel Walker has suggested Conway as the possible author of Seder Olam’s original
Latin. It is certain she contributed substantially to the Two Hundred Queries and the
Cabbalistic Dialogue, and likely she did so to Kabbalah Denudata (The Decline of
Hell: Seventeenth-Century Discussions of Eternal Torment, Chicago: Chicago U P,
1964).
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The exhilarating optimism and ecumenism characteristic of Pico della
Mirandola’s Oration on the Dignity of Man and Nine Hundred Theses
resurfaces in the innumerable, though largely forgotten texts of these
millenarians…Within what appears to be a narrowly esoteric work, one
finds the basis of the kind of tolerant ecumenism and belief in progress
that are generally associated with the Enlightenment, but which had
their beginnings far earlier among Italian Humanists.7
This chapter steps beyond Coudert’s broad point about the conceptual lineage
of van Helmont’s millenarianism by arguing that the van Helmont circle finally
exceeded their origins and put forward a conception of the purpose of human life that
radically decenters the afterlife and even a transcendent God. In their mature work,
human history is a zone primarily defined by human efforts, and the most prominent
rewards attach to our activities here rather than in a future life. Despite beginning
their careers as inveterate questers for secret knowledge, by the time of Conway’s
death, the van Helmont circle was articulating an anthropology and sense of history
that aligned them more with the burgeoning philosophy of Enlightenment liberalism,
with its idea of justice fulfilled in the secular realm by right organization of society,
than with the Millennial philosophies of divine entrance into history that defined their
initial entry points into intellectual life.8 Gradually, through decades and many
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conversations with Quakers, Kabbalists, Platonists, and interlocutors in the
increasingly secular “public sphere,” their religious enthusiasm transformed into a
version of liberal optimism about human progress expressed, paradoxically, in the
very anti-secular language of Kabbalah and transmigration. The complexities of a
divine justice system continue to stand in for what would later be the complexities of
a human bureaucracy, but they nevertheless succeed in rendering this life, or rather
these lives, as the realm of climacteric value, where justice will or will not be
achieved. Divine theodicy, that looks to Last Things and articulates final rewards only
in the heavenly realm, yields slowly to what Emmanuel Levinas called “secular
theodicy,” an account of proper social organization such that human life itself upon
the earth adds up to a just picture, fulfilled on its own terms without recourse to
heavenly reward, eschatological purpose, or even immortality.9 In contrast to previous
interpretations, in my view Kabbalah becomes secular when transmigration becomes
a means of writing out of the world a transcendent God who settles final deserts in
heaven.
While I acknowledge the contributions of the entire group, it is Conway
herself, rather than van Helmont or the others, who fully accepts the implications of
their shared moral and philosophical commitment to metempsychosis as a form of
secular theodicy.10 Her commitment can be seen in the embrace of a natural-scientific

Henry More (1614-1687) ed. Sarah Hutton, Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 1990,
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explanation for metempsychosis in her metaphysical treatise, articulated at a level of
philosophical clarity approached by none of her collaborators. Her writing therefore
marks a defined shift in worldview, not necessarily driven by Conway’s idiosyncratic
personality but as part of the larger shift toward Enlightenment at the end of the
seventeenth century. Conway did not seek out Kabbalah in order to articulate a
secularized worldview of human fulfillment. Indeed, in all likelihood part of
Kabbalah’s appeal for her consisted in it offering a horizon that transcended the
merely human and captured the divine. Yet the worldly concerns of herself and the
Quaker women with whom she increasingly identified, pressed ever more on her own
mind and pushed her philosophy in a direction that imagined human life, especially
civilized life, as the realm of climactic value, the world where God’s purposes would
be fulfilled, and at human hands. Conway’s physical and mental suffering arguably
contributed to her sense of the injustice of ordinary human life but also to her sense of
the concrete steps humans can take to mitigate it. By virtue of Conway’s all-too-real
struggles with health, loss, and disappointment, her philosophy articulates a hope for
the future, not in the next world, but in this one, in what Wordsworth later called “the

associated. Since he acted in loco auctoris in relation to certain works of which he
was not the author, printers sometimes used his name as if he were. And in the case of
certain other works of which he was actually the author, he adopted a pseudonym or
did not give any name. In such confusing circumstances there is no consensus about
the precise list of genuine van Helmont writings. There is a use, therefore, for the
wider term ‘Helmontiana’ to refer to writings van Helmont sought to publish or
whose publication he encouraged, as well as those of which he was in some sense or
to some extent the author.” (“F.M. van Helmont: His Philosophical Connections and
the Reception of His Later Cabbalistic Philosophy,” from Studies in SeventeenthCentury European Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997, 105)
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very world, which is the world / Of all of us—the place where, in the end / We find
our happiness, or not at all!”11

I. The Identity Question
In the opening of The Sense of an Ending, Frank Kermode writes that “It is not
expected of critics as it is of poets that they should help us to make sense of our lives;
they are bound only to attempt the lesser feat of making sense of the ways in which
we try to make sense of our lives.”12 As Kermode shows, in making sense of a life, we
often have recourse to fictional forms, searching for the coherence, the meaning
bestowed by beginning, middle, and end. The formal arrangement of life into a
narrative of actors and actions makes possible the distribution of praise and blame.
When we look at the structure of a life, we usually do so within an ethical framework
that facilitates judgments about the actions and deserts of the person who lived it. We
have demands for justice and think of those demands within the confines of what an
individual life could have known. In fiction, this idea is sometimes popularly called
“poetic justice.” In theology, it is called theodicy, the vindication of God’s justice in
the face of the existence of evil.13 The relationship between theodicy and the narration
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of a life arises from a tendency to assess life in general from within the framework of
a single life, given that that life is the only one the person will get. When we consider
the life of another, in a sense we are often considering Life, by imagining the
internalistic perspective of one person’s lifetime. How must life have seemed to
them? If we smoothed the entirety of one lifetime into a form with dimensions, a
purpose, a lesson, a point, would we think justice had been done?
The word theodicy is more appropriate than a term drawn from secular ethics,
because it is the precise term for the explanatory framework of a life as conceived by
Anne Conway. Deeply pious and yet deeply concerned with the justice of life and
God, life’s creator, Conway tended to conceive every serious ethical or theological
project as a version of theodicy. For example, Conway justified her belief in the
vitality of all matter with an appeal to God’s attribute of goodness: “since God is
infinitely good and communicates his goodness to all his creatures in infinite ways, so
that there is no creature which does not receive something of his goodness, and this as
fully as possible, and since the goodness of God is a living goodness, which possesses
life, knowledge, love, and power, which he communicates to his creatures, how can
any dead thing proceed from him or be created by him?”14 Everything in her
philosophical system needed to prove God’s goodness to his creatures.15
Conway’s intense focus on God’s goodness receives a new valence when we
consider her own struggles with unmitigated evil. From the time Conway was twelve

14

Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, ed. Allison Coudert,
Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1996, 44.
15

Van Helmont also maintained the moral efficacy of pain as part of the larger project
of vindicating God’s justice: “Is it not the Nature and end of God’s vindictive justice,
and indeed of all punishment, to aim at the good of those that are punished? Is not the
Nature of all punishment Medicinal?” (quoted in Brown 101)

81
years old until the end of her life, she was stricken by nearly constant grievous
migraines. A glance into her letters shows evidence of the continual, unremitting
suffering she endured in her own body. In a typical example, on Jan 19 of 1656,
Conway wrote to her husband while away from their home at Ragley Hall, “I have
continued ever since in as ill a condition of health as you left me, besides a violent fitt
of the headache which troubled me 2 or 3 dayes.”16 Conway’s lifelong pain from
migraines was so great that in 1656 she traveled to Paris with More to have her skull
drilled open with a trepan. At another time, she had her jugular vein cut open and
bled. In 1666 the famous Irish faith healer, Valentine Greatrakes laid hands on her in
front of the scientific Royal Society. None of these cures affected Conway’s
migraines, though they may have helped convince her of the inadequacy of existing
explanations of the relationship of body, mind, and soul.
As Sarah Skwire suggests, migraines were “something of a mystery” in
seventeenth century England; Conway’s contemporary “Thomas Willis notes in
frustration that they are constant to no temperament, constitution, or manner of living,
nor to no kind of evident or adjoyning causes; ordinarily fall[ing] upon cold and hot,
sober and intemperate, the empty and the full-bellied, the fat and the lean, the young
and the old; yea upon Men and Women of every age, state, or condition.”17 The
deeply moralized systems of early modern medicine could offer little in the way of
explanation for migraines; they were not the result of intemperance, of lust, of bad
behavior, of being a woman, of spending too much time indoors or out of doors, of
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self-obsession, of pride, of anything at all. They were seemingly random acts of God,
edicts of suffering without redemption, purpose, or point. For a pious Christian like
Conway, whose painful migraines continued throughout her entire life, they deeply
threatened the sense of the moral order and the idea that suffering was the result of sin
and that it served a preparative function for the moral health of the sufferer. It seemed
to Anne Conway, and to many of her friends and family, that she suffered for no
reason.
Strange as it may have seemed to her Protestant contemporaries, the
Kabbalistic notion of metempsychosis provided an explanatory framework for
otherwise inexplicable evils, like Conway’s migraines.18 Pain, for Conway, always
has purgative value; it is God’s way of driving out or punishing some sin. In her
posthumously published philosophical treatise, she writes that “every degree of evil or
sin has its own punishment, pain, and chastisement appropriate to the nature of the
deed, by means of which evil turns back again to good.”19 Through discussions with
her friends George Keith and Francis van Helmont, Conway came to the conclusion
that metempsychosis provided the framework for understanding the preparatory and
purgative value of human suffering that receives no recompense inside a given human
life. The person who lives a life of suffering and dies without reward will be reborn
into another body, one without the same disease and limitations, so that in a renewed
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state of goodness, she may continue to strive to love and serve God. The reverse of
this is also true: those who suffer in this life are receiving the punishment of a
previous one, so that their sins will be purged off, and next time, they will prosper in
goodness.
The doctrine of transmigration, and with it the doctrine of preexistence,
reduces the importance of Original Sin. In Augustine’s influential conception, human
beings are punished in aggregate for the sins of the first two individuals. Though
Adam committed the sin of disobedience against God, the rest of humanity inherits
their ancestor’s punishment without having sinned themselves. As Joseph Glanvill
writes, “If I was then newly created when first in this body; what was Adam to mee,
who sinned above 5000 years before I came out of nothing?”20 The theology of Isaac
Luria offered a solution to this problem by suggesting that each individual human soul
sinned against God before having assumed a human body. As Allison Coudert
explains, the idea of gilgul suggests that “Every soul had participated in Adam’s sin
and consequently must suffer for it. Luria’s belief that souls had twelve
reincarnations, or twelve ‘revolutions,’ in which they perfect themselves and escape
the cycle of birth and death laid the foundation for a belief in universal redemption.”21
While not repudiating the importance of the central event, the apologists for
transmigration suggest that not all human suffering comes from the actions of Adam
and Eve acting on behalf of the collective unborn human race. Instead, human beings
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receive their own punishments for their own crimes.22 In demanding that God’s
punishment of human beings be isolated to those who committed the crimes,
transmigration offers a more rational framework for the justice of the created world.
Through metempsychosis, Conway and her collaborators create a narrative
structure for a human existence that exceeds the temporal dimensions of a single life.
We live for seven thousand years, all of us, and in that time, every piece of suffering
will be redeemed, every moral act good or evil will receive its reward: “at length the
Souls and Bodies may be purified in this VVorld from all dreggs of Sin and Death, as
in a refining Furnace of Affliction and Suffering, and lastly, eternally glorified in a
indissolvable & incurruptible union of both Body and Soul.”23 In this framework,
these kabbalists explain the contradiction of injustice and an all-knowing creator
within a global picture. All the elements of life add up to a fully justified whole, such
that each human’s existence constitutes a theodicy in itself. Futurity continually
makes space for moments of God’s grace. Even those “whose Sins are neither
forgiven in this World, nor in that which is to come, and yet are forgiven in some
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third World.”24 All those forms of material injustice that affect human beings and all
other creatures unequally can be explained through recourse to the overall theodicy.25
There is a problem, however, in this ethical framework, one that has been
identified by Emily Thomas: “For Conway, what secures a [person’s] identity over
time?”26 The context of a system of justice in which every wrong will be righted
requires a stable human person to whom all the activities, right and wrong, can be
attributed. In the Grand Mystery of Godliness Conway’s mentor More solved this
problem by appeal to the immaterial soul:
why are men solicitous of the same numerical body, but that they may
be sure to find themselves the same numerical persons? But it being
most certain there is no Stable Personality of a man but what is in his
Soul, (for if the Body be Essential to this numerical Identity, a grown
man has not the same individuation he had when was Christned;) it is
manifest, that if there be the Same Soul, there is exactly the Same
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Person; and that the change of the body causes no more real difference
of Personality than the change of cloaths.”27
Believing both in transmigration and the soul’s materiality, Conway cannot
solve the problem as More does. If my soul travels from body to body, does my body
have anything to do with who I really am as a person, with what makes me me?
Where am I inside this process of continual change? Conway understands the
importance of this problem and insists in her philosophical treatise that God’s wisdom
has seen to it that human identity must persist through these transformations: “if we
suppose that one righteous man is changed into another, as Paul into Peter and Peter
into Paul, then Paul would surely not receive his proper reward but that of Peter, nor
would Peter receive his but that of Paul. This confusion would not suit the wisdom of
God.”28 While Thomas supposes that Conway resolves this issue by an appeal to the
continuous “substance” of the soul, I suggest instead that the problem is unresolvable.
In fact, the writing of the van Helmont circle intensifies the problem of human
identity, rather than trying to identify a solution.
The van Helmont Circle’s ethical theory takes up the large question of the
persistence of identity over time, a question that significantly engaged John Locke in
the later part of the century. Anne Conway’s philosophy contains the most
challenging version of their metaphysics for traditional conceptions of personal
identity, though any belief in metempsychosis, considered seriously, poses problems
for a grounded sense of personal identity. Conway is not unique among the circle for
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challenging the positioning of self in traditional ethics, but she is more aware of and
more committed to the consequential implications of their divergence from
philosophical doxa. Seder Olam, a Kabbalistic work translated by one of Conway’s
associates and possibly written in Latin by Conway herself, accords very closely to
the philosophy outlined in her posthumous Principles of the Most Ancient and
Modern Philosophy. So close are they in broad points and tone, I will treat them as
productions of a single mind. These texts together give the fullest picture of the
aporia created by Conway’s investigation into the nature of individual identity, and in
the end they challenge rather than resolves the problem of who exactly is the moral
agent supposed to accrue positive or negative reward from her actions.
Seder Olam describes a world in which every human being has existed for
thousands of years before his or her bodily, material birth. According to Conway, the
opening of Genesis describes not the creation of the world, but the creation of a
world, called the “World of Fabrication,” or the “Asiatick World.” God built the
visible world from the pieces of the two earlier worlds, the “World of Formation,” and
the original, the “World of Creation,” the only world that God specifically created.29
Each world existing seven thousand years, human beings have forgotten most of our
history and nearly all of our significance. “Men are created in the World of
Creation…formed in the World of Formation…” and “made in the World of
Fabrication,” but the whole of our living memory belongs to the World of Fabrication,

29

Seder Olam, or The order, series or succession of all the ages, periods, and times of
the whole world is theologically, philosophically and chronologically explicated and
stated also the hypothesis of the pre-existensy and revolution of humane souls
together with the thousand years reign of Christ on earth, London, 1694, Early
English Books Online, 78.

88
and only one meager age of our lives in that world.30 The difference between what the
human soul has experienced and what the human mind remembers is staggering. We
remember bits of our one life as human beings, but we have lived a dozen lives. We
have existed for thousands of years, and we have been created as part of the preexistent principles that make up the fundaments of Creation.
As a result of our impossibly long lives before our most recent birth, human
consciousness only dips a toe into the enormous pool of everything we are, our
countless previous lives and other spiritual-physical formations, as well as everything
we will be. The antiquity of matter implies the antiquity of our souls as well. As van
Helmont and the others write in the later Two Hundred Queries: “Is not the Soul of
Man as ancient as the body? And is not the body confessed by all to be a Praeexistent
matter or substance?”31 We have existed as souls at least as long as the corporeal
elements that make up our bodies have, but we cannot remember the entirety of our
lives as souls. Consciousness does not have a monopoly on the important facts of who
a person is and for what they are responsible. The object that was for Conway’s
contemporary Descartes the ground and root of all further knowledge—the cogito—
would for Conway capture only the mere sensation of one late form of being, a form
that the living spirit will soon transcend on its path to other forms. If the cogito
established the root of knowledge, it also established the root of identity: I am as a
logical consequence of my thinking. Seder Olam supposes instead that human
consciousness lacks a direct relation to human identity, since the vast majority of the
facts about a person’s life are unnoted and unrecorded by consciousness.
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What are we, then, as human beings, and in what sense can we be understood
to bear moral responsibility for our actions? One way to understand the core of
identity may be to look at those parts of identity that survive the human person’s
death. While there will be many “bodily deaths” along the way, there will also be one,
final, all-time death prior to the soul and body’s resurrection in heaven. This final
death will occur after the Millennium and will result in new, glorified bodies for all
the righteous: “the Saints ought to live a thousand Years on Earth, partly that they
may receive a visible Reward from God” and “obtain so much, and so great Glory, as
they shall be invested with, when they shall ascend Bodily into Heaven.”32 The fact
that the bodies are new indicates that we will not find the stable person by looking at
the heavenly resurrection. Human bodies are not restored to their original perfection
but simply improved by passing into heaven. A thoroughgoing Platonist might
suggest that the afterlife strips mere materiality from the human person, conceiving
that materiality never constituted the core of the person from the beginning.33 But
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Seder Olam merely grants another body to the human person who has enjoyed many
different bodies—a better body, but not an original one. This new, glorified body is
the reward of the virtuous person on earth, but it is not the essence of that person any
more than any given body occupied on the long journey of transmigration.
Neither our present consciousness nor our final reward in heaven constitutes
the autonomous “self” to whom the reward of all our actions good and bad accrue.
The new soul will never recognize the structure of its existence within a given
lifetime. The beings that do experience them will not have the present person’s
memories, will not experience a continuity of consciousness, will be, in a certain
sense, a new person. Thus, Seder Olam gives no coherent account of the essence of
human personhood. Rather, it is human beings’ placement into a moral story that
gives them distinction from one another. At the imagined telos of the end of time,
each person will look back over his or her life and understand the story that was being
told. It is not the substance of this final body, but its promise that suggests the
integrity of the human person. “Why therefore cannot Men remember that they have
lived before?” the text asks. “For that stands in the Counsel and Goodness of God; but
in the end of the World the Books shall be opened, and they shall remember all
things.”34 Only in the fullness of time, in the apocalypse, will souls look back on their
collective lifetimes and understand the story being told.
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In the here and now, the success or failure of a life can only be appreciated
formally, because no human being will ever experience the deserts of his or her own
good deeds or the redemption of suffering. Life will only reveal its genuine shape at
its end. The end promises to reveal not just the purpose of life but the identity of the
life’s protagonist, which otherwise never comes into view. I will not know who I was,
until the end of time, when at last I see all the people I have been. Rather than
showing the true location of personal identity, the vision of a soul in continual
transmigration upsets traditional perspectives on the stability of personal identity. It is
the overall framework of ethics, the global picture, that supports the attempt at
theodicy, not any particular individual’s actions and deserts.
By redrawing the boundaries of a human life to a 7000-year span of repeated
soul transmigrations, Seder Olam reconceptualizes personal identity and attempts to
push her contemporaries to rethink the ethical boundaries of a human lifespan. The
author’s theory of metempsychosis articulates a vision of world history that does not
depend on the imagination of a future state of heavenly bliss. Seder Olam imagines an
overall theodicy for each human lifetime spread out over several reborn lives. In order
to accomplish this re-envisioning, the author diminishes the importance of each
individual human self in favor of an extended and more global personality.
Conway’s idea of metempsychosis upsets the humanistic notions of personal
autonomy being articulated in the same moment by her contemporaries John Locke
and Thomas Hobbes. The fact that the human soul bears responsibility for so many
unremembered actions, for so much pre-conscious activity good and bad, suggests
that Conway has an idea of ethical being that does not rely on the agency of the
autonomous individual. Instead, human responsibility arcs over a vast range of time,
over 7000 years and countless bodies; within that global perspective, human
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sinfulness has the potential to be distributed beyond the confines of a single life.
Conway may imagine that each piece of human suffering receives redemption and
reward, but she does so inside a framework impossibly vast and intricate.
The clean distinction between that for which I am responsible and that for
which I am not vanishes under the perspective of Conway’s globally-conceived
lifetime. The black box of my past lives may contain anything and everything that has
occurred in human history, and the entire future will be, in a sense, my responsibility
to live through as well as to influence and determine. Metempsychosis transforms the
concept of the ‘I’ by extending it, mysteriously and almost infinitely, in all directions
around one’s geographic, temporal, and social self. Though conceived as an organic
unit, the borders of a given lifetime vanish into the horizons of a self continually and
unpredictably reborn. The implications of the sociality of the self as conceived in
Kabbalistic metempsychosis connect to a struggle for ideological power inside the
leadership of the growing Quaker community and more broadly within the religiopolitical goals of late seventeenth-century Millenarianism.

II. Millenarian Optimism in the Two Hundred Queries
The members of the van Helmont circle always wrote with the aim of
persuading readers to adopt their theories. This attempt at persuasion had different
interlocutors but a common eschatological purpose. Van Helmont and his
collaborators were attempting to bring about the forthcoming Millennium by means of
persuasive, conversionist writing. Much more tolerationist than many of their
contemporaries, they believed Jews, Muslims, and Catholics could be potential
converts to a Protestant Kabbalist-Quakerism that would be the authentic Christian
truth and a spiritually liberated theology. This theology uses metempsychosis as the
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engine of its history, which might potentially lead to a philosophy of quietism. Since
metempsychosis places into God’s hands the exclusive capacity to settle the affairs of
justice on earth, metempsychosis might lead to quietism, the belief that God will sort
out human problems without human effort. The van Helmont circle was committed to
the opposite hypothesis and to the drive to work actively in order to fulfill God’s
purpose on earth. Indeed, in the Two Hundred Queries, the Kabbalist emerges,
simultaneous with metempsychosis, as the engine of history.35 Eschatology prompts
an immediate political and social response on the part of true believers. For them,
conversion and the propagation of authentic truth are a mission toward which the
Millenarian converts contribute by sharing their abstruse but salvific philosophy with
the unconverted.
These eschatological efforts and Millenarian expectations came together in the
publishing effort of the Two Hundred Queries. In the 1680s van Helmont and his
collaborators wrote a work that pressed the Quakers to accept the doctrine of
metempsychosis as a centerpiece of their radical theology. As a text worthy of study
in its own right, showing van Helmont’s eclecticism as well as Conway’s
perspicacity, it represents one of the era’s profound explorations of the idea of
transmigration and its compatibility with a version of Christian history. Traditionally
attributed to van Helmont alone, the Two Hundred Queries Moderately propounded
concerning the Doctrine of the Revolution of Humane Souls, and its Conformity to the
Truths of Christianity reflects the collective work and interest of Keith, Conway, and
van Helmont. The text was an attempted intellectual and dogmatic coup within the
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Quaker ranks. Written to show the Scriptural reasonableness and compatibility with
Quakerism of van Helmont’s Kabbalistic doctrine of the soul’s preexistence and
transmigration, the text was met by a stern response both from English academic
theologians and the unofficial leader of the Quaker movement, George Fox.
Unwilling to see the Quaker faith split into separate camps of Helmontians and
Foxians, Fox quickly pressured other Quaker leaders to condemn the treatise and the
Kabbalistic theology it represented.
Due to modern perceptions of Quakerism as a modest, individualist, and
simple faith, van Helmont’s attempt to interpose these baroque Kabbalistic theories
may seem out of touch with Quakerism’s intellectual and religious core, but to van
Helmont, Quakerism and Kabbalah had more in common with each other than they
did with the Christianity of England and his native Netherlands. From van Helmont’s
perspective, Quakers and Kabbalists likewise believed in a universal faith that
downplayed the importance of the historical Jesus and more complex theological
doctrines like the Trinity and thereby created an ecumenical faith for the conversion
of Jews and Muslims. Like Quakerism, van Helmont’s faith had a strong Millennial
aspect; in his spiritual optimism, van Helmont was always looking forward to the
coming Millennium, a time when the spiritual purity of individual believers,
actualized by the recognition of the divine seed or inner light within them would be
shared not just with a small community like that at Ragley Hall, but with everyone in
a global Christian community.
Of particular importance in this respect were the Jews, whose conversion had
been imagined in traditional Christian theology as a means of hastening the
forthcoming eschaton and thus became for van Helmont one of the active duties of the
intellectual Christian. The intellectual heritage of the circle was largely Millenarian.
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Conway was of course taught by More, whose tutor at Cambridge was the Millenarian
Joseph Mede, a so-called “Middle Puritan” and voice of moderation during the years
leading up to the Civil Wars.36 Believing the millennium incipient, Mede thought that
the people of England were in the midst of a revolution of knowledge that would only
intensify in the ensuing decades as the end of days drew near.37 More was “an heir of
this puritan expectation of a radical increase in knowledge as a presage of the
Millennium,” and Conway’s letters show the great expectations for a renewal in
knowledge she shared with her former mentor.38 Through Conway and More the van
Helmont circle shared the Cambridge Platonists’ millenarian enthusiasm. The
development of a purified theology, one aimed at the conversion of both Jews and
Muslims (the latter tolerated by van Helmont even if their conversion did not effect
the same results), was a matter of the first degree as both a spiritual and political
project. Through texts like the Two Hundred Queries, where he tried to establish
Quakerism as a Kabbalistic faith perfect for the conversion of Jews, van Helmont
believed he was saving souls, correcting centuries-old errors, and hastening the
forthcoming Millennium and the fulfillment of the purpose of history.
The text’s revision of Christian chronology is the most explicit statement of
transmigration’s agreement with Christianity produced by this circle of thinkers.39
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The author frames the introduction of a bizarre revisionary chronology through
Scriptural examples, everywhere making the soul’s transmigration appear the only
reasonable interpolation to resolve otherwise illogical exegetical inconsistencies.
“Seeing Christ said in John 9.12.35.,” the author writes, “There are twelve hours in
the day…doth he not thereby intimate, that those men had had a long day, which was
no expiring, and with many of them, perhaps the very last hour?”40 Questioning the
literal reader, the author demands “what day is this? and what are the twelve hours
thereof? is it (think you) the natural day? and natural hours?”41 The author takes up
Christ’s parabolic metaphor of the lifetime as a “day” and, rather than allegorizing it,
treats it numerologically, with each hour esoterically linked to the hour represented by
a single reborn lifetime: “is it not much rather to be understood of twelve distinct
intervals of life, which every man receives upon this earth, by the appointment of
God, in much long-suffering, causing them to be twelve several times born into the
World?”42 Despite van Helmont’s adoption of the idea of transmigration, or gilgul,
from the Jewish Kabbalah, the author here tries to justify the idea as rising naturally
out of paradoxical cruxes in Scripture. This apology for Kabbalah requires a voluntary
display of ignorance of the typical Christian practices of allegorical reading, born
from Tertullian and the Platonist school at Alexandria in the early Christian era, in
order to justify the importation of an otherwise foreign (to the work’s English, mostly
Christian and Quaker, readers) theological concept. Only gilgul or transmigration
saves Scripture’s reasonableness from the abyss of literal reading. Exegesis, however,
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is not the text’s primary justificatory strategy; the primary strategy to defend gilgul,
and likely the motivation for the idea’s inclusion at all, remains its work as an engine
of theodicy. Transmigration does not just defend the reasonableness of Scripture but
the reasonableness, and the justice, of God himself.
In keeping with the early modern assumption that virtue is learned over the
course of a life rather than inherent, the author of Two Hundred Queries asserts that
the early deaths of many human beings are a profound cosmic injustice, since these
individuals are never given the opportunity to learn, grow, and repent of their earlier,
youthful crimes. “God hath indured with much long-suffering the vessel of wrath
fitted for destruction,” Paul writes in Romans 9.22, and the author asks “can this be
properly said of such Vessels of wrath, as he cutteth off in their wickedness at eight,
ten, twelve, or twenty years?”43 God’s justice owes an equal temporal duration to
human beings; because (as the author quotes from Scripture) “with God there is no
respect of persons” and “all the ways of the Lord are equal,” equal duration grants to
all human beings equal opportunities for growth and development of virtue.44 God’s
gifts extend to the gift of time itself, the mere sequence of instants that make up a
human life, and even the duration of these instants must, in the final reckoning, have
been equal for every human being, whether born in the first decades of Christian
history, prior to it, or now.45
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This idea in van Helmont and Conway has a conciliatory and ecumenical
dimension. Important for van Helmont and his company is the problem of the “noble
pagans,” those virtuous men and women who lived before Christ or were otherwise
unexposed to his Gospel. The idea of transmigration supposes an equal distribution of
opportunities for virtuous action and Christian repentance. Those who do well in their
lives as pagans will be reborn in Christian countries, to be afforded with a more
bountiful opportunity for virtue in the form of exposure to the Gospel and the nurture
of Christian community:
If all that dyed in their sins from the beginning of the World, to the
death of our Saviour Jesus Christ, did immediately after death, suffer,
and continue under the same punishment, as those that lived after, and
rejected the mercy and Grace offered through Jesus Christ; how could
the Apostle say, That God winked at them all that time of
Ignorance?...Is it not most probable from hence, that those very Men
then living, whom the Apostle so warned, had lived before in those
times of Ignorance, sleeping as in the Night?46
The idea of the noble pagan suggests that Jews, Muslims, and pagans have in
them the capacity for virtue. From the perspective of Kabbalistic metempsychosis, the
noble pagan idea receives the additional dimension of future lives for those
experienced in virtue during their lives. The noble pagan, born before the birth of
Christ, will be reborn in a Christian society. Gradually, as they are reborn, the noble
pagans will be exposed more fully to the Gospel. The Christian therefore is placed
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toward the ends of the historical cycles of birth and rebirth, transforming the Jewish
Cabbalistic gilgul into a form of Christian apologetics.
There is a stadial aspect to the view of history proposed in this notion, in
which successive forms of human social and religious life lead inexorably, at least for
the virtuous, Christ-ward. Human pagan societies are redeemed, soul by soul, into
societies ever closer to the truth of Christianity. One at a time right-acting souls are
reborn into Christian societies and places with increasingly liberal practices. One
could compare this view of history to a progressivist, Whiggish theory of history, but
the idea bizarrely transposes the cultural history of nations and races onto the history
of a single individual, whose continual birth and rebirth registers, with passing
centuries, the appearance, death, and reappearance, of higher forms of culture and
religion, culminating in a Christian society. For van Helmont and Conway, the ideal
society, founded on Christian principles, had not yet been fully achieved, for that
would be the Millennium society, one brought into temporal existence by the
conversion of the Jews, the very act of conversion narrated in the history of the
individual soul’s cycle of gilgul. The fact of the Jew’s present state of non-conversion
indicates that the Millennium is yet to come. It also shows that while the historical
scheme of gilgul is stadial, the final stage has not been achieved.
The “end of history” is not the current state of things, either in Christian
Europe (regardless of van Helmont’s tolerationist attitudes toward fellow Christians,
both Protestant and Catholic) or in Restoration-era England. The end of history rests
on the other side of a concise and specific political activity, the conversion of the
Jews, but also, mysteriously, as the incalculable result of the endless varieties of lives
acted out, being born and reborn according to their moral deserts, and preparing in
that fashion for universal conversion to Christianity in some future, unguessably
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distant life. History is therefore malleable, subject to the political projects of
individuals who undertake the political task of conversion; but it also rests in the
uncountable hands of the many, whose personal morality directly ties to their reward
after death, a reward that will further advance history, both personal and global,
toward its higher stages.
The increased political agency of the individual, who acts through conversion
to bring about the turn toward history’s liberating conclusion, stands in contrast to the
measured, top-down quietism of Seder Olam, where the individual’s life contributed
only to its own recuperation. In fact, the historical agent was absent from the theology
of Seder Olam except as a total picture, a sum of all the actions good and bad
undertaken by a repeatedly reincarnated spirit over several lifetimes. By contrast, the
Two Hundred Queries’ emphasis on Christian rather than cosmic history transforms
the realm of climactic value from the final moments in the heavenly realm, when the
universal story will be revealed, to the pre-Millennial world where right-thinking
Christians will contribute to and hasten that forthcoming golden age. The two texts
dramatize a conflict between the quietist and revolutionary mindsets embedded in the
van Helmont circle’s Millenarian discourses. At the same time, they present rival
visions of the function and consequence of transmigration, or perhaps two sides of its
nature. Transmigration either involves human beings in a cosmic story of such
mysterious complexity as to be unintelligible to all but the providential intelligence of
God, or it places humans into a context that makes broad collective action spiritually
as well as politically meaningful. In Seder Olam, the purpose of a life adheres only in
those little actions of good and bad that add up to no pattern discernable by human
perception; in Two Hundred Queries, purpose lies in the pragmatic organization of
individual and collective beliefs in order to effect a more perfect social world.
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III. The Natural Science of Metempsychosis
Metempsychosis has a strange afterlife as mechanical theory of existence and
material replication. This afterlife began in the writing of Conway herself, as she
attempted to articulate the natural scientific explanations and implications of a belief
in metempsychosis. The Kabbalah espoused by the van Helmont circle finally
repudiated its own epistemic foundations, when Anne Conway offered a natural
scientific justification of metempsychosis in place of the esoteric knowledge on which
it was first grounded. In Conway’s posthumous treatise, The Principles of the Most
Ancient and Modern Philosophy, the means of proving the coherence of Kabbalistic
metempsychosis become conceptual and natural-scientific. Just after Conway’s time,
natural scientists and esotericists like Whitelocke Bulstrode articulate a vision of
metempsychosis fully coherent with the most groundbreaking corporealist
philosophies of the day, an articulation anticipated and largely directed by Conway
herself. The transition from a philosophy of divine immanence to one of materiality
can be seen therefore in the way metempsychosis is reinterpreted by corporealists, but
also in the way corporealism can be found as an under-theme in the writing of avowed
spiritualists like Conway.
The Principles does not reproduce the ideas of any of her collaborators or
contemporaries but instead blazes ahead into the intellectual territory they left
unexplored. Where the Two Hundred Queries and Seder Olam approach
metempsychosis from a scriptural point of view, in the Principles Conway explores
the quiddities of distinctive Kabbalistic doctrines under their metaphysical aspect. Her
analysis opens up a heretofore unexplored intellectual terrain: the relationship
between metempsychosis and a philosophy of materiality. Her idea of materiality
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must be qualified, since it might also be described as anti-material. Like her
contemporary Margaret Cavendish, Conway rejected dualistic premises altogether.47
Where Cavendish conceptualizes a world built, like Thomas Hobbes’s, entirely of
matter, albeit intriguingly sensitive matter, Conway collapses bodies into the wider
category of spirit.48 Conway justified the spiritual aliveness of matter with an appeal
to God’s attribute of goodness: “[h]ow can it be, that any dead Thing should proceed
from him, or be created by him, such as is mere Body or Matter, according to their
[the dualists’] Hypothesis, who affirm, that the same is wholly inconvertible [sic], to
any degree of Life or Knowledge?”49 For Conway, the goodness of God made
impossible his creation of anything dead, corrupt, or immoral. Conway maintained a
conviction that matter possessed an irreducible moral good, that it participated in and
could be formed into spirit, and that it was created for the enjoyment of living beings.
This spiritual theory of matter derives largely from van Helmont’s Kabbalistic nondualism. Though many of the large points of her metaphysical scheme accord with
van Helmont’s, her sharper metaphysical focus rejects many of the unproveable
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historical aspects of Kabbalah, such as the cycle of worlds. The rejection of these
unproveable historical details indicates how Conway takes onto Kabbalah the task of
explaining the operations of the physical universe absent scriptural verification.
Like her mentor More, Conway was undoubtedly interested in the
philosophical implications of the new experimentalism. Like More, however, she
mostly rejected its premises, especially materialism and empiricism, believing that
reasoning from the attributes of God secured a more stable foundation for natural
knowledge. Conway’s natural scientific mode grounds even the radical conclusion
that human and animal natures can mutually transmute into each other. As P.C.
Almond explains, “Since all created beings share in the one substance, their essence is
mutable. Thus, human substances can change—are really changed—into different
kinds of things, sometimes into animals, eventually into aethereal beings.”50
Though the Principles presents a natural science of metempsychosis, the
primary explanation for Conway’s idea of transmigration is ethical. Transmigrations
or, it is equally appropriate to say, transformations, occur as a result of the ethical
lives lived by the individuals; such is a requirement of metempsychosis being used as
an engine of theodicy, where deed is always linked to punishment as cause is to
effect. Conway writes of this process in an exuberant mode characteristic of Pico della
Mirandola’s famous encomium for human transformation: “is it not just that if a man
lives a pure and holy life on this earth, like the heavenly angels, that he is elevated to
the rank of angels after he dies and becomes like them, since the angels also rejoice
over him?”51 Like Pico, Conway imagines the human soul capable of a remarkable
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range of transformations toward the highest orders of being, but the same morallydriven transformation also occurs in the instance of an evil or “diabolical” man who
dies unredeemed. On death he becomes a devil. The soul transforms its body into
what it emotionally and morally resembles.52
Despite its ethical motivations, the actual process of transformation is narrated
physico-chemically via her concept of the plastic faculty and the relationship among
competing spirits inside the individual soul. Conway argues that the so-called plastic
faculty of the spirit creates the outward form of the body from its constituent parts.
Her defense of this power draws upon myths (which also occupied the attention of
Plotinus) about the power of the mother’s body to form the infant body into whatever
she looked at or imagined during the time of conception. By the same logic in
Conway’s account, the human soul creates and sustains its own human body by its
plastic power. By its righteousness and resemblance to God, the human soul manages
to generate its own body out of a certain arrangement of smaller, lesser spirits. Over
this “innumerable multitude of Spirits united together” reigns “one Captain, or Chief
Governor,” with an array of lesser spirits serving as administrators. When the chief
spirit in an organism cedes power through sin to one of its lower powers, the organism
transforms to resemble more closely the lower element, which is animal in nature: “if
someone lives neither an angelic or diabolical life but rather a brutish or animal life,
so that his spirit is more like the spirit of beasts than any other creature, does the same
justice not act most justly, so that just as he became a brute in spirit and allowed his
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brutal part and spirit to have dominion over his more excellent part, he also (at least
regards his external shape) changes his corporeal shape into that species of beast to
which he is most similar in terms of the qualities and conditions of his mind?”53
Conway explains how transformations occur only at death by appealing to the
reconstituting power of the plastic faculty. While individuals are constantly changing
in minor ways, only at death do they undergo a radical bodily change in the form of
decomposition, and over this radical process the plastic faculty exercises its force and
sway.
This process will occur by means of the conflict among spirits within the
human soul. When the bestial part of a human assumes dominance over the rest,“[i]t
necessarily follows that this body, which the vital spirit forms, will be that of a brute
and not a human, for the brute spirit cannot produce or form any other shape because
its formative power is governed by its imagination, which imagines and conceives as
strongly as possible its own image, according to which the external body must take
shape.”54 The captain spirit strives in competition with these lesser spirits, which
denote the human being’s connection to brutal and inhumane vices such that when the
singular spirit dies in a brutish person, the brutal spirit carries dominion and returns,
now with “Dominion over that Body, so that its Plastick Faculty hath the Liberty of
forming a body, after its own Idea and Inclination (which before, in the Humane
Body, it had not).” On death, the lower spirits inside the body assume control and,
having dominion over the body, begin to form the new body in accordance with their
own nature. Thus, a man becomes bestial and through the vital spirit’s imaginative,
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forming power, becomes a beast. This unique argument, filtered through the
Kabbalistic definition of matter as a spiritual substance, effectively offers a natural
scientific explanation for metempsychosis, one not to be found in the writings of the
other members of the van Helmont circle.
While Conway’s argument would not pass for empirical observation in the
vein of her contemporaries in the Royal Society, her arguments about the nature of
substance partake not only of the moralizing logic of theological sin and punishment,
but also of the contemporary debates about embryology and the nature of biological
life as such. This natural scientific register in regards to the soul’s transmigration is
corroborated in the work of other philosophers of the period. In 1692, over a decade
after Conway’s death, the English mystical writer Whitelocke Bulstrode published
“An Essay of Transmigration in Defence of Pythagoras,” in which he challenged the
predominant view of Pythagoras’s doctrine of metempsychosis on corporealist
grounds.55 Bulstrode argues that all previous interpreters of Pythagoras had
understood his signature theory of the soul’s transmigration incorrectly. “I writ this
Essay for my own Satisfaction and Use,” Bulstrode writes, “and now publish it to
vindicate the Honour of Pythagoras, whom, though I would not, with the Heathen,
Deifie for his eminent Works; yet I would defend him from the Calumny of the
World, so unjustly cast upon him, as the Author of an erroneous Doctrine.”56 The
“erroneous Doctrine” assumed to be held by Pythagoras was the idea that conscious
human souls leave their bodies upon death and enter into the bodies of new creatures,
including those of animals. Because of its unacceptable association of the human with
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the animal, the doctrine of transmigration into the bodies of animals was generally
held “scarce worth the refutation,” as the Athenian Gazette put it in 1691.57 Against
these previous interpretations, Bulstrode argues that properly understood
metempsychosis was nothing more or less than a consequence of the materiality of the
sensitive and vegetative parts of the soul. Since all matter preexists the body,
Bulstrode suggests, and since the sensitive and vegetative parts of the soul remain
material, these aspects of the soul predate and postdate the body. Matter not being
destroyed at the death of the body, the animal spirits in the blood continue after the
body’s life. These spirits are in turn consumed by creatures in the soil, by worms and
carrion birds, and in the process are incorporated into their bodies. In this fashion, the
souls of human beings can really be said to have transmigrated into the bodies of
brutes. This interpretation of transmigration might not have impressed Ovid’s
Pythagoras, whose impassioned speech before the gods of Olympus argues for the
moral necessity of vegetarianism because of the possibility of killing one’s brother or
of eating one’s father in the form of a slab of meat. Bulstrode’s account, however
much it downplays the element of consciousness in the lives of animals, provides a
more radical sense of the common material basis of life on earth than the traditional
conception of the Pythagorean account. Not only do animals consume and pass on the
sensitive and vegetative aspects of the soul; even plants contain the transmigrated
souls of human beings, as they suck up life from the remains of human bodies. The
whole world, as one vast material substrate, hums with the same stuff that made up
human life. This is Pythagoras, corporealized.
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In Bulstrode’s hands, transmigration is not an improbable immaterialist
philosophy but a logical consequence of materialism. Bulstrode’s natural scientific
aspiration can be seen in his assertion that the idea of transmigration is not merely
acclaimed as “Orthodox & Philosophical among the Ancients, but as True and
Evident in Nature”58 If the notion of transmigration were merely “a speculative
Notion, and of no Use…it should have slept in eternal Shades; but in regard it
acquaints us, in its full Latitude, with the various Operations of God, the Generation
and Dissolution of all Created Beings…it is a subject not so mean as to be
despised.”59 While Bulstrode’s belief in an incorporeal rational soul separates him
from materialists in the vein of Hobbes and Cavendish, his reinterpretation of the
Pythagorean theory of soul origin rewrites its value for an increasingly corporealist
science of embryology and bodily reproduction.
Bulstrode does not revolutionize the theory of Conway and her collaborators
but instead follows it to its natural conclusion. Like Bulstrode, Conway recognizes the
compatibility of a modified Pythagorean metempsychosis with corporeal explanations
of soul activity. In the Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy,
Conway incorporates metempsychosis into a pseudo-materialist philosophy that
ascribes ethical value to all forms of life, whether they have achieved the state of
reason or remain irrational, if self-propelled bodies. Conway casts all living
creatures—and all creatures in some respect are alive—into a state of perpetual
redefinition that resists hypostasis into a single world order. With transmigration as
the engine of this continual change, Conway’s redefinition demonstrates the creature
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operating in accordance with the wide latitude of possibility offered by the universe’s
diversity for entities’ transformation and repeated, not completed, fulfillment.
Conway’s physico-chemical explanation for the processes of metempsychosis
indicates how she has integrated the doctrine into a worldview that, while not strictly
materialist, involves explanatory frameworks and expectations similar to the century’s
other forms of mechanistic naturalism.

Conclusion
The vision of metempsychosis articulated by Conway and her collaborators
repudiates the traditional vision of the afterlife represented by most seventeenthcentury Christian philosophers, by virtue of its naturalism, its secularism, and the
roles imagined for the human being inside history. It is an early attempt to articulate a
theory of history as a phenomenon driven by human rather than divine efforts. The
driver of this increasingly secular history is the liberating power of the authentic
Gospel itself, understood as a private revelation and an inner purity. The
overwhelming impulse of history for the van Helmont circle is to make human spirits
free. Liberty is conceived as a state of transformation that frees us from external
forms of social control by integrating essential truth into our very persons. Quakerism
and Kabbalah together add up to a liberating theology that finally wrests itself even
from the external Scriptures themselves.
Van Helmont, Conway, and Keith saw a future in which Quaker-Kabbalism
swept across Europe and Asia, converting Jews, Muslims, and Christians into a
Christocentric but individualist and spiritualist faith. Had such a conversion
succeeded, the philosophies of Enlightenment might not have coalesced around the
idea of the nation state, with its army of atomistic units brought into mutual relation
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by social contract; instead, it would have involved a voluntary association of
individuals united by their common sense of salvation and purification. It is no
surprise that this ideological revolution did not happen; van Helmont and Conway
were far from perfect representatives of the vita activa in the seventeenth century.
Their perspective has more generalized quietism about it than activism, but they
sensed and attempted to articulate another way of being-together than those in the
imagined communities of Catholicism and Protestantism, one that would be private,
ecumenical, and enlightened.
The vision of world order, however, imagined by these collaborators
anticipates timely aspects of our modern conception of a global society. Without a
doubt, the circle’s employment of Lurianic Kabbala seems to drive against the
encroachment of scientific and ecumenical modernity, but the uses to which they put
this philosophy indicate their growing commitment to a kind of materiality (abstractly
understood), a society built on consensus and human efforts, and, amazingly, a vision
of world peace. Seen from this perspective, the van Helmont circle articulated an
innovative vision of world order and built it around a to-hand metaphysical system in
the form of Kabbala. In that system, metempsychosis provides an explanation of the
positive engine of progress in history, in contrast to Renaissance theories of the
degeneration of human civilization as well as Christian pessimism about the fate of
the secular world. Finally, metempsychosis provided a fair approximation of the ways
in which a secularizing world observes its own life, death, and survival. We die and
become the next generation.
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Chapter Three
Visions of Eternal Being in Thomas Traherne’s Writings

The problem inherent in the surface of things, and only in the surface
of things, is the heart of things.
-Leo Strauss1

Introduction
In several poems in his two manuscripts and in set piece reflections in his
magisterial Centuries of Meditation, the poet and priest Thomas Traherne (16361674) borrows the Platonic theory of the soul’s preexistence and experiments with its
possibilities. Traherne’s thoughts on preexistence are scattered throughout his works,
not consolidated into a sustained treatment. Several of his poems feature imagery and
language derived from previous explications of preexistence, sometimes directly
borrowing from other writers who believe the idea, yet Traherne never professes
belief in preexistence. Though each deployment of these tropes is different,
Traherne’s method consists in viewing preexistence as a fiction that displays a
spiritual truth. Traherne consistently plays with preexistence in his poetry, because
preexistence, like his other poetic conceits, suggests the grandeur of the human soul
and the miraculous innocence of the newborn child. Entertaining the idea also allows
Traherne to investigate and imagine several otherwise unimaginable events, such as
the subjective experience of bodily creation. Traherne’s poetic use of preexistence is
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ultimately metaphysical conceit, highly valued for his poetic art, though an instructive
fiction rather than a belief.
At the same time, this “conceit” is deeply revealing about the structure and
character of Traherne’s poetic theology, especially how it manifests in his more
“mystical” or “visionary” moments of poetic expression. These shopworn words
effectively convey the kind of writing on which Traherne is engaged in certain
passages. A crucial moment early in his Centuries of Meditation shows Traherne as a
child confronted with the intuition that the entire world is not just preexistent but
eternal. As a child, Traherne perceives a world that was not created by God, a world
where “all things abided eternally as they were in their proper places.”2 While the
passage is justly celebrated as one of the heights of Traherne’s prose, when the vision
denies a creator, it dangerously departs from the established theology of the Anglican
Church and Traherne’s own theism. Traherne’s poetic preexistence conceit teaches us
how to read this crucial moment. Traherne imagines a world that is endless, deathless,
and unbeginning, precisely because these qualities correspond to his own intuitions
about the nature of consciousness.3 Since Traherne trusts vision to reveal the real
nature of things, internal conceit and momentary vision become means of challenging
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authoritative accounts of reality. For this reason, though Traherne only entertains the
doctrine of preexistence, his entertainments achieve paradoxically the strength and
purposiveness of vision, almost a private revelation. Preexistence, though a fiction,
reveals a truth, and Traherne’s childhood vision of deathlessness shows the world, not
as it is, but as it ought to be. The deathless and uncreated nature of the world occupies
a conceptual character different from either metaphysical truth or religious belief. It
remains true, but true in a mysterious sense, a mystery transcending facts, even
transcending faith.
In line with Plotinus and several of the Cambridge Platonists, Traherne
believes the perceiving soul to be the same perceptive unit through which God sees.
The mind, for Traherne, is also “the candle of the Lord.”4 While drawing on this
metaphysically-backed doctrine of Platonic contemplation, he flouts the supposed
truth of this doctrine by using its purview to display an evident falsehood. He borrows
the Platonic authorization of the individual philosopher—that power of contemplation
we have seen in Henry More and in Plotinus— and secularizes its internal logics.
Traherne aestheticizes the category of theology from the inside out by claiming the
contents of personal vision, but by refusing to derive metaphysical claims from that
vision. In his Centuries he carefully describes a vision, authorized as true by the
Platonic theory of inspiration, but one that negates Christian theology and nature
itself. About another early modern philosopher, Leo Strauss writes gnomically but
intriguingly, “The problem inherent in the surface of things, and only in the surface of
things, is the heart of things.”5 For Traherne, appearances do not indicate essences,

4

Proverbs 20:27: “The spirit of Man is the Candle of the Lord.”

5

Thoughts on Machiavelli, 13.

114
but exist as simple facts rather than surfaces of things with depths. For this refusal to
move beyond appearances to essence, spiritual vision need not reveal metaphysical
content, and vision itself—that high theory of Plotinus’s soul—is nothing more than
what is captured by ordinary, if aesthetic, observation.

I. A sweet mistake intending true: Preexistence in Traherne’s Poems
Unlike Henry More and Anne Conway, who wanted to recruit sympathetic
readers t to their metaphysical positions, Traherne attempts to show how the Christian
should meditatively organize his or her internal spiritual architecture. Rather than
philosophical treatises aimed at doctrinal certainty, Traherne’s writings are
meditations intended to help the Christian live spiritually. Traherne thus adopts the
preexistence of the soul as one of his pleasing fictions, a choice conceit that
mystically expresses a deeper spiritual truth without being literally true. An example
of another of these is the “sweet mistake” of “Shadows in the Water,” in which
Traherne sees another world beneath the surface of the water. A “mistake though
false, intending true,” the perception of the watery world teaches the infant Traherne a
lesson he will later encounter through direct instruction: that a heavenly world awaits
him beyond this life.6 Likewise, Traherne’s entertainments of preexistence are mental
heuristics that teach the soul the right way to understand its nature and the nature of
its creator God. In this context, Traherne takes up the soul’s preexistence for much the
reason he takes up the conceit of “Shadows in the Water.” He believes it teaches us
something true about the nature of God’s goodness toward us.
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Preexistence furnishes a key metaphysical conceit that appears frequently in
Traherne’s poetry: the image of his own soul as a stranger newly arrived in the world.
This fancy plays with alienation and with the Christian disjunction of the soul from
the physical world. This conceit appears in “Wonder,” “The Salutation,” and “The
Preparative.” It is wittily reversed in “The Apostasie,” in which Traherne narrates
how the soul gradually transforms from a stranger to the world to a “stranger to the
shining skies.” Traherne uses this conceit to dramatize the spiritual attitudes that
constitute the proper relationship of self to the world and God, but the metaphorics of
the “stranger” are troubled and questioned. Traherne refuses to endorse the traditional
Christian interpretation of this idea—that the soul should act as a vaguely hostile
stranger toward the world. Rather, the scene of encounter between the soul and the
physical world is an opportunity to learn more about the soul’s nature. The soul is
starkly distinct from the “World of custom,” but not entirely distinct from the world
of nature. By pushing on these moments of encounter, Traherne dramatizes the
acquisition (and loss) of the soul’s self-knowledge.
While at one level these entertainments are heuristic devices, at another level
they possess the authority of metaphysical vision. In Traherne’s philosophical
scheme, objects entertained by the mind achieve a level of reality that is greater than
typical early modern conceptions of imagination. For Traherne, the act of thinking
possesses a mystical character whereby ideas achieve new reality by means of the
soul’s contemplation. Traherne “asserts the ultimate reality of that which has been
perceived,” because the mind, the imago dei, authorizes and makes real that which it
perceives.7 Occasionally, in fact, Traherne asserts that objects or images in the mind
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have a higher reality than those that are merely physical. In the second century, he
asserts that “a Thought of the World, or the World in a Thought is more Excellent
then the World, because it is Spiritual and Nearer unto GOD. The Material World is
Dead and feeleth Nothing.” Traherne adds that “GOD hath made you able to Creat
Worlds in your own mind, which are more Precious unto Him then those HE
Created.”8 The spirituality of internal worlds, in contrast to the dead materiality of the
actual, enlivens them with potential to body forth spiritual truth. The interior world
exists in the vibrant structure of the human mind, an image of God, and thus thoughts,
even “sweet mistake[s],” can transcend their literal falseness and mystically achieve
the nature of a higher truth. This mystical and metaphysical transition of interior
thoughts does not contradict the heuristic use of ideas as mere entertainments; indeed,
this philosophy guarantees the heuristic will teach the spiritual truth, whatever its
literal falsehood or truth.
A small group of “preexistence” poems can be found in Traherne’s two poetic
manuscripts, Dobell and Burney.9 Traherne’s poem “Wonder” is one of these handful
of poems that think through the soul’s preexistence:
How like an Angel came I down!
How Bright are all Things here!
When first among his Works I did appear
O how their GLORY me did Crown?
The World resembled his Eternitie,
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In which my Soul did Walk;
And evry Thing that I did see,
Did with me talk.10
As in Henry Vaughan’s “The Retreat,” a more conventional lyric in many
ways, the speaker of “Wonder” entertains the possibility of the soul’s preexistence
without asserting it.11 In the first line, the idea flutters over the speaker’s mind, but he
does not stretch forth a mental hand to grab it. It rises only from the implications of
the temporal language, such as “When first among his works I did appear,” the
implied beginning before “came I down.” Coming down implies that the speaker
existed before his appearance on the scene of earth, an idea cut against by his evident
nostalgia for the sensations he experienced as a newly arrived infant. Nevertheless,
the aspects he values most about new experience are those he thinks may be
reminders of a spiritual life in heaven. In his early days, “the world resembled [God’s]
eternity,” and of all things, eternity best resembles eternity. The through-line of
childhood and God is preexistence. Though Traherne points to his infancy and not to
any “pre-infancy,” that infancy possesses many of the angelic qualities of the typical
pre-mortal existence. The speaker seems to remember coming down “like an angel”
from a higher world. Yet the poem is not about that higher world; it never revisits
heaven, if it really begins there.
Despite the visible absence of preexistence from the poem, a brief thought
experiment elucidates the role it nevertheless plays in the poem’s cosmic logic, a
detail the philosophically-minded poet would not have missed. The poem’s central
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concept is the scene of encounter between a fresh soul and a fresh world. Having
come from afar, the soul arrives at the world and greets each new object with wonder.
A newly created soul, under a psychological theory such as John Locke’s, would not
yet have the categories of ideas furnished from experience. In other words, the newly
created soul in a Lockean scheme could not experience the world as new, because it
has nothing to contrast with that world. The very idea of newness is something that
must come later. Since Traherne believes the infant soul to possess a number of
positive goods—epitomized by that state he called “Perfect innocency by creation”—
the idea of preexistence may not be necessary for the encounter to take place.12 A
newly created soul may well be furnished with enough tendencies to have a full
encounter with the world and experience it as new. Therefore, preexistence remains
somewhat adjacent to Traherne’s true aim and topic, childhood. Preexistence is only
an implication of the poem, and even if literally true, the speaker is more invested in
the idea of childhood that preexistence enriches and brings into focus.
The very brief, bright life of the child’s soul perpetually tantalizes with the
possibility that it may last forever. Indeed, the child’s vision mostly consists in the
illusion of eternality, the appearance that simple objects will last forever: “The world
resembled his eternity.” The fresh appearence of healthy things gives no sign of the
fact that they must die. Traherne hopes that the apparent eternality of sensory objects
can be mirrored by a soul—presumably his—that can appreciate the same objects
forever: “So rich and great did seem, / As if they ever must endure / In my esteem.”
Such valuations do not last, as Traherne soon admits this failure by confessing that as

See Elizabeth Dodd, “Perfect innocency by creation’ in the writings of Thomas
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against a pre-Romantic Traherne, insisting that Traherne’s idea of innocence is a
specific early modern religious concept that does not imply primitivism.
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a child he really knew nothing at all, not knowing pain and death: “Harsh ragged
objects were conceal’d,” along with, “Oppresions tears and cries, / Sins, griefs,
complaints, dissensions, weeping eyes.” The child has not seen anything ugly,
dangerous, or imperfect. The phrases “were concealed” and “Were hid” indicate an
active protection from these objects, by parents or happenstance. Despite the
meditative power of the child’s moment of visionary contemplation, that vision is
only protected by a deliberate ignorance, not just an ignorance of culture’s debilitating
customs, but an ignorance of all life’s harder facts.
By emphasizing the child’s ignorance, Traherne deliberately shows the
artificial construction of his visionary moment, the fact that it emerges from the
contingent arrangements of his life as a child. The child’s vision is not a divination
based on an inner power, grasping through mystery some ideal state. Traherne may
want to suggest that what the child sees is better, “only things…the angels prize,” but
he has no choice but to admit that the child misses substantially the real drama of life
on earth, which is always bound up with death. Perhaps it is a miracle that things have
been placed before the child in such a way that the unreality of what the child sees
reveals a reality about the world to come. This true-false sight of the child is really a
conceit, tested every time he repeats it. As in “Shadows of the Water,” the touchstone
of Traherne’s use of such conceits, Traherne can believe the child has made a
“mistake though false, intending true,” intending, but never certainly achieving.
Taken philosophically, Traherne has implied that the life to come—and
possibly the life past—is like the life of a child, especially in the fact that the child
does not yet believe in death. Traherne seems to believe in a childhood shot through
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with portents of eternal life, “bright shoots of everlastingness” as Vaughan puts it.13
For Traherne it is not just ignorance that impresses him, but the accompanying
wildness of childhood, when he “wander’d over all men’s grounds, / And found
repose,” and when he believed “Proprieties themselves were mine, / And hedges
ornaments.” That wildness too comes from a kind of ignorance of the proprietary
borders between field and field, which may be transgressed even by adults. One
limitation on the poet’s aspiration, property relations, is negotiable; death, on the
other hand, must be accepted. In the case of property, the child’s ignorance teaches
adults a real lesson: that “proprieties” can and should be transgressed. If the child can
transgress the borders of property, what else may it transgress? The implicit
comparison between death and property suggests likewise that the heavenly border is
as porous as the conventions governing property. As the child passes from field to
field, so might he pass from the heavenly kingdom to the earthly realm, transgressing
those “proprieties” as easily as he did the others.
Traherne puts no pressure on this thought, but merely suggests it, as in the first
line, “How like an angel came I down.” Some phrases suggest temporal development,
a gradient progress from heaven to earth, but others flatly declare a temporal
beginning: “When I was born.” To conclude, Traherne floats the possibility of
preexistence but does not assert it. The child’s “heavenliness” probably results from
the contingent miracle of what the child sees, and this same glow of enchantment
results from protection from the harsher elements of earthly life, especially “trades
and poverties,” rather than being a glittering relic of the life he just departed.
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In “The Apostasy” Traherne uses the same language of preexistence he
borrows from Vaughan to tell a reverse story, depicting how the child who enjoyed
perfect sight came to fall from that state of grace. Once as wise and salubriously
ignorant as the child in “Wonder,” the speaker of “The Apostasy” has fallen into a
dejected state, where
The Sun
And Moon forgon,
As if unmade, appear
No more to me; to God and Heven dead
I was, as tho they never were.14
For the adult speaker in his indeterminate state of apostasy, creation has been
virtually abolished. He is the opposite of the child whose celestial joy appreciates all
things in their best aspects. This apostasy came when he caught the popular curse and
“[grew] mad with customary folly.” He unlearned all his natural wisdom and came to
value “their pence and toys,” trinkets and money:
But I,
I knew not why,
Did learn among them too
At length; and when I once with blemisht Eys
Began their Pence and Toys to view,
Drown'd in their Customs, I became
A Stranger to the Shining Skies,
Lost as a dying Flame;
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And Hobby-horses brought to prize.15
As a child, he instantly guessed the worth of “the shining skies,” the physical
and metaphysical skies that surround him, but at some point, he lost his internal sight
and clarity. The soul comes down from immortality and learns the many painful
lessons of mankind, embodied in the dramatis personae of human lives. In More’s The
Præexistency of the Soul, the soul is a “stranger” on the earth—in the whole extended
cosmos—a refugee flown in from the “shining skies.” Traherne’s poem finds this
same poetic character—the exiled soul—a little further along, having forgotten its
earlier life. Traherne remolds More’s conception of the soul into a stranger, not to
earth, but to the realm of his celestial nativity. In a short line Traherne refers to the
soul “a dying flame,” as the Stoics did, glowing faintly in a dark material world and
going out. As the flame gutters, the soul’s gleam and heavenly color fade. The last
line impresses the sadness with which Traherne regards the “hobby-horses” the child
has chosen, or been forced to choose, in place of a grander, vanished aura of
knowledge. Traherne takes More’s image of a fiery, illuminated soul pressed in by
dark materiality and transforms it into a moving if abstract image of loss, a once-wise
soul caught up in the oblivion of childhood until it forgets itself to the point of playing
insensibly with a toy.
Traherne’s language here resembles that of Plotinus, who declared that the
descended soul “has become a partial thing, isolated, weakened, full of care, intent
upon the fragment.”16 Once a participant in all things through their participation in
Platonic realms of being, the soul is now just one single part fiddling idly with one
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other single part. Even the metaphor of play is the same, “fusses” being a word for
children. Traherne draws out this pathos recognized by Plotinus, who could scarcely
have drawn more poignant images than these of the soul’s catastrophic drift into
matter, its appearance as “stranger to the shining skies” and destiny “lost as a dying
flame.” The preexistence of the soul becomes the language of loss and painful
transformation.
In another poem, preexistence helps Traherne think the unthinkable. As
Timothy Harrison shows, Traherne often poses philosophical questions in his poetry,
and, like a science fictional thinker, he is drawn to the most impossible questions.17
For this reason, his most interesting poems often resemble thought experiments,
passing judgment on ideas and possibilities as the poem unfolds and completes. In
“The Salutation,” Traherne employs a framework of preexistence in order to
dramatize the scene of his own birth, an otherwise unimaginable event. As the
introductory poem of Traherne’s most important poetic collection, “The Salutation” is
Traherne’s salutation to existence itself, played out over several stanzas of
philosophical poetry. The Dobell manuscript begins with Traherne’s own version of
Genesis, a personal one. Against a void of non-being, Traherne imagines himself
coming to life as a baby, and when he imagines this scene, he is swarmed by the
questions it raises:
These little Limmes,
These Eys and Hands which here I find,
These rosie Cheeks wherwith my Life begins,
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Where have ye been? Behind
What Curtain were ye from me hid so long!
Where was? in what Abyss, my Speaking Tongue?18
These questions are directed at the mental image of himself as a newborn
child, but in a deeper sense they are directed toward being as such, of which the child
is a new member and vehicle for its experience. Material being, as opposed to nonbeing, is asked to justify its sudden appearance on the mental scene: “behind / What
curtain were ye from me hid so long?” The indexical quality of “these little limbs”
draws the reader toward a lyric present. Keats memorably draws us into the moment
of composition by pointing directly to his writing hand, “This living hand, now warm
and capable,” which itself contains a reminder to the reader, separated by time and
space, that hand and voice are both gone. In a similar fashion, Traherne places the
reader in a suspended moment and asks her to consider its implications, but he draws
attention to a moment already lost, perhaps always lost: the birth of the infant. He
asks his body and tongue a series of questions and in the process draws into alignment
the body of the child, now gone, with his own body in the moment of writing. Behind
these questions, bodily existence may be experienced as if new.19 These thoughts
gather precision from the adjectives this and these.20 The poet looks at his own hand
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and imagines the vast time when it had not been, together with the surprise of the fact
that it exists now. Traherne takes up the philosophical implications of this
consideration, namely its importance both for his identity and the ontology of the
universe as such. These are the same, because Traherne imagines that his own period
of pre-nativity was part of the “chaos” that predated the world’s formation into a
completed object. Traherne uses this Greek term for the formless primordial matter of
the universe to characterize his own identity prior to his physical creation:
When silent I,
So many thousand thousand yeers,
Beneath the Dust did in a Chaos lie.21
A preexistent soul is implied by the existence of personal identity before
matter. To say that “I” lived in a chaos is ambiguous, because in the confusion of preformed matter, “I” could not be distinguished from the general universal material.
Chaos has no space for individual identity. The only “I” that could exist while one’s
physical parts spun about in chaos is the soul, but what soul-birth looks like and when
and how that soul that joined with the physical body, is unknown. That question,
called psychogenesis, Traherne’s poem does not answer. Soul must come before
matter, but of the look and feel of the transition from nothing to new soul and from
new soul to soul-with-body, Traherne tells nothing. Clearly, Traherne can imagine his
body not existing, but he cannot imagine himself not existing. His soul must have
existed prior to the body if he imagines that some part of him did “in a chaos lie.” In
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an Aristotelian sense, the soul is the pattern or form of the body, the integrity that
makes the body hold. If the various atoms that make up his physical body pre-exist
him in matter, “a chaos,” then his soul must not pre-exist, since the integrity that the
atoms need to become a body is not yet there. His soul could not exist prior to his
body because if it did, the body itself would have achieved integrity and it too would
exist. If, however, Traherne takes a more Platonic view, then his soul must have had
some self-existence prior to the assumption of integrity that calls his body up from the
embryonic atoms of chaotic matter. Traherne does not choose any one of these
theories from the philosophers—traduction, immediate creation, nor even really
preexistence. His poems do not function as philosophical systems, and therefore these
specifics remain unresolved. Regardless of the nature of the soul he investigates,
Traherne makes the significant choice to leave out its creation. All the wondrous
features of his child’s body discussed in stanza one do not reveal his real, immaterial
creation. The implication of preexistence, or non-creation, lies behind this gap in the
metaphysical narrative, a possible explanation to sort out the mess Traherne’s speaker
has created.
In “The Salutation,” Traherne offers no resolution, but other poems suggest a
clue toward the solution of this problem of origins. Traherne’s speaker cannot
imagine the creation of his soul, but he can look at that soul in its current state and
make guesses that might begin to lighten the uncertain path toward its origin.
Traherne knows this path will be uncertain, as difficult to see clearly as the answers to
the questions that begin “The Salutation.” Therefore, when he takes up the question of
the soul’s original state, the one it enjoyed when freshly created, he begins in a
riddling mode, aware of how little can be known about the things he seeks to learn.
His best poem on the soul’s nature, “My Spirit,” falls midway through the Dobell
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collection, and its riddling procedure works to answer some of the questions asked by
that first poem, “The Salutation.” The first stanza begins describing an indeterminate
past in a series of philosophical words that do not hide their strangeness from
common use:
My Naked Simple Life was I.
That Act so Strongly Shind
Upon the Earth, the Sea, the Skie,
That was the Substance of My Mind.
The Sence it self was I.22
Act, life, substance, sense—these are metaphysical ideas, unusual and
estranged from ordinary use and certainly from poetry. They alert the reader the poem
has embarked toward the understanding of a quiddity. The inkhorn is nearby. Through
these various philosophical names, the speaker offers different hints about that
unnamable thing, whose name is known only through the title: “My Spirit.” That title
is a clue that offers no explanation. “Spirit” has always been a less precise word than
“soul,” itself no standard of definitional precision, variously described by different
philosophical schools. In Traherne’s time, the word filled in for a vast array of other
terms and ideas, as it does today. The title is therefore a something searching for a
name. “Spirit” is no name but a placeholder, and the speaker cannot say really say
whether it is a placeholder for “Act,” “Life” “Substance,” or “Sense.” Traherne’s
speaker characteristically keeps them all: I am “Life,” I am “Act,” I am “Substance,”
and I am “Sense.” Traherne does not specify, and as a result, the name “spirit” hovers
ambiguously over the arresting first few lines. As in Traherne’s other poems, the

22

“My Spirit” 1-5 from Centuries, Poems, and Thanksgivings 51-56.

128
speaker consistently uses the past tense. “I felt”; “the sense itself was I”; “my essence
was capacity.” Loss, descent, and failure are the themes of these past-tense
declarations. At the same time, the poet scarcely dwells at all upon this loss,
manifesting it only in these past tense phrases. Even the poem’s last moments
dispense with sin in two and a half lines: “Tho’ now eclipsed / by sin / There they are
useful and divine, / Exalted there they ought to shine.” Traherne’s speaker is not
presently concerned with fallenness. The fall narrative disappears as the speaker
merely looks within his own mind. About this inner awareness, he exclaims
It Acts not from a Centre to
Its Object as remote,
But present is, when it doth view,
Being with the Being it doth note.
Whatever it doth do.23
And later,
An Object, if it were before
My Ey, was by Dame Natures Law,
Within my Soul..24
Traherne is considering the very process of his own thinking. The second set
of lines quoted offers an explanation of the first: whatever the eye observes, the soul
immediately captures and brings into itself: “an object, if it were before / My eye,
was…within my soul.” Traherne distinguishes his own conception of the working of
the internal eye by explicitly rejecting the Galenic theory of optics. To imagine a
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“centre” reaching to a remote object is to imagine something physical stretching from
the eye—or the mind, as internal eye—to the thing observed, as Galen did. Traherne
rejects this possibility. When the eye-soul-spirit sees something, it cuddles right next
to its object, almost temporarily sharing its being, as seen in “Being with the Being it
doth note.” It can move lightning quick, but not through physical space, and it
instantly shares essences with another being. Through this elastic power, the inner eye
can almost trade souls with other forms of being. This spirit is the very conscious
spirit that wrote all these poems, driver of the “thoughts that wander through
eternity.”25 Realizing that he has this magnificent elastic inner sight, he proclaims its
sublime importance:
My Soul a Spirit infinite!
An image of the Deity!
A pure substantial light!
That Being greatest which doth nothing seem!
Why, ’twas my all, I nothing did esteem
But that alone. A strange mysterious sphere!
A deep abyss
That sees and is
The only proper place of Heavenly Bliss.26
The nature of the soul at present abnegates the reality of a temporal fall. The
soul’s very solidity, its completeness and incredible elasticity, belie the possibility
that it is currently in some degraded state. This internal eye sees all the heaven
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possible for a human being, “A deep Abyss / That sees and is / The only proper place
of Heavenly Bliss.” Traherne focuses on the quick impressive internal changes he can
effect by the exercise of his internal eye. Like Benjamin Whichcote, Traherne is
implying that heaven itself is a “temper,” an emotional state or quality in the soul
rather than a physical, or for that matter metaphysical, location.27 The metaphysical
facts that attend the Christian fall—a decline in the world, in the soul, a need for
restitution by divine agent, a set of final places to receive the dead—are nowhere to be
found. A tension with Christian doctrine therefore arises, because the present strength
of the soul negates the explanatory need for a fall in the first place. The soul is the
soul, complete and perfect.
The speaker spends the rest of the poem unwinding this possibility. His spirit
is what the speaker saw, but also that by means of which he saw; that “wondrous
Self” and “sphere of light” is also the “living orb of sight” that allows him to see.28
“My naked simple Life” consists not in biological body, nor in the “I” that
participates socially, but in “sense itself,” the fact of being presented with a world.
Life, or perception, is “the substance of my mind,” not thinking exactly, but sense, the
awareness of thinking: the “I” that performs the subject-role in thought, but also the I
that notices thought, always capable of stepping outside the thought, but never
capable of stepping outside itself. Traherne thus argues that the nature of the soul is
awareness, acts of perception that cut across time. For Traherne, thoughts flow so
majestically by the direction of his internal attention that he cannot help but feel awe
toward those thoughts and the will that directs his attention. “It was so quick and
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pure” he insists, “[t]hat all my Mind was wholy Evry-where.”29 In these magnificent
capacities to summon things near, far, past, present, and future to the chamber of its
own observation, the soul demonstrates its true, elevated nature. In this responsive,
viewing part Traherne sees the image of the divine origin of his own soul. “Tho now
eclyps’d by Sin,” the nature of his mind or “intellect” testifies its divine provenance,
even its divine nature.30
Through these poems, Traherne is approaching, from the underside, the
Platonic doctrine of deification, a significantly ambiguous word that always suggests
more than it says. Among the mystics, deification means to merge with God, usually
in some transcendent experience that fades. The same idea among Puritans might be
living regenerated or “walking with God.” The Platonic concept of the “internal eye,”
the eye with which both God and human beings see, goes further than the implication
of mere personal rectitude entailed by the doctrine of personal regeneration. There is
an amoral aspect to deification, an identification with God’s power, not only with his
goodness. I am “not fetter’d by an iron fate,” says Traherne in the “The Preparative,”
thundering also, “simple sense / Is lord of all created excellence.” Human beings hold
sway over the kingdom of their own lives and especially the kingdom of their own
minds. This possibility had taunted and tempted Henry More. In More’s Præexistency
of the Soul, the human soul fell when it came to this belief in its own power, thinking
“of [it self] something to have been.”31 What More regards with monotheistic
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anxiety—he both wants and fears to be a power opposite to God—Traherne welcomes
as a delicious option.
Traherne grasps this theme of divine resemblance, but he holds it as lightly as
he holds any idea. He draws a connection in “The Preparative” and “My Spirit”
between the soul and God by means of a self that is whole and uninterrupted by nonexistence, a soul whose history drifts back into eternity. The soul is so much like God
that all time can be bounded up in human perception, our eye being God’s eye.32
Traherne’s relationship to this Platonic doctrine is ambiguous. He is far more of a
materialist than More. For that reason, Traherne invites the question why we should
trust the power of a faculty known to be only the projection of nerves and atoms. His
answer comes at the problem from the side, bypassing truth, bypassing immortality,
and looking for philosophy from unphilosophical phenomena. Traherne accepts
contingency, for he is looking mostly at resemblance. Even mistaken perception
grasps something real. Eternity is what appears to be eternal. This doctrine is put into
practice in The Centuries of Meditation. What Traherne performs at the beginning of
the third century is a subtle experiment in negative capability. He trusts perception to
tell him something profound but almost indescribable in words of any kind, certainly
inexplicable by formal logic. To understand this capacity for openness, it is necessary
to review the early modern concept of “experience.”

II. Experience and Vision in Traherne
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The richness of the category of experience in early modern thought emerges
from its status as the coordination between the philosophical, Baconian concept of
experiment as a source of true knowledge of natural things and the mystical
conception of experience as the direct, immediate conveyance of knowledge of things
divine. Both ideas, in their most interesting formulations, make special importance out
of human sensation, granting special status to our organs of perception. Both of them
also stand against the orthodox Christian definition of what counts as true knowledge.
Faith, for the Calvinists, is the imposition of knowledge on a mind and body that
endlessly resists that knowledge, the forceful integration of the revealed knowledge of
God, his acts as creator, judge, and redeemer, that are not revealed by way of the
natural faculties but by an original expression by the deity. True knowledge for the
Calvinists stands in blithe contradiction to experience: it is experience that must be
made subject to knowledge, rather than vice versa. We are to find our knowledge as
participants in the cosmic Christian story, not find the cosmic knowledge through
experience.
If the two are to be distinguished, it would be on the grounds that in the
mystical view, there is an additional, preternatural if not supernatural, perceptive
organ—the soul or spirit as the medium between self and God. The mystics, like Peter
Sterry, believe that this mystical faculty conveys para-psychological information and
something like sensory experience itself, even if expressed in partly ambiguous terms.
Reason is one extra-sensory instrument, but there is another implanted alongside it,
the wandering experience called “the Spirit of God.” These two elements Sterry
describes by the awkward term “Principles,” and asserts that they “are
the Spirit of Man or Reason; the Spirit of God.” He proceeds to elucidate their
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different natures by means of a metaphor drawn from the manifold of sensory
experience:
I can no more convey a sense of this difference [Between Reason and
the Spirit of God] into any soule, that hath not seen these two Lights
shining in it self: than I can convey the difference
between Salt and Sugar; to him, who hath never
tasted Sweet or Sharp. These things are discerned only
by exercise of senses; and are too hard for those, who have not their
own senses exercised in them.33
The two experiences are rendered into sensation, but the medium of that
sensation is not the physical body but the immaterial soul. The soul is a broad,
sensitive, perceptive medium, a consciousness separated from the body, but also
subject to the tumult and agitation of experience. For Sterry, these “two Lights”
manifest as the “difference between Salt and Sugar” in a figure deprived of that
experience, like Locke’s blind man trying to imagine color. Peter Lopston called
More a “somewhat wooly thinker[]” in contrast to Anne Conway, but compared to
More Sterry himself is a mystic.34 He likes paradoxes and living in doubt, not
carefully hammering out his metaphysical predicates. He is a “poetic philosopher”
drifting toward the irrational and beautiful, tendencies that are only at the suggestive
fringes of More’s rationalism, as seen in chapter one. Sometimes, Sterry explicitly
“feels” the spirit of God, a fact he incorporates into his wider philosophy.
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In temperament and style of thought, Traherne is more like Sterry than like
any other of the Cambridge Platonists. Traherne begins with the concept of
“experience” and leverages an entire alternate view of the metaphysical universe—
one played with, suggested, but never quite asserted in the tantalizing dance of his
poetry and mystical prose. “God is unseen till He be so known,” Traherne writes in
the Fourth Century, “and David’s Spirit an inscrutable mystery, till this is
experienced.”35 Statements like these are indeed theological, yet in the same instant
something about them remains merely experiential. Though it is a transcendental
belief—a higher plane intersecting with this one—the experience of that
transcendences plays out in the consciousness of ordinary experience. Ordinary
experience is to be transcended, but by means of ordinary experience. By accounting
for experience, albeit in abstracted terms, something like phenomenology is
approached, as Gary Kuchar explains and Timothy Harrison elaborates further in
diverse ways.36 Traherne’s trust in experience borders on the Gnostic, as Geoffrey
Babbit has recently noticed.37 Babbit’s analysis focuses on the moment of “uplift”
associated with poetic composition, which can be deepened into Traherne’s wider
sense of the relationship between experience and truth. Poetic composition is indeed
crucial to Traherne’s theory of experience, but it is modulated through another
intellectual concept of his day, the figure of the Platonic rapture. This idea of rapture
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is a theory and practice of experience that connects the emotional sensorium to
metaphysical reality, capturing what Kenneth Borris has called an aesthetics of the
“sublime” generated, not from scientific awe, but perception of a completed divine
plan:
Unlike the postmodern sublime, which focuses on materiality and its
contrasts with consciousness, perception, and representation, its early
modern predecessor was still, as before, associated with a sense of
transcendence, with intimations of a sacred realm beyond materiality,
or with perception of the natural world in ways complementary to felt
supernatural awe.38
Felt supernatural awe is a succinct explanation of the “affect of preexistence”
identified in the introduction, connected to its “intimations of a sacred realm beyond
materiality.” What is felt is feelable and transmittable through experience. According
to John Guillory, this “poetic furor” disappeared after the Florentine Neoplatonists,
except in the poetry of Spenser and Milton, but that aspiration reappears in Traherne’s
and Sterry’s language of experience.39 The fact of the soul’s rapturous experience of
vision, called “prophecy,” manifests as “supernatural awe,” a present fact that plays
across the internal senses. The immaterial becomes feelable for them. In Traherne’s
scheme the immaterial and metaphysical—the real—manifests itself through the
sensations of ordinary experience. But it especially manifests through sensations and
observations that seem to rise above ordinary experience and offer themselves up as
“visions” that convey intellectual truth. This type of experience is secured as true
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knowledge by way of poetic furor: by the sensation of the very emotions that
accompany it.
This formulation creates an opening toward the concept of experience for
experience’s sake, and for a vision of poetry that disconnects from its theologized
origins and drains “vision” of its metaphysical content. Looking, in one famous
section of the Centuries of Meditation, Traherne experiences a vision. In this famous
“Corn passage,” Traherne makes a mistake, intending true, but he does not this time
look beyond this mistake toward a deeper truth. He takes the mistake, not as revealing
the truth of the matter, but as the truth itself. Traherne sticks to the surface of things.
Appearances do not indicate essences or reveal metaphysical reality, but appear as
simple facts. Nature is that which has no inside and no depths. Traherne’s passage
writes a spiritual life without metaphysics through an act of mere observation.
The idea of the intuitive truth of mere observation is best compared with
Ralph Waldo Emerson, the genius of nineteenth-century American literature, in SelfReliance. Emerson demands, “Let us stun and astonish the intruding rabble of men
and books and institutions, by a simple declaration of the divine fact.”40 The
suggestiveness of these words lies in the conviction that human experience itself is a
formless content that resists incorporation into a system of meaning that is public and
universal. The individual has her own prized experience, a kind of possession. The
proprietary and individualist aspect of Emerson’s theory stands in contrast to
Traherne’s own sense of the injustice and absurdity of “proprieties,” the capitalist
relations that he, unlike Emerson, resists. Nevertheless, on the importance and power
of the “divine fact,” Traherne would agree with the later visionary. Traherne has his
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own theory of the “rabble of men and books and institutions,” which he calls
“custom.” “[I]t is not our parents’ loins, so much as our parents’ lives, that enthrals
and blinds us,” he writes in the Third Century, reversing Benjamin Whichcote’s point
that “custom is a second nature.”41 In Traherne likewise, the proper response to this
ruin lies in “a simple declaration of the divine fact.” The worldview of the preexistent
soul is a lonely one, as it stands in distinction to the whole weight “of men and books
and institutions.” This Platonism which sets itself in fundamental metaphysical
opposition to the world beyond the philosopher’s own mind here becomes
transmogrified, not exactly to the mind of the philosopher, but to the experience of the
feeling person and the poet. States of elevation connect to a kind of speaking truth,
but what that truth is difficult to say, for Traherne as well as for Emerson.
And now at last the highest truth on this subject remains unsaid;
probably cannot be said; for all that we say is the far-off remembering
of the intuition. That thought, by what I can now nearest approach to
say it, is this. When good is near you, when you have life in yourself, it
is not by any known or accustomed way; you shall not discern the footprints of any other; you shall not see the face of man; you shall not
hear any name;--the way, the thought, the good, shall be wholly
strange and new. It shall exclude example and experience. You take
the way from man, not to man.42
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For Emerson, original intuition possesses something, the very something that
abnegates the rest of life, a kind of Gnosticism by way of sensorial impressions. It is
important that “the highest truth on this subject remains unsaid; probably cannot be
said.” To say and name in this final area is to transgress on what Fredric Jameson
once called “the unnameable,” the remaining sense of all to be yet described.43
“[G]ood” does not exist according to the normal rules of reality but intrudes on reality
in the form of an interruption. Paradoxically, this intrusion upon normal reality is not
opposed to experience but a part of it. The hour of vision is ordinary; it comes and
goes. Before leaving, however, it calls all into doubt.
Transcending the different boundaries of Traherne’s theological categories is a
bare attention to the truth revealed in ordinary experience, forever transgressing
against the realms of the not known. He wrote poetry not because he was ignorant of
philosophy, but because he wished to see it pushed further into the wilds of unknown
experience. The Centuries of Meditation as a whole dramatize the drift of his
distinctive style of thought. The Centuries are full of moments of vision and rapture
that add up to a rather lopsided and occasionally repetitive whole. One of Traherne’s
particular visions, the “Corn was orient and immortal wheat” passage, is one of the
most popular passages of Traherne’s prose for the poetic construction of its sentences
that lay out one of the most powerful statements of spirituality in seventeenth-century
literature. Despite its wide acclaim, the passage has rarely been studied for the
particulars of its vision, as if it were just a uniform account of rapture. The content of
Traherne’s poetic account of rapture reveals his intuition of preexistence, or rather,
more boldly, eternal existence:
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Those pure and virgin apprehensions I had from the womb, and that
divine light wherewith I was born are the best unto this day, wherein I
can see the Universe…
The corn was orient and immortal wheat, which never should be
reaped, nor was ever sown. I thought it had stood from everlasting to
everlasting. The dust and stones of the street were as precious as gold:
the gates were at first the end of the world. The green trees when I saw
them first through one of the gates transported and ravished me, their
sweetness and unusual beauty made my heart to leap, and almost mad
with ecstasy, they were such strange and wonderful things: The Men!
O what venerable and reverend creatures did the aged seem!
Immortal Cherubims! And young men glittering and sparkling Angels,
and maids strange seraphic pieces of life and beauty! Boys and girls
tumbling in the street, and playing, were moving jewels. I knew not
that they were born or should die; But all things abided eternally as
they were in their proper places. Eternity was manifest in the Light of
the Day, and something infinite behind everything appeared which
talked with my expectation and moved my desire. The city seemed to
stand in Eden, or to be built in Heaven.44
Traherne’s first, anchoring perceptions indicate that the objects of his vision
are pre-existent and eternal. By the poetry, we have been prepared to see “pleasing
fictions” as opportunities for deep instruction. This vision is certainly a
fiction. Traherne imagines the corn standing “from everlasting to everlasting,”
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participating in an existence with neither beginning nor end. It is not just immortal,
undying, or sempiternal, as it “never should be reaped,” but preexistent, since it was
not “ever sown.” The corn was not created. Unlike Adam in Paradise Lost, who leaps
up newborn from the grass declaiming his creator’s existence, Traherne’s infant in the
third Century does not perceive any act of creation implied by the fact of a world
itself.36 The world, including the corn, the human figures, the city, all appear as if they
are eternal. Older men appear “Immortal Cherubims!” and young men “Glittering and
Sparkling Angels,” while the girls are “strange Seraphick Pieces of Life and Beauty.”
The comparison of living human beings to angels suggests that humans rightly
understood are immortal creatures. This comparison appears to indicate only the
presence of an immortal soul inside these human creatures, but when placed against
the claim about “nor was ever sown,” these angelic creatures appear to have existed
from eternity: “I knew not that they were born or should die.” These angels “stood
from everlasting to everlasting,” though only in appearance.
According to the passage, the infant’s ideal sight, which discovers the great
vision of the passage, arises largely from ignorance of human institutions and
customs. At the time of his vision, the speaker “Dreamed not of Poverties Contentions
or Vices, as well as “churlish proprieties [read: properties], nor bounds, nor
divisions.” Traherne characterizes this ignorance as “Divine…Knowledge.” Ignorant
of custom, “proprieties,” and “divisions,” the human infant apparently perceives
the divine reality. However, if it is divine reality the infant perceives, that reality does
not include many things that belong in reality as human beings know it. As in the
poem “Wonder,” already discussed, the infant does not know death, pain, or even
birth: “I knew not that they were born or should die.” Custom, propriety, and division
may be imaginary and unreal, but these things are, even to Traherne, undeniably

142
real. “Everything was at Rest, Free, and Immortal,” the speaker writes, yet
restlessness, unfreedom, and mortality are real. The speaker’s “divine
knowledge” is profound ignorance, not just of human custom but of the reality of a
fallen world. Becoming “a little Child again,” and entering into “the Kingdom of
God” means unlearning many true facts about the world, not just unlearning human
superstitions or foolish customs:
I knew no churlish proprieties, nor bounds, nor divisions: but all
proprieties and divisions were mine: all treasures and the possessors of
them. So that with much ado I was corrupted, and made to learn the
dirty devices of this world. Which now I unlearn, and become, as it
were, a little child again that I may enter into the Kingdom of God.45
The end of the passage jerks abruptly to the present, to the decay of this
transcendent vision and the arrival of reality: “with much adoe I was corrupted; and
made to learn the Dirty Devices of this World. Which now I unlearn, and become as it
were a little Child again, that I may enter into the Kingdom of God.” Traherne is
ignorant of the fact that the world had a creator. The knowledge of the world’s
creation is one of the “Dirty Devices of this World,” whereby he was corrupted.
Traherne seems to insist that the world is rightly understood when once more the corn
becomes “Orient and Immortal Wheat, which never should be reaped, nor was ever
sown.”38 Contemplation of his vision as a child thrusts Traherne into a transcendent
perspective that has transcended Nature itself, perhaps better to say has ignored it. He
is living a fantasy that the world is “in Eden” and was “built in Heaven.” He describes
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his realization of death and birth as a process of “corruption,” as if he were deceived,
rather than educated, by coming to know beginnings and endings.
The account of the Third Century, incandescent with a sense of the
everlasting, is a recovery of past knowledge that cannot be proven true by reality.
This true feeling that all has lasted forever, cannot be confirmed by experience,
indeed is disconfirmed by the facts of life. Traherne later suggest that these
perspectives can be “Collected again, by the Highest Reason” and reincorporated into
the adult vision.39 He also repeated the same vision in “Wonder”:
The streets were pav’d with golden stones,
The boys and girls were mine,
Oh how did all their lovely faces shine!
The sons of men were holy ones,
In joy and beauty they appear’d to me,
And every thing which here I found,
While like an angel I did see,
Adorn’d the ground.46
Traherne has minutely but significantly altered the vision in this different
presentation. Once again he boldly claims to possess all the creatures that he sees,
insisting that he did not know “[c]urs’d and devis’d proprieties.” He has tempered his
statements about the eternality of the world of his vision. The boys and girls appear
“in joy and beauty,” not suggesting their everlastingness. Instead of angels, “the sons
of men were holy ones.” This change allows Traherne more ambiguity: rather than
being immortal creatures, almost gods, the children of men may be merely blessed,
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but still human, creatures. Traherne’s devaluation of the strong terms of the vision
from the third century likely indicates that he recognized how difficult it was to
incorporate into a larger scheme of interpretation.
Traherne’s vision is irrecoverable. The descent into personal identification,
into the knowledge of life and death, perhaps simply into language
itself, have all placed the hour of vision immeasurably far away. The experience of
vision is not a certain number of regimented degrees, of historical and psychological
experiences, removed from the present moment. “This spectacle once seen,” Traherne
writes later in the Third Century, “will never be forgotten.”47 But Traherne cannot use
ordinary language to convey what vision sees, and the realities of language, like the
realities of the world itself, will not just diminish but make absurd what Traherne
powerfully felt and lost as powerfully. A single shift from the moment of vision
results in an irreversible transformation from then to now. We are an inch from that
vision, but from the vision’s perspective, we are contained inside its ever-nowness
where immanence and transcendence are the same. Traherne’s loss of vision is also a
means of gaining it: that single, imaginative step of reading finds us again inside the
world where everything clung together and being seemed available, if unable to be
voiced again.
Traherne’s openness to a condition that transgresses against his own faith
constitutes the incorporation of his trust in vision into a life philosophy deeper even
than faith: “This spectacle once seen is never forgotten.” Regardless of what the
preachers and grammarians say, this vision remains a testament to something
otherwise revealed. If this theory of experience resembles anything, the resemblance
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is with the negative theology of Christian Platonism, at least in approach, for the
vision resists explication and meaning and can thus be known by what it
resists. Traherne tries to say, in effect, nothing—to express being without
commentary, experience without interpretation. Traherne approaches nature from a
situated standpoint, the Christian determination of nature’s meanings according to
God’s purposes, but he does not see what that standpoint is supposed to show him. He
sees a vision that negates Christian theology, one that writes against existing
descriptions of nature. He makes a mistake, intending true, but he does not this time
look beyond this mistake toward a deeper truth. He takes the mistake, not as revealing
the truth of the matter, but as the truth itself. By sticking to the surface of things,
Traherne writes a spiritual life without metaphysics but also without “nature,” through
an act of mere observation that does not distinguish between the natural world and
Traherne’s own perception of it, seeing them both as a continuum of being, a
continual surface, like the Platonist’s sensitive soul, vibrating meaning.

Conclusion
In Mortal Thoughts, Bryan Cummings puts forward the content of
secularization in early modern ethics and epistemology as the acceptance of human
finitude, the end of the belief in life after death (or by extension life before life).48
Traherne shows how it means moreover the acceptance of “walking with God” or
spiritual regeneration as a process integrated into ordinary human life. Spiritual living,
like spiritual knowledge, becomes instantiated through ordinary, not extraordinary
acts of perception and integration. This is the very purpose of the Centuries of
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Meditation, as Louis Martz understands, to integrate the act of perception, which he
calls by its Christian name, meditation, into the wider experience of life.49 Integration
and connection of the richer parts of experience are the goals of the Centuries, which
were written for Traherne’s friend Susanna Hopton of Hereford in a notebook that she
herself provided him: “since Love made you put it into my hands I will fill it with
those Truths you love without knowing them.” From this outset, the Centuries are a
book about writing and connection, the connection of one soul to another, the
connection of a soul to God, even the connection between the blank pages and the pen
with which Traherne writes. Traherne makes explicit this link between the human
soul and the pages of a book: “An empty book is like an infant’s soul, in which
anything can be written. It is capable of all things, but containeth nothing.” The
linkage also suggests a connection between Susanna Hopton’s soul and the very book
he writes in; he writes with a pen on both Mrs. Hopton’s soul and his own, making
those marks that help to form the soul in the direction intended by God. Fulfilling the
soul’s nature in capacity, Traherne proposes to trace out the “invisible ways of
conveyance by which some great thing doth touch our souls, and by which we tend to
it.”50
Those invisible ways of conveyance are natural to the soul even in its infant
state, but easily forgotten, clouded over by what Traherne usually calls
“custom.” Custom, by which Traherne mean the implicit education conveyed by our
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upbringing in human society, is always a negative word in Traherne. With custom put
aside, Traherne’s connecting pen shows the metaphysico-spiritual linkages that tether
the human being to the universe and the universal creator. Each time the linkage is
experienced, a fresh well of life is found. The concept of walking with God or
regeneration is the global reincorporation of these experiences into a way of life.
When cast together over a lifetime, they add up to a state of regeneration or spiritual
completion. This regeneration takes the form of integrated aesthetic experience, the
aestheticized category of “vision” that we have already seen.
Traherne’s account of his own vision shows his expansion into new territory in
English literary history, into a “disinterested” perspective on religious vision that
resembles the new developments in aesthetic theory by the early eighteenth-century
philosopher Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713).
Shaftesbury wrote an influential three-volume treatise, the Characteristics of Men,
Manners, Opinions, Times, that among its many dynamic advancements, arguably
began the tradition of aesthetic theory in England.51 The poet, Shaftesbury writes,
must
fix his eye upon that consummate grace, that beauty of Nature, and that
perfection of numbers which the rest of mankind, feeling only by the
effect whilst ignorant of the cause, term the Je-ne-sçay-quoy, the
unintelligible or the I know not what, and suppose to be a kind of
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charm or enchantment of which the artist himself can give no
account.52
It is this concept, of Je-ne-sçay-quoy, that arguably constitutes Shaftesbury’s
most original contribution to the critical study of literature. Precisely by not naming
that quality that makes art art, Shaftesbury lays the foundation for Addison’s more
Lockean account of the preeminence of the experiential and sensorial qualities inside
art; Je-ne-sçay-quoy moreover captures something factual about the process of art
appreciation, which is that art always seems incompletely explained no matter how
finely tuned our explanations. In Shaftesbury’s view, attention to the subjective
experience and away from what can be rationally established as truth nevertheless
achieves a kind of truth, though of a different order. Truth in art is beauty. Literary art
makes this identification especially difficult, since literature from a philosophical
perspective consists of propositions that are untrue; Shaftesbury maintains, however,
that “In poetry, which is all fable, truth still is the perfection.53 Shaftesbury’s account
of the literary arts is mainly found in his “Advice to an Author,” collected in the
Characteristics. His wider theory here advances disinterested or “objective” taste,
which nevertheless has a “subjective” element; in a Platonist fashion, the intelligent
critic gradually molds his taste after “the good,” “the beautiful,” and “the true.” Still,
since the experience of art belongs in one of the human being’s higher faculties,
Shaftesbury can fit even this open-ended idea of appreciation into a roughly Platonist
psychology that acclaims such perceptions as possessing intimations of higher, even
metaphysical truth.
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Like Shaftesbury, Traherne presents a “disinterested” point of view, not
described with any such name, but present in the existential implications of his
account of childhood vision. Traherne’s vision offers no answers, no gloss that can
equip one for the proper spiritual life. It is, in Philip Sidney’s sense, a lie, a golden
world offered as an alternative to the brazen world of actuality. But unlike Sidney’s
golden world of the poets, it is not derived from the imitation of nature in its truth, but
an account merely of what one man saw, once. For this reason, it bears important
similarity to Shaftesbury’s salutary ideas of Je-ne-sçay-quoy, that property in an
artistic vision that is difficult to describe, essentially itself, a part of one perspective
and no other. In Traherne’s reading of his older contemporary Vaughan, his rewriting
of that classic poem “The Retreat,” he rejects the easily resolvable default aesthetic
model, the lyric, for which the theory of preexistence is so apt. This moment from the
Centuries is an advancement on his deployment of preexistence in “Wonder,”
precisely because it does not fit itself into the category of lyric but remains inert and
unallegorized. It is a step toward the perspective of “disinterestedness,” for Traherne
wants nothing from his vision.
Shaftesbury also is one of the great creators of the idea of sensibility, by which
a person’s moral character is established through their emotional refinement and
sensibility. A form of moral and aesthetic qualification, sensibility is a theory of
human experience that grants a special status to the sensitive person. The soul of the
Neoplatonist, vulnerable to the quivering onset of emotion, is a sentimentalist, albeit
on other terms than the exponents of sensibility in the later part of the century. Poetic
composition joins with vision to make up a theory of sensibility on its own, by way of
Platonic mysticism. The mysterious and ambiguous truth in Traherne’s vision
indicates how theology is transformed in his work into an aesthetic object. Though a
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believing Christian, Traherne treats doctrines as ideas to be put on or discarded
insofar as they enlarge his aesthetic horizons and make him a better writer. Moreover,
his work displays how the doctrines and theories of knowledge that lie behind
theology yield to an epistemology of subjectivity and artistic effects. The ideas’ value
lies in their contribution to a whole, not a whole world, but a whole book or a whole
poem.
Traherne’s anticipation of Shaftesbury shows a shift in the realms of value
from spiritual or religious practice toward, not just art, but the unified perceptions of
the observer as such.54 Traherne’s vision captures things in their very aliveness, their
completeness, and their excess of all the desires of the individual viewing subject. In
their ontological completeness, objects of vision become not so much repositories of
individual desire as ever-present suggestions of the world’s ideal character, in which
all things deserve respect. The perspective of preexistence in Traherne therefore
reveals the je nei sais quoi of all things, their resolute perfection when retrieved from
the usual systems of valuation and division: property, classification, even assessment
in terms of subjective wants and needs. Traherne’s view thus anticipates
Shaftesbury’s but with a radical and more universal focus, transcribing the power of
disinterested art into the account of the mystical viewer, who achieves a sense of the
excess in things themselves and thereby learns their inexpressible and uncontainable
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nature. This nature is always in excess of programs of thought, even of interpretation.
Traherne shows, therefore, a version of perception that refuses to fix a value on
anything, exactly at the moment, the late seventeenth century, when the idea of value
became paramount in the organization of collective social life.
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Chapter Four
Gnostic Deists: Preexistence after Milton

I believe in death. I believe in disease. I believe in injustice and inhumanity, torture
and anger and hate. I believe in murder. I believe in pain. I believe in cruelty and
infidelity. I believe in slime and stink and every crawling, putrid thing, every possible
ugliness and corruption, you son of a bitch. I believe in you.
-The Exorcist III1
Introduction
The philosophical transitions of the late seventeenth century and early
eighteenth century have been widely studied as significant for the production of
secular modernity. The Deists, the Spinozists, the empiricists, the political liberals—
all of these have their place in the historiography of emerging Enlightenment. This
chapter introduces a figure absent from the existing scholarship, though one who
participated in these same debates at these same historical junctures. This figure is the
Deist who believes in the preexistence of the soul. Radicals of all stripes have been
contextualized and understood, but not this figure, because the number of scholars
searching for the odd combination of radical questioning of Christian orthodoxy and
radical metaphysical dualism—characteristic of the believers in preexistence—is
small.2 A “metaphysician in the dark,” challenging Christian doctrine and expressing
spiritualist dualism is a specimen unfamiliar to our paradigms of philosophical
materialism and natural science. Yet they existed, and their existence suggests that we
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have missed the true extent and also the character of the rethinking of Christian
doctrines in the transition from the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries.
In the later part of the century, the doctrine of preexistence found a home not
among clerics and bishops like George Rust and Joseph Glanvill, nor among
aristocrats like Anne Conway, but among Deist authors at the periphery of English
social life. From 1690 to 1735, the primary and almost the only defenders of
preexistence were the Deists Jacob Ilive (1705-1763), William Staunton (1663c1740), and the anonymous author of Prӕexistence (1714).3 Characteristic of their
skeptical questioning of Christian theology, these early English Deists employ a
version of preexistence that breaks with the more modest Christian Platonism of the
previous century. The Platonist Henry More had argued that the souls of human
beings were created by God in Heaven before the creation of the world, a reality
allegorically expressed in the Book of Genesis by God’s first command, “Let there be
light.” Like Henry More before them, these writers argue that preexistence was a lost
part of the Gospel truth, but they press their case in terms and with additions that
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would have shocked the earlier philosopher. Unlike the seventeenth-century defenders
of preexistence, the authors of the early eighteenth century assert the bolder idea that
human beings are in fact fallen angels. Rather than arguing for an allegorical
interpretation of the Genesis creation myth, these authors substantially reject that
myth. Claiming that Genesis is a false and corrupted version of the true story of
preexistent creature, they undermine the authority of both reason and revelation and
write original narratives of the creation that center human beings as powerful cosmic
agents trapped inside limited bodies in a fallen world.
Both Ilive and the Præexistence author construct their cosmologies with the
colors and concepts of their most influential contemporary author on angelic matters:
John Milton. Though no believer in preexistence, Milton wrote landmark epics that
memorably describe actions in heaven consequential for the lives of human beings. In
the process, he firmly cemented his own vision of heavenly life in the minds of his
literary successors, and these English Deists combine their preexistence theology with
Milton’s astonishing heavenly landscape and set of actors. Moreover, as other critics
have shown, Milton’s own poetic expansion of biblical stories opened a new genre of
religious poetry, extra- or para-biblical in character, of great creativity and a degree of
theological originality.4 Preexistence enters both the poetic and philosophical works
of Deists in a Miltonic garb, because Milton’s work suggested a practice compatible
with these authors’ questioning of Christian orthodoxy and scripture, a way to speak
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heterodoxy with an orthodox voice and to narrate cosmic, divine things without
relying on scriptural accounts.
The most salient text among these is Præexistence, a Poem in Imitation of
Milton (1714). Contrary to the analysis of the poem’s modern critics, the poem
presents a Deist theology in which preexistence plays a primary role. After creating
the world, the God of Præexistence does nothing to affect that world and its
inhabitants. The poem also describes the entire progress of human life without any
mention whatever of the Incarnation, sacrifice, and redemption of Christ. Like his
fellow Deists William Staunton and Jacob Ilive, the author of Præexistence believed
that human beings were angels fallen from heaven after their conflict against God and
that God did not intervene after the world’s creation. These beliefs supported each
other by cleanly separating the heavenly (supernatural) and earthly (natural) worlds
and by telling a story of the creation and depravity of human beings more reasonable
than the account in Genesis. Through it all runs alienation from the world as created, a
state of spiritual pravity that leaves one unsatisfied in the world as found, especially
because it so contrasts with our essence as angels. Both Jacob Ilive and the author of
Præexistence express deep dissatisfaction with the created world, regarding it as a hell
rather than a gift—created evil, as the God of Præexistence avers, not corrupted by
human failure. For Ilive, human beings are eternal, pre-existing principles, gods in
their own right.5 In Præexistence humans are literally Miltonic warriors, like Michael
and Satan in Paradise Lost, who squaring off seem larger than the planets in conflict.6
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Ilive and the Præexistence author contrast these elements with the world through
antitheses, “God principles” and “hell principles,” divine soul and devilish flesh.
Strangely, Ilive and the author of Præexistence reject nearly every doctrine of
Christianity as mystifications and yet erect the stridently metaphysical doctrine of
preexistence in their own cosmology. In the cosmologies of Ilive and the
Præexistence author, a transcendent God exists, but only on the other side of a
metaphysically impassable barrier. The created world is “orphaned,” permanently
beyond its transcendent father’s reach. The earth is governed only by natural causes,
and supernatural revelation has never happened, all apparent revelations being
mystifications by crafty priests to control the ignorant. Christ is not to be worshipped,
and general redemption from human sin has not been effected. The metaphors that
govern these cosmologies arrange God’s light against the created world’s darkness,
transcendence against immanence, with the whole world seen as irretrievably dark
and immanent and God’s transcendent light placed at an unapproachable distance.
The category of “knowledge” unites their Deism and belief in preexistence into a
structural, not a doctrinal, gnosticism. Characteristic of this metaphorical and
affective gnosticism, the only possible hope lies in the recognition (re-knowing,
recovered gnosis) of what Gnostic founder Valentinus calls “the knowledge of who
we were, what we became; where we were, whereinto we have been thrown.”7 In

such as to set forth
Great things by small, If Natures concord broke,
Among the Constellations war were sprung,
Two Planets rushing from aspect malign
Of fiercest opposition in mid Sky,
Should combat, and their jarring Spheres confound.
7
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other words, human hope lies in individuals recognizing themselves as preexistent
souls dwelling previously in Heaven, a fact that does not ameliorate the brutality of
earthly life but reveals it. The soul’s preexistence is the content of a dual forms of
knowledge: knowledge that the priests’ authority is false and knowledge of human
beings’ semi-divinity. This twofold knowledge authorizes the individual’s experience
as the only source of truth. This knowledge takes the form, as will be shown, of
Enlightenment skepticism built on truly radical metaphysical and ethical foundations.

I. Deism and Preexistence
Præexistence, a Poem in Imitation of Milton is a strange and for the most part
unfamiliar poem, known mostly to students of Milton’s influence on early eighteenthcentury poetry. It was published in 1714 by John Clarke, a Whig bookseller in
London. The poem is a few hundred lines of formidable blank verse, written as the
title indicates in imitation of Milton’s Paradise Lost. The book proved popular in the
mid- and late-eighteenth-century, not in its original printing but as a part of Robert
Dodsley’s Miscellany, which itself was famous even in the nineteenth century among
literary antiquarians. With regards to plot and setting, Præexistence is almost nothing
but a speech by God to the angels in heaven, modeled on the Father’s similar speeches
in Paradise Lost. After a description of heavenly noise ringing through the cosmic
frame, the poem opens with the good angels returning from the gates of Hell, “Hot
with pursuit, and reeking with the blood / Of guilty cherubs smear’d in sulphurous
dust.”8 Præexistence is set between books six and seven of Paradise Lost, between
the war in heaven and the creation of the physical world. Præexistence gives these
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two events a strong causal link.9 The God of Præexistence creates the physical world
in order to have a place to house the middle angels, those who followed Satan in his
rebellion without malice or stubbornness. These angels will be given a place befitting
the lesser severity of their crime and their sincere repentance: the earth. He also
creates human bodies to house these angelic souls and to carry out his punishment on
them for their fall. In his long speech, God lays out a cosmological plan for effecting
this transformation of the guilty from angels to human beings. God will send the rebel
angels out into the darkness of “eternal night” where the anthropomorphized “Silence
sits, whose visionary shape / In folds of wreathy mantling sits obscure.”10 There in the
abyss of night flows the River Lethe, the famous river of oblivion that washes away
the memories of all who drink its waters. “Hither compell’d, each soul must drink
long draughts / Of those forgetful streams,” the poem’s God announces, and in the
process the “forms within, / And all the great ideas fade and die.”11 By the classical
topos of Lethe, God makes clear: nothing of the divine knowledge will remain to
fallen human beings, so that when they assume their bodies, they do not inherit any of
the high Platonic knowledge and sense of metaphysical unity, that experience of
divine oneness that characterizes Plotinian contemplation. Instead, human beings will
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be lost in a lost world, without a metaphysical guiding light or hope for true
knowledge. This is the condition of humanity on God’s newly created Earth.
As Dustin D. Stewart has recognized, Præexistence is politically a Whig
poem.12 It was published anonymously by John Clark in 1714, during the lengthy and
politically divisive peace negotiations concluding the War of the Spanish Succession.
The death of the last Spanish Hapsburg left the Spanish throne vacant and sparked a
war lasting from 1701 to 1714, dividing Europe into partisans of the French King,
Louis XIV, and those of an oppositional coalition headed by the Holy Roman
Emperor and the Dutch. On the English front, this conflict widened the growing
ideological gulf between the English Whigs and Tories.13 Whigs argued for strong
opposition to the French, hopeful to maintain a Protestant Netherlands and to prevent
the Catholic French from gaining further power in Europe.14 While not exactly
supportive of the French monarchy, the Tories argued against entering the war and
called for peace several times during its progress. The Treaty of Utrecht brought the
war to its conclusion slowly from April 1713 to February 1715. Having witnessed the
triumph of the anti-French Duke of Marlborough at Blenheim in 1702, the minority
Dustin D. Stewart, “Angel Bodies to Whig Souls: Blank Verse after Blenheim” in
Milton in the Long Restoration, edited Blair Hoxby and Ann Baynes Coiro (Oxford;
New York: Oxford U P 2016): 204-223.
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Whig parliamentarians desired the treaty to demand considerable concessions from
the Catholic and, from their perspective, tyrannical Louis XIV. Under Tory minister
Robert Harley, the House of Commons negotiated a treaty that in the Whig view
favored the French. The resulting conflict escalated political tensions among the
relatively new political parties. As Andrew Varney writes, “The debate about the
peace extended all the way from the Queen and her ministers to the scruffy boys who
sold badly printed half-sheet ballads and songs in the muddy streets of London.”15 It
was in this political atmosphere that John Clark published Præexistence in 1714.
Nearly all of Clark’s publications during the war years, with the minor
exceptions of some devotional handbooks, offered support for either Dissent from the
Church of England or for the Whig side of the war debates.16 The other publications
of his imprint include several sermons by preachers Dissenting from the Church of
England from the early years of the eighteenth century.17 In 1713 Clark printed a
political pamphlet by John Withers entitled “The dutch better friends than the French,
to the Monarchy, Church, and trade of England.”18 The pamphlet argues for the Whig
position on the Treaty of Utrecht, asking for greater penalties for the French. He also
printed in 1714 a treatise offering support for the censure of a few articles from the
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Treaty by several Whig members of the House of Commons.19 Besides that, Clark
printed in 1706 a translation of Le Clerc’s enthusiastic biography of John Locke, the
thinker most commonly associated with the political settlement of 1689 and the Whig
constitutional interpretation.20 Clark’s record of printing Whigs and Dissenters should
prompt a look at the political context of Præexistence. That effort is made harder by
the anonymity of the author, but the poem’s considerable preface is signed by J.B.,
probably the Dissenting preacher John Bowden from Somersetshire.21 Bowden was
the brother of Samuel Bowden, a physician and poet in Frome. He became a minister
in Frome in 1707, and by 1717 preached to a congregation of about one thousand
Somerset denizens. A Dissenter, John Bowden published four sermons, two of them
printed by Clark. In 1715, the year after the publication of Præexistence, Bowden
published a sermon in which he attacked critics of English Dissent along
Latitudinarian lines.22 Bowden’s probable authorship of the preface contributes to the
idea that Clark saw the poem as part of a larger project in defense of Whig and
Dissenting ideas.
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Even the form of Præexistence, non-satirical Miltonic blank verse, announces
its party affiliation. Whig encomiasts of the early eighteenth century wrote several
poems in Miltonic blank verse, such as Joshua, Ramellies, and The Battle of
Ramillia.23 Modeled on Book VI of Paradise Lost, these epic encomia mostly appear
around 1704 as tributes to the military success of Lord Marlborough at Blenheim, an
important victory in the War of Spanish Succession. Among these Whig writers,
Miltonic blank verse becomes a vehicle to celebrate the victories of the anti-French
Duke of Marlborough and King William III, two figures closely associated with the
Whig conception of liberty in the early eighteenth century. A second type of Miltonic
imitation relevant to Præexistence has Dissenting sympathies. Several poems appear
in the early 1700s in a genre R.D. Havens calls “essays in the sublime.”24 Among
these are Elizabeth Rowe’s “A Description of Hell” and “A Description of Heaven”
as well as Præexistence (1714) and William Bond’s A description of the four last
things.25 These poems imitate Milton in his imagination of heaven, hell, death, and
Apocalypse, offering poetic speculations on theological doctrine. They use imitation
as an opportunity to imagine and celebrate religious freedom. These Dissenters
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develop their religious ideology where rational speculation and poetic fancy meet.
The author of Præexistence belongs in one sense to this class of writers.
Præexistence has attracted critical interest in two respects. The first is as part
of the early response to Paradise Lost. From this viewpoint, the poem has been
judged remarkable. In an encyclopedic study from 1922 of Milton’s influence on
eighteenth-century poetry, R. D. Havens commended Præexistence as written in the
best blank verse between Milton and Thompson. “Best” is highly qualitative but
Havens seems to mean the most Miltonic, a thoroughgoing imitation of Milton’s
prosody that walks the narrow line between imitation and parody.26 Recently, Dustin
Stewart has grouped the poem with a set of “Whig” Miltonic imitators struggling to
define the party poetry after the death of Dryden. “Milton” offered a vision of poetry
with a moral message that corresponded to Whig optimism and opposition to
absolutism. Stewart suggests Milton’s angels are the image these Whigs most want to
imitate—free, creative, and expansive. For Stewart, Præexistence thus shows a desire
to imagine oneself as an angel, meaning a creature free from rigid order and tradition.
Blank verse, too, is the language of freedom.27 Related but not identical is the critical
study of Præexistence as an example of religious poetry or theological thought in the
early eighteenth century. In one volume of Religious Trends in English Poetry, Hoxie
Fairchild examines Præexistence in this respect and finds it to contain deep spiritual
pessimism, denying human redemption and deprecating human ability—exactly the
opposite of Stewart’s claim of “Whig” optimism. In this detailed analysis, Fairchild
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also notes the ambiguous tone of the poem, which appears somewhere between
sincere imitation and possible parody. Notably, the absence of Milton’s distinctive
claim to divine inspiration leaves the poem of uncertain seriousness, neither a
prophecy nor an authoritative theological tract.
Only one critic has singled out Præexistence as an important work in its own
right. As part of his larger study of preexistence in Western intellectual history, Terryl
Givens treats the poem as a unique example of the expression of preexistence
theology in the early eighteenth century. For Givens, the theology of Præexistence is
drawn from the theology of Paradise Lost. Since Milton memorably depicted the
premortal lives of angels and divine agents in Heaven, the author of Præexistence
understood himself to be completing Milton’s project by extending that premortal
existence to human beings. Givens writes that “If Milton resisted developing the motif
[of preexistence] with real intent,” the Præexistence author, “did not hesitate to repair
the connection Milton had missed (or obscured) and identify the rebellious hosts with
preexistent mortals.” 28 Putting aside the unfortunate construction that Milton “resisted
developing the motif with real intent”—is this the same as not intending to convey the
motif?—this idea is unconvincing, partly because most readers then or now do not
experience Paradise Lost as almost expressing the soul’s preexistence. The Archangel
Raphael conveys that the God of Paradise Lost breathes into Adam’s nostrils the
breath of life and makes him thereby a living soul.29 In his own theological tract De
Doctrina Christiania, Milton assents to soul creation by traduction, the process
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directly opposed to preexistence.30 Moreover, Givens’s interpretation produces an
internal contradiction; Givens wants the author of Præexistence to be willful and
creative and at the same time a mere handmaid of the impression he received from
Milton. A variation on Harold Bloom’s theory of “strong misreading” seems to lie
behind Givens’s depiction of the relationship between these writers.31 As a matter of
historical reality, the author of Præexistence did not find the doctrine of preexistence
in Paradise Lost but instead placed the doctrine into Milton’s mouth.
Against Givens’s interpretation, I assert that Milton’s Paradise Lost did not
represent to the author a powerfully idiosyncratic theology awaiting a minor
correction to achieve its true heterodox potential. Rather, Milton’s grand epic
represented the orthodox theological consensus that the author sought to overthrow,
not to correct. The key to this argument is that the author is a Deist, and as such
looked at Paradise Lost as a literary expression of mainstream Christian theology, a
theology that was wrong almost to its bones. As a result, he treated Milton’s epic as
most Deists treated the Bible, as the necessary zone of argument about how to achieve
a more just and rational theology. Orthodoxy must be battled in its own lair. The
author turned toward Paradise Lost for strategic reasons, in order to depict an
unorthodox theology in the garb and with the authority of mainstream theology. The
author thus wrote about Milton for the same reasons the Deists wrote about the Bible,
not because he was a “Miltonist” but because he was a Deist, intending to replace and
not to supplement.
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The scholarly understanding of the term Deism has changed in recent decades.
The contemporary debate concerning seventeenth-century deism constellates around
its sources and doctrines. Historians describe three sources of deism: radical
Protestantism (especially the Socinians), materialist philosophy (especially Spinoza),
and classical deism (the Epicureans, Stoics, Platonists, or Aristotle).32 The third is
especially intriguing because contemporary critics of deism often traced its lineage to
the former two sources and not toward its classical ancestors. Stoicism,
Pythagoreanism, Epicureanism, and other ancient philosophies can be called “deisms”
and were of course well-known. Wayne Hudson has emphasized this aspect to the
deprecation of the other two, but the radical Protestant element in the makeup of
English deism matters, especially in the way deism critiqued aspects of orthodox
Christian theology.33 Deism emphasized the critique of Trinitarian theology, Christian
ritualism, and priestcraft, all three aspects derived from Socinianism and other forms
of radical Protestantism. Many Deists questioned crucial Christian orthodoxies like
the Trinity, but so had Locke and the Socinians before them. Deists maintained that
Christian ritual religion was a set of erroneous practices installed by priests to
maintain their own power, but the most radical Protestants had argued much the same.
Seen in their right context, Deists are not complete radicals breaking with tradition but
thinkers who took certain radical Protestant criticisms of traditional theology further
and who demanded an even simpler theology than that of Socinianism.
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The replacement of Milton’s theology intended by the author of Præexistence
lies at this conjunction of the theological points between radical Protestantism and
Deism. Milton may have been in his own day a radical Protestant, but by the early
1700s theological radicalism had taken a new turn, against the Bible and mainstream
theology itself. On all the key issues of contemporary polemic—the necessity of
revealed religion, the justice of Original Sin, the coherent and veracious nature of the
Holy Trinity, and the justice of eternal punishment—the author takes the radical
stance: that revelation is unnecessary, Original Sin incoherent, the Trinity nonexistent,
and eternal punishment inconsistent with the justice of God. Prӕexistence balances
this radical theology with a convincing depiction of Paradise Lost’s cosmology.
Elements borrowed from Milton’s epic contrast with its own rational and non-biblical
account of God’s justice.
Against the orthodox Augustinian position presented in Milton’s epic,
Prӕexistence transforms the nature of the Original Sin from the singular,
representative action of Adam on behalf of mankind to millions of individual crimes
performed by the angels. The story of Adam and Eve depicts a strongly
anthropomorphic God whose voluntary action after the Fall upsets the laws of his own
creation for a moral purpose. In the usual scheme, God punishes not only human
beings for their original sin, but also birds, beasts, fish, and plant life, creatures that
bore no responsibility for the sin of Adam. This scheme creates a host of difficulties
for theodicy, both in the form of unjust punishment toward the animal world—
embodied in Milton’s God’s inexplicable though Biblical condemnation of the
innocent serpent—and in the form of a limitation on free will imposed as the
consequence, not merely the cause, of the Fall. According to Prӕexistence, God did
not first create a beautiful, perfect world and then mar it because of his creatures’ sin.
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The world the author envisions is created complete, and divine intervention does not
occur after this first act of creation. The change of seasons, in Paradise Lost a
consequence of the Fall, here is a constant feature of the world, since “frost / at either
end shall rage” and “the torrid zone…fries with constant heat.”34 God marks the moral
reason for these painful consequences. The earth will be barren, overgrown, and prone
to threatening weather conditions so that it must be “reform’d / To fields, and grassy
dales, and flow’ry meads, / By your continual pains.”35 This revision in the
consequences of Original Sin abnegates the need for the Garden of Eden story and its
anthropomorphized picture of a God intervening repeatedly in human life.
Human life is uniformly tragic but the afterlife is described only very briefly
as the era when “the prisoner, now enlarg’d, / Regains the flaming borders of the
sky.”36 This brief description given by God is the poem’s entire story of life after
human death, and it makes no mention of the possibility of Hell, only “the flaming
borders of the sky.” Divine judgement is conspicuously absent from the imagination
of death; God has done his worst already. Instead, the predominant fact of death is its
unknown quality. The dying man expects to take a “dreary road…he knows not
where.”37 When the narrating God focuses on the unknown nature of existence after
death (a fact on which presumably he speaks with authority), he does not emphasize
that human beings will be unsure whether they are destined for heaven or hell. Rather,
he focuses on the fear of annihilation, the radical position that made Lucretius such a
significant and challenging figure for early modern theologians and philosophers. At
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the end of the road that “leads he knows not where,” “empty space gapes horrible, and
threatens to absorb all being.”38 According to God, the fear of death comes not from
the fear of eternal hellfire but of the “empty space” that may await the dying human
being. God implies that human beings will not believe in the immortality of the soul, a
doctrine that must be true since the human soul “[r]egains the flaming borders of the
sky” at its end. Entertaining the imagination of annihilation, God reveals that there is
no reasonable basis for fear of eternal punishment in hell, a fact that he compounds by
his compatible assertions about the unreal nature of demons and other evil creatures
that sometimes invade the imagination the dying man. The author goes out of his way
to suggest that the vivid images of life after death that come to the dying man’s mind,
torture by demons and haunting by ghosts, are the products of his imagination and not
realities. In the moments before death, “sooty demons glare, / And dolorous spectres
grin” before his eyes. These supposed “demons” are marked by their unreality. The
author characterizes them as “the shapeless rout / Of wild imagination.”39 Even the
description “sooty” and the word “spectres” indicate these creatures’ unreality, their
status as mere phantasms rather than real entities. Just as when God suggests that the
imagination of annihilation haunts the dying man, in Lucretian mode he here
intimates that the worst torments of the dying derive from man’s own imagination.
The poem utterly renounces eternal punishment as a feature of life after death,
because it is human life, not human afterlife, that constitutes the punishment of
sinning against God. The punishment of the angels comes through their embodied
lives as human beings, not through a divine dispensation at the Last Judgment.
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Judgment after death, Last or otherwise, is found nowhere in the poem’s cosmological
lexicon.
The poem’s depiction of God also corresponds with one of the central points
of Deism, reflective of its influence from Socinian theology: anti-Trinitarianism.
Despite all the divine images the author borrows from Milton’s God—throne,
lightning, oratory—he never once refers to this divine sovereign as “the Father.” He is
simply God, absent any Trinitarian entanglements. In heaven, the God of
Prӕexistence acts and speaks alone, without the Son acting as the vehicle of his
power. Throughout the poem, God makes no mention of Christ, but he also makes no
mention of a Holy Spirit. Like the prototypical Deist clockmaker, God arranged
human affairs before the first act of creation has been effected. In Milton’s poem, of
course, the Son of God ends the heavenly conflict, an act that earns him acclamation
in song by the loyal angels. In Prӕexistence, God greets the loyal angels on their
return from pursuing the rebel angels to the gates of hell and congratulates them for
their victory, with no mention of a Son of God who won the war on their behalf.40
God does mention that the fallen angels “have try’d the force / Of this right hand, and
known Almighty pow’r.”41 The right hand may be an obscure reference to the Son’s
status at God’s right hand, but more likely the phrase is only a metonymy of God’s
vengeance, as in Paradise Lost when the rebel angels fear God’s “red right hand” or
when Satan claims, arrogating divine power, that his “own right hand / Shall teach us
highest deeds.”42 The slender nature of this reference, combined with the substantial
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and unitary figure of God, indicates there is no Son in Prӕexistence’s heaven. The
Holy Spirit, as “comforter,” is nowhere to be found either.
Even more tellingly, God’s narrative makes no mention of further intervention
into human history in the forms of Incarnation or redemption. In the Christian
scheme, human beings are punished for their sin, but Jesus Christ takes on the worlds’
sins and offers himself as a sacrifice to redeem humanity. As Hoxie Fairchild notices,
God’s speech offers no suggestion that human beings “are to raise themselves through
faith in a Redeemer. Life is to be for them a prison from which death provides the
only escape.”43 Fairchild’s point is apt, because it is death, not salvation, which makes
human suffering end. When the human being dies, they “regain[] the flaming borders
of the sky.” The author makes mention that only when the human soul is “now
enlarg’d,” can he return to heaven, but it is by death the soul is “enlarg’d,” not by
regeneration. The emphasis on the return to heaven through mere bodily death
confirms that the sacrifice of the Son of God is unnecessary, and human life proceeds
without divine assistance or aid.
On this cosmic scheme, knowledge of God is impossible, whether won by
right reason or divine revelation, Faith in Christ—even in God himself—plays no part
in this story. Indeed, when the human being “tries / With all his might to raise some
weighty thought, / Of me,” the activity “but recoils to crush the laboring mind.”44 This
skepticism about human capacity to conceive of God might indicate Calvinist
pessimism, but if so, God does not add the further point that he will implant faith in
the human soul, a necessary piece of Calvinist orthodoxy to secure human life from
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utter hopelessness. No actions on the part of human beings, no faith or obedience by
word or deed, work to secure a place for them in heaven. The author does not
differentiate the fate of the faithful from the unfaithful. He mentions several figures
who will suffer uniquely painful fates, presumably on account of their crimes, but
these are all earthly punishments. Faith in the historical Christ and his sacrifice on
behalf of all human beings, the crux of Christian theology, has no place in the scheme
laid out by the author’s God.
The author might be saved from complete defeatism about knowledge of God
with recourse to the traditional Platonic doctrine of innate ideas. Like John Locke a
few decades earlier, the author specifically denies this possibility. Though the angels
beheld God in heaven, the soul’s draft of the water of Lethe will purge all knowledge
of divine things. The soul will enter the earth perfectly “blank,” a significant word in
the history of philosophy. God is explicit on this point: if the soul’s heavenly
knowledge, its “vast thought,” were contained in a fleshly mind, the soul would break
its material bonds and “wing away.”45 For this reason, “each soul must drink long
draughts / Of those forgetful streams, ‘till forms within, / And all the great ideas fade
and die.”46 God insists that all this divine knowledge, Platonized by the names
“forms” and “ideas,” do not transform or weaken when the soul becomes embodies,
but instead they utterly die as a result of those “forgetful streams.” God announces
that “‘Tis therefore my decree, the soul return / Naked from off this beach, and perfect
blank.”47 This position of an entirely blank soul reflects the position not taken by
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Platonists, whom one might expect be the philosophical parents of a poem called
Prӕexistence, but of Locke himself. Locke strongly criticized the doctrine of innate
ideas, usually associated with preexistence, and the author’s emphasis on the total
purging of all preexistent knowledge is in fact compatible with Locke’s position. Like
Locke, the poem deprecates the divine power of reason, for the Cambridge Platonists
the great source of knowledge of God, in favor of a more skeptical, Lockean version
of the source of knowledge, including knowledge of God. The God of Prӕexistence
says that human “reasonings” are “high,” but essentially deluded in its reasoning
since, “the feeble clue / Of fleeting images he draws in vain / To wond’rous length.”48
The idea of the vanity of the “images” of God in the human mind correspondences to
Locke’s own position on the philosophy of religion, but for Locke, the poverty of
reason in matters divine necessitated divine revelation. In this respect, his own
theological view was more conservative than the first generation of Deists who were
in some respects his heirs.49 If the author of Prӕexistence believes the same, his God
offers no promise that revelation will recompense this failure of reason. The author of
Prӕexistence denies innate ideas in human beings, deprecates reason as a pitiful
faculty in apprehending divine things, but does not offer revelation as a solution to
either problem. Though the poem aims at a more rational theology, God in
Præexistence is simply inscrutable to embodied human creatures, and the poem’s
view on the possibility of any theological knowledge is simply negative. Human
beings will never obtain knowledge of God in this life.
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The poem’s silence on revelation is compounded by its denial of eternal
punishment, critique of Original Sin, and its anti-Trinitarian characteristics. Its
emphasis on preexistence may seem to cut against the poem being a Deist work, but
as mentioned above, two contemporary Deists committed themselves to exactly the
position of the author of Præexistence on the status of human beings as sinful angels
punished by God with embodiment: chancery clerk William Staunton and radical
bookseller Jacob Ilive. Their theology includes the same critiques of Christian
orthodoxy, but also the same story of human beings’ genesis from angelic beginnings.
Seeing their biographies and points of view places the author of Præexistence in the
deeper context of the contemporary critiques of Protestant theology, critiques that
both these authors carried almost as far as they could.
A legal secretary from Hampton, William Staunton wrote several treatises and
letters on theological and philosophical subjects. His birth and death date are unclear,
but according to The Ancient Physician’s Legacy to his country (1732), a compilation
of medical knowledge, he was sixty-seven in 1730 or 1731.50 Staunton’s
philosophical views tended toward Deism, and he repeatedly defended the
accomplishments and capacity of natural reason over revelation. Staunton believed
the Gospels were “a Comment upon the Law of Nature, the Only Law now in force.”
This phrase, which is the title of one of his works, is similar to the more famous John
Toland’s Christianity as Old as the Creation. Christianity is not “news,” not gospel,
but a restoration to the knowledge of the singular ancient truth, a truth potent without
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revelation. For Staunton, the good news of Christ meant liberation from the law of
God to the law of nature, whereby human beings could now trust their reason to
discover the natural law. Staunton does not insist that there was never a Law of God
in force, but that law is repealed by Christ. While once God, now Nature, reigns. For
Staunton, Christ’s Revelation announced the repeal of revelation and the ongoing
reign of merely natural truths. Staunton also claims that Jesus forbade all worship and
prayer of himself, instead claiming that all religion regard the Father directly,
Staunton approaches something much more like Deism.51 Indeed, Staunton takes anticlericalism further than a radical Protestant—like Milton—would have done when he
insists that the corruptions of genuine Christianity can be found in the Bible itself,
specifically in the later Gospels, Acts, and the various epistles. Christianity became
corrupted, Staunton says, when Christians decided to worship the risen Christ instead
of God the Father, when “Men first conceived that Jesus Christ, the Messenger of the
Covenant between God and Man, and the Apostle or Ambassador of God, is God
himself.” 52 This position sloughs off what many of Staunton’s contemporaries
considered the central Christian belief, the divinity of Christ. In that sense, Staunton is
not an atheist, but a Deist on the border with Socinianism.53
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Staunton combines this Deism with a belief in the personal preexistence of the
human soul. He believes human beings were not just souls with preexistent lives in
heaven, but actual angels, a theory he propounds in his modestly titled Sincere
Thoughts of a Private Christian (1719). Like Henry More, Staunton believes that “this
Ancient Doctrine” of preexistence “not only strikes a Light into several Texts of
Scripture, otherwise dark and puzzling” but “in great measure Justifies the
Providence, and Goodness, and Love of God.” Preexistence solves the problems of
God’s providence—specifically the justice of Original Sin—by making each of us, as
Staunton puts it, quoting John Norris, “his own Adam.”54 Human beings earned their
punishment not because Adam ate the apple, but because as angels they “were in
some Measure partakers of the Sin of Devils, and fought under Satans banner.” His
surprising proof for this fact lies in the biblical promise that both human beings and
angels will be punished at the Last Judgment. God created Hell first for the evil
angels, not for human beings and thus “if we Men, were never [God’s] Angels, then
that Fire is not prepared for Men.” Otherwise, “an Infinitely good God” would have
had to create a place of eternal punishment for his yet non-existent human creatures,
prior even to their sin.55 Staunton argues that no benevolent God would create a place
of punishment as a threat to those who have not yet sinned, but the Biblical
announcement that God created hell for human beings must be harmonized with the
traditional story of the War in Heaven, because of which God threw down the evil
angels into hell. Staunton’s solution is to suggest that we are the fallen angels. Thus,
God created hell for us, not just for the angels, because we are the angels as well.
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Preempting a criticism from those scandalized by this idea, Staunton adds that the
elect are not the most diabolical of the fallen angels but only a middle sort, much like
the contingent that become human in Præexistence. This odd argument is revealing in
its absurdity. Saving God from an ostensible lie is probably a pretense: more than
likely, his Deism produced his belief in preexistence, a possibility compounded by the
coincidence of these two factors in the minds of some of his contemporaries.
Indeed, Staunton’s combination of preexistence with Deism is idiosyncratic,
but resonant with that of other Deists. The notorious Deist bookseller Jacob Ilive
preached a similar, though more radical, theory of preexistence in his public oration at
Joiner’s Hall (1733), a speech that incited considerable controversy and required his
response a year later. Ilive is perhaps most famous as the publisher and secret author
of a 1757 printing of the Book of Jasher, an apocryphal text mentioned in the Hebrew
Bible and supposed to be translated by Alcuin. Though he was censured for this fraud,
for a separate controversy he was convicted of blasphemy and sentenced to two years
in prison.56 The speech at Joiner’s Hall also attracted deserved controversy, as it is
quite radical by the standards of the 1730s. In it, Ilive reproduces the private beliefs of
his mother and brothers, all apparently heterodocts, that human beings were the angels
who followed Lucifer in Heaven, that the earth is Hell, that posthumous punishment is
not eternal, and that human beings will eventually come individually to rule
succeeding planets in an infinite procession. Eventually printed, the speech nominally
proceeds as an exegesis of the sentence from Scripture, “In my Father’s house are
many rooms,” but this exegetical point becomes secondary to the elaborate cosmology
Ilive is establishing in his speech. Like Staunton, Ilive hangs preexistence on a textual
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technicality. Ilive asserts that there is a vast universe of worlds, drawing on Derham’s
plurality of worlds theory from Astro-Theology, through which human beings may
eventually freely travel. This single world of earth is hell itself, and the human being
is the soul of an angel trapped in a physical body. Ilive narrates his cosmology while
drawing on Scripture at key points, but the cosmology itself seems to have a priority
over the textual justification., only trying to elucidate difficult Scriptural points.
Unlike Staunton, Ilive apparently lived in a small family community with whom he
shared all these beliefs, and his mother made it an item in her will that Ilive should
deliver this address upon her death. Ilive thus represents not a single isolated case but
a voice of a small household of people of the mechanical class who ascribed both to
Deism and preexistence.
The essence of Ilive’s Deism is a sociological point with theological
implications, though these two descriptors could also be plausibly reversed. This
essence is the critique of “priestcraft,” or the social and theological authority of the
clerical castes dating back from the beginning of Christianity. The orthodox theology
created by the priests justifies their own power as legislators over the human race.
Thus, recovering the true Christian belief invariably entails triumphing over
tyrannical priests. In one work, Ilive begins by asserting that “Opinions, like cities and
empires, have owed their origin to certain causes; and have in every age like them,
been subject to various changes and revolutions” and, like cities and empires,
opinions have “degenerated so far from their original, that they have lost even their
primitive intention, and have been perverted in order to convey to the minds of men
ideas and doctrines the authors never intended.”57 In his two orations, Ilive attacks the
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main opinion that protects priestly power, the doctrine of eternal damnation, from two
different sides. The Oration at Joiner’s Hall asserts the preexistence of the soul and
the plurality of worlds, together with the notion that Earth is Hell. These concepts fuse
together into a vision of the soul as coming from heaven and journeying not from
earth to hell but to a vast number of different planets or cosmic levels in the soul’s
eternal life as spirit. Eternal damnation is impossible, because this earth is itself Hell
and our eternal soul has an infinite lifetime’s journey before it through physical space.
The Oration at Trinity Hall argues strenuously against the resurrection of the body at
the Last Judgment and for a denial of the Last Judgment in general, with the assertion
that Jesus’s reappearance on Mount Olivet following his death constitutes his
“coming again.” For obvious reasons, the denial of Last Judgment entails a denial of
eternal damnation, but Ilive also insists that denying the resurrection of the body,
found in the creeds, entails the impossibility of eternal damnation, since only bodies
can suffer in Hell.
The doctrine of preexistence forms the keystone of these intersecting Deistic
critiques of Christianity. In his oration, Ilive lays out his commitment to several
theological theories, “the P[l]urality of Worlds,” “That this Earth is Hell,” and “That
the Souls of Men are the Apostate Angels.” These concepts add up to a single
perspective, called “gnostic” by James A. Herrick.58 Ilive offers little to no argument
on behalf of a belief in preexistence. He does not make the pedantic case put forward
by Staunton, but like Staunton, he claims to find authorization for preexistence in
Scripture. His oration is not an argument in favor of preexistence but an elaboration of
the idea, which cannot itself be proven. Beyond the belief in the soul’s preexistence,
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the theologies of Ilive and Staunton resemble that of Prӕexistence in denying the
presence of a divine Messiah who saves sinful humanity. Considered against the
reduced focus on life after death in Prӕexistence and the fact that human beings do
not appear to go to hell, the positions of Ilive and the Miltonic imitator align in critical
ways, especially in their common portrait of life on this earth. God intervened only
once in human affairs, through the set of events that led to the creation of the world,
and since this initial act, earthly life has proceeded according to its natural processes.
The elaborate prehistory of human life stands in contrast to the dilapidated,
desacralized world of created human life.
These three authors observed have much in common. These authors distrust
revelation and deprecate stories of miracles and divine intervention, yet they also
believe that human beings originated in heaven rather than earth. How do we explain
the coexistence of general skepticism about Christian theology with a commitment to
a strange, specifically metaphysical theological doctrine—preexistence—that is
highly unlikely to be proved by reason or by empirical science? Settling this question
of Deism and preexistence requires the importation of a third term, one that resonates
with the oldest and perhaps the quintessential Christian heresy. The best word for
them is “gnostic.”

II. The New Gnosticism
The most famous creed of ancient Gnosticism comes from the sect of
Valentinus: “What liberates is the knowledge of who we were, what we became;
where we were, whereinto we have been thrown; whereto we speed, wherefrom we
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are redeemed; what birth is, and what rebirth.”59 Gnosticism is an account of human
life in terms of an elaborate cosmology and “backstory” or prehistory of the world and
the human person. This prehistory and cosmology have the result that the earth is evil,
human life just manifold forms of suffering, and God—and all the good he
represents—restrained permanently from the world. As descendants of the true God,
human beings have something of the original divine spark of goodness, but it is
imprisoned inside a flesh and a soul created evil in an evil cosmos. As the Valentinus
quotation demonstrates, Gnosticism also purports to “liberate” the human being from
this world and from its evil body and soul by recognition of its divine nature: a
liberation to the “spirit,” pneuma or spark.
Gnosticism produces a particular metaphoric language centered on light and
darkness. As the philosopher Hans Jonas describes the relation, “to the divine realm
of light, self-contained and remote, the cosmos is opposed as the realm of darkness.”60
This language flows directly from Gnosticism’s cosmology and cosmogony, in which
the true God remains hidden from the entire created universe. He is “hidden from all
creatures” and “unknowable by natural concepts” and thus “can hardly be expressed
otherwise than in negative terms.”61 These metaphors do not just express the relation
between the reality of divinity and the created world: rather, the dependence on
metaphor, and the metaphor’s implicit acknowledgment of its own failure, conveys
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the very failure of “concepts” to describe the true God accurately. Gnosticism’s inner
logic refuses distillation into concepts describable by discursive reason.
The historical Gnostics themselves prized “experience,” a category not
reducible to rationalism, over both authority and the erection of doctrinal creeds.
Elaine Pagels characterizes this dynamic as Gnosticism’s reliance on “the primacy of
immediate [religious] experience” over and against mediations by authorities.62 For
this reason, they produced works of art, poems, music, and other expressions of
religious experience rather than theological works. The Gnostic works of theology, or
really cosmogony, that exist are themselves slightly mystifying and semi-poetic. This
reliance on metaphor and immediate experience has been described many ways,
including as the “Eastern part” of first-century Christianity, as opposed to the
“Western part” of Greek rationalism, with all the limitations and prejudices such
essentialisms produce. Moreover, the point of Gnosticism’s irrationalism can be
overstated, but as an analytic matter the unknowability of God in Gnosticism results
in obviously symbolic language, as in the metaphors of light and dark. The metaphors
comport with the unknowable nature of God but also highlight the personal, intuitive
quality of “gnosis,” a form of authorizing knowledge that does not reside in
institutions, traditions, or even in ideas, but in the experience of people.
The content of this experience relates directly to the theology outlined by
Gnostic cosmology. Pagels explains the constructive cosmology of Gnosticism as
flowing not from concepts but from the experience of the “anguish and terror” of
human life. For Pagels, the gnostics knew the world was created by an evil God
because of the experience of evil, or rather kakia [ill-ness], evil in the sense of “evils”
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not the moral category in the physical world but also in the human soul in the form of
suffering.63 In other words, human religious experience reveals the nature of the world
and life as such, its nature as suffering. In this powerful interpretation, Gnosticism
highlights suffering, brokenness, and frailty as the very nature of the created world.
The metaphorical nature of Gnosticism, the reliance on personal experience, and the
complicated theology that places God beyond the limit of the world and all experience
add up to an affect of despair and awareness of suffering.
In this sense, a lower-case gnosticism represents not so much a set of ideas as
a mood, one that inverts mainstream Christian theology to emphasize the suffering,
weakness, and incapacity that orthodoxy recognizes but subordinates to the principle
of redemption. Gnosticism allows Christianity to become tragedy rather than comedy.
The nature of this gnostic mood is evidenced well by the film Exorcist III. At the
conclusion of the film, written and directed by William Peter Blatty author of the
original Exorcist novel, the hard-bitten Detective Kinderman played by George C.
Scott confronts the demon “Legion,” who has tormented him throughout the film.
Having struggled throughout the film with his decayed religious faith, Scott’s
detective is pushed too far when Legion kills his friend and religious conscience,
Father Dyer, placing the priest’s blood in hundreds of small jars around Dyer’s
hospital room. Rather than destroying Kinderman’s faith, the demon’s vicious act
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rekindles it, though permanently transformed. Face to face with Legion, Kinderman
exclaims in a combination of ecstasy and anguish,
Yes, I believe. I believe in death. I believe in disease. I believe in
injustice and inhumanity and torture and anger and hate. I believe in
murder. I believe in pain. I believe in cruelty and infidelity. I believe in
slime and stink and in every crawling putrid thing, every possible
ugliness and corruption, you son of a bitch. I believe in you.64
Kinderman no longer believes in God, but he believes in something perhaps as
powerful, evil. This faith gives him the strength to resist Legion, the embodiment of
evil, not in the name of God, but, paradoxically, in the name of evil. He accepts the
existence of a metaphysical principle of evil opposed by no equivalent metaphysical
principle of good. Affected by the gnostic mood that isolates evil as the sole
metaphysical principle in the cosmos, Kinderman comprehends that the cosmos will
not stand up for justice on behalf of sufferers. He must do so himself.65
Like Detective Kinderman, Præexistence the poem powerfully rejects the
Christian theology of redemption—as expressed in Paradise Lost—for a theology of
suffering. As Gnosticism flips Christianity, Præexistence flips Paradise Lost; a
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cosmic tragedy snatched from the jaws of comedy. “World without end,” in the
poem’s gnostic cosmology, is not an appealing prospect. As in historical gnosticism,
this affect finds expression in metaphors that concretize “the dark”—metaphysical
evil—into a principle opposed to the true God’s far-off light. The poem’s dualistic
metaphorics differ in relation to the complex but ultimately more optimistic theology
of Paradise Lost. Milton’s poem reproduces the Augustinian and Plotinian
metaphysics of universal good, where evil is a privation of good, not an entity in its
own right—Præexistence flips this binary and presents evil, if not as more solid than
good, as a real contender in the cosmic fight.
This freighted opposition appears in the poem’s sole epic simile. Early in the
poem, God shows up on the scene of heaven wheeled out on a large throne flashing
with the usual iconography of deity. This prompts the author’s epic simile in the
tradition of Milton and Homer, beginning with the long-established “As when...”
followed by the traditional “thus…”:
Out flows a blaze of glory: for on high
Tow’ring advanc’d the moving throne of God,
Vast and majestic; on each radiant side
The pointed rays slope glittering: at the foot
Glides a full tide of day, that onward pours,
In liquid torrents through the black abyss,
Sparkling among reluctant shapes which thence
Retire confus’d; as when Vesuvio shakes
With inward torments, and disgorges flames,
O’er the vast mountain’s ridge the burning waves
Drive their refulgent curls, and on they roll
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Sweeping the glowing plains down to the sea;
Th’affrighted sea leaps back with hideous roar
To give the fire its course: thus Chaos wild
Hissing recoils to let in floods of light.”66
In this passage, the author creates a simile in which God, and the light from
heaven, become the onrush of Vesuvian lava, while the world of Chaos outside
becomes the sea, fleeing backward on itself with a “hiss.” Here, the Miltonic imitator
has done something Milton is careful not to do: compare God to physical nature.
Though Milton describes God in figurative language, he favors Scriptural descriptions
to those of his own invention, rarely if ever characterizing God as being like his
creation, and certainly never placing him inside the world of a simile as one actor
amid many. In a contrary practice, the Præexistence author constructs a metaphorical
world in which God and Chaos are each transferred to physical, created things, lava
and the sea. In saying God is like a volcano, the poem has confounded God with his
creation and placed him on an equal imaginary footing with the other subject of the
simile, the ambiguous and perhaps malevolent force of Chaos. Describing Satan as
“Leviathan,” as Milton does, is one thing—however different, both are created.
Mount Vesuvius and the surrounding Mediterranean Sea differ not in kind, but in
degree, being both majestic and powerful created things. In the Præexistence simile,
God can be understood as one natural force battling another, lava struggling against
sea, and the dazzling appearance he makes in heaven serves to highlight his absence
from the earth. In reality, the explosion of Vesuvius is thoughtless destruction, neither
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good nor bad. God in heaven may be great, but upon earth the natural forces that
resemble his divine strength do not embody or serve his moral will.
God is a God of light against the darkness, of supreme majesty against
cringing creatures of shadow. These “reluctant shapes” are a new creation by the
author, and their presence displays the differential logic of God in Præexistence,
foreign to Paradise Lost, where God is God of light and dark. Præexistence’s God
battles darkness; he does not cover himself with its “Majesty,” as Milton’s Mammon
avers about the Father. Something of dualism creeps into these descriptions, a sense
that God is battling a “force” possessing will, animation, and at least animal reason.
The “reluctant” shapes of night “retire confus’d” before God’s light—they do not
vanish like unreal specters into thin air. The implication of such passages is that
“Night” is not the mere privation of Paradise Lost, but a figure aligned with Hell and
the evil that opposes God. Like the True God of Gnosticism, the God of Præexistence
battles an opposing force of metaphysical evil, and even if God has the upper hand,
the battle is ongoing. After his pompous triumphal entry, God explains his plan for the
assembled “middle angels,” again those who followed Satan somewhat halfheartedly.
God will lead the angels to the water of Lethe, where they will bathe until they lose
their memories of Heaven and “all the great Ideas sicken and die.” God will send
them into the new Earth, which he describes in gruesome and uninviting terms:
I rear
In those meanders turn’d, a dusty ball,
Deform’d all o’er with woods, whose shaggy tops
Inclose eternal mists, and deadly damps
Hover within their boughs, to choak the light,
Impervious scenes of horror, till reform’d
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To fields and grassy dales, and flowry meads,
By your continual pains.67
Prior to creation, the universe is disorganized—“meanders,” meaning rivers—
until God ordains order. In stark contrast to the Genesis account, the world ordained is
not “good,” but cruel and desolate, Earth a “dusty ball,” dry and dead compared to the
lively rivers of Chaos it replaces. Even the vegetable life of earth, sign of divine
beneficence in Paradise Lost, is not good either. Earth is “deform’d” by “woods,”
which hide light from view, rendering Earth a place of “[i]mpervious scenes of
horror.” Beyond the unappealing slant of all these descriptions, the metaphorics of
gnostic negative theology emerge. The veiling of light by forests metaphorically
represents the hiddenness of God by the darkened cosmos. The only light in the
physical world is a burning sun that “fries the torrid zone with constant heat;” this
light is not a revelation but another punishment. The divine light of God cannot pierce
into the created world. Physical life is a prison, without a lifeline to the world
outside—to God. Even the human mind, the great perceiver of Platonic metaphysics,
cannot bridge the gap of physical nature and divine essence. According to the poem,
both body and soul make all human attempts to know God impossible. In another
passage, God describes the useless attempts of the solitary “Sage”—the human
philosopher or theologian—to understand divine nature:
The SAGE shall haunt this solitary ground,
And view the dismal landscape, limn'd within
In horrid shades, mix'd with imperfect light.
Here JUDGMENT, blinded by delusive SENSE,
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Contracted through the cranny of an eye,
Shoots up faint languid beams, to that dark seat,
Wherein the soul bereav'd of native fire,
Sits intricate, in misty clouds obscur'd,
Ev'n from itself conceal'd, and there presides
O'er jarring images with reason's sway,
Which by his ordering more confounds their form;
And by decisions more embroils the fray:
The more he strives t' appease, the more he feels
The struggling surges of the darksome void
Impetuous, and the thick revolving thoughts
Encountering thoughts, image on image turn'd,
A Chaos of wild science, where sometimes
The clashing notions strike out casual light,
Which soon must perish and be lost again
In the thick darkness round it.68
Human beings will fail to conceive the deity, because they are presented only
with a darksome world that “choak[s] the light,” never with light itself: “The more
[the sage] strives t’appease, the more he feels / The struggling surges of the darksome
void.” In this long descriptive passage Milton’s imitator appropriates Milton’s
language describing Chaos and applies it to the human mind itself. The author writes
that “the soul bereaved of native fire…presides / O’er jarring images with reason’s
sway,” sounding the decisive final note in Milton’s exact words: “And by decisions
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more embroils the fray.” For the author, the human mind is one of those places, like
Chaos itself, from which God has withdrawn himself. Not only is the mind unable to
find God: he is not there, an absence, a void. The author thus coordinates the human
mind with that “utter…darkness” beyond even Chaos, Hell, where the fallen angels
“found no end in wandring mazes lost.” Hell is a place “which God by curse / Created
evil,” where grace cannot reach and “hope never comes that comes to all.”69 The
author of Præexistence raises hell from cosmic fundament to “pendant world,” or
perhaps lowers the earth to the hideous bottom of all things. God’s “curse” lies over
the earth from its creation, this curse expressed as divine absence. Human beings
cannot glimpse God, not even in their own natures as God’s image.
Under this general curse, human life is a parade of destruction and suffering.
The author thus lays out a long future history, modeled on Books 11 and 12, taking up
lines 215 through 356.70 In this account, universal misery proceeds not from human
sin—as a glutton must suffer gout—but from the fundamental flaw built into the
created world. God ordains all the fruitless types of human character, the tyrant, the
slave, the hedonist, the idiot philosopher, even, amusingly, the avaricious litigant.
Each of these sinful natures creates worse sins in others, making the whole more
contemptible than each would be on their own. This horrible history resembles the
Archangel Michael’s prophecy of sin and consequence, but the omissions in the
poet’s tribute to Milton are crucial. Not only are these human types bad, but they are
apparently the only types, buttressed by no positive examples of human behavior.
Even “the hero,” the admirable figure from the Virgilian and Homeric epics, “fiercely
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leads / A martial throng” of fellow humans that the poet calls “his instruments of
rage,” with which the hero will “fill the world with death, and thin mankind.”71
As in Milton, the models of literary virtue exemplified by past epics are recast
as moral failures, but here, unlike Paradise Lost, no Redeemer will bring them out
from sin. Life “is one continued scene of grief,” human grief, never grief shared by a
divine intercessor or mourned by a divine parent. Because of the denial of
supernatural redemption, and this lunatic procession of stupid suffering, the God of
Præexistence resembles simultaneously the Gnostic demiurge, deliberate creator of an
evil world, and the removed “true God,” placed permanently beyond human
experience. This God embodies both the negative and positive conceptions of Gnostic
deity, because the poem’s theology flows from human suffering. Caught between an
evil and unknowable God, the human mind remains trapped in “Wandring mazes
lost,” and “by decisions more imbroils the fray” of fruitless thinking. The picture of
the human world in Præexistence resembles therefore, not the Edenic or post-Edenic
world of Adam and Eve, but the limited, doomed, self-enclosed prison of the fallen
angels of Milton’s Hell. The solemn declarations of suffering put forward by the God
of Præexistence resemble most the resolute despair of Mammon in Milton’s council
of Hell or the titanic Stoic perorations of his Satan. Concluding that evil
circumstances leave no option but self-reliance, Satan declares that in Hell “Here at
least / We shall be free; th’Almighty hath not built / Here for his envy, will not drive
us hence.”72 The pragmatic Mammon cautions the fallen angels to accept Hell, as not
so bad, to lower their gaze of the fallen angels to the infernal world they have, not the
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divine world they lost. Echoing Valentinus, “what liberates is the knowledge of who
we were, what we became; where we were, whereinto we have been thrown,”
Mammon declares “we may / Compose our present evils, with regard / Of what we
are and were.”73
Likewise, the God of Præexistence offers the small but real consolation that
the created world will be “reform’d by your continual pains,” by the exertions of men
and women in fallen lives, the responsibility humans must accept in a world without
external redemption. The poet’s pessimism thus contains the seed of redemptive
optimism. Like the woebegone Detective Kinderman of William Peter Bladdy’s
Exorcist III, the author of Præexistence finds justification and a limited species of
theodicy, not in the oversight of a benevolent God, but in the fact that our suffering
matters and brings forth fruits. Suffering produces knowledge as a recompense for
itself. The poem has aestheticized the suffering experienced by human beings into an
object from which the reader may learn without undergoing the same trauma. God is
triumphed over by his reduction to a mere character in a poem. Only we know what it
is to know the world as experienced in this poem, Præexistence, a knowledge we
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Mammon also:
Let us not then pursue
By force impossible, by leave obtain'd
Unacceptable, though in Heav'n, our state
Of splendid vassalage, but rather seek
Our own good from our selves, and from our own
Live to our selves, though in this vast recess,
Free, and to none accountable, preferring
Hard liberty before the easie yoke
Of servile Pomp. Our greatness will appeer
Then most conspicuous, when great things of small,
Useful of hurtful, prosperous of adverse
We can create, and in what place so e're
Thrive under evil, and work ease out of pain
Through labour and indurance. (Paradise Lost 2.249-262)
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carry forth as the knowledge of “what we are and were.” This knowledge is achieved
through a fact unavailable to any of the poem’s characters, unavailable even to God.
Even God does not know he is in a poem. The fact that the poem is read by modern
readers, in the light of another poem, is a metatextual gnosis, an experiential fact not
convertible to the propositions laid out by God. Moreover, human suffering and the
meaning of human suffering belong solely to human beings. Human suffering teaches
what sort of world we are in, “whereinto we have been thrown.” The fruits of human
suffering include “experience” broadly conceived, the self-knowledge that is the true
religious experience, not that experience held in the palm of the priestly power, the
power represented by the authority of God.
Like other works written in the early days of the Deist controversy,
Præexistence conveys a radical and liberating message between the lines. Human
beings possess the capacity to set the meaning for their own lives. God expressed the
reason for our suffering, the result of our libertarian choice to rebel in heaven, but
cannot control that suffering. Human suffering directs itself. In this sense, the poem’s
Deism and affective gnosticism comprise one cumulative argument. The world
belongs to humanity, as meaning has devolved from cosmic origin to the experience
of human beings inside a world. By this devolution, the author’s gnosticism unites to
its Deism: human beings must search out their own path, never looking for the God
who is not there, but trusting in human faculties and capabilities alone. This is the
author’s version of enlightenment.

Conclusion
Scholarship has produced several historiographical narratives with relation to
“The Enlightenment.” All of these have in common materialism and humanism.
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While the preexistence Deists like this anonymous author cannot be accused of
materialism, they do suggest a drift toward what Charles Taylor calls “exclusive
humanism,” the sociocultural worldview that presents human flourishing as the sole
goal of political society.74 Exclusive humanism contrasts with views that combine the
goal of human flourishing with other goals, such as obeying the will of God—the
Christian view—or with the view of modern environmentalism, which assert our duty
to the planet and regard a sole interest in human flourishing as parochial.78 Deism,
with its radical distrust of metaphysics and supernatural ordination, represents an
important thrust in the direction of exclusive humanism. But, once more, preexistence
Deism appears to take one step forward—toward modern skepticism—and one step
back—toward old metaphysics.
According to Yirmiyahuh Yovel, there was another Enlightenment that
happened during the Enlightenment, a so-called “Dark Enlightenment” provoked by
the political republicanism and philosophy of immanence of Baruch Spinoza. Dark
Enlightenment “proved a sharp awakening from religious and metaphysical illusions,
incurring pain and conflict in its wake…But for these very reasons, it was also a
movement of emancipation, serving to inspire a richer and more lucid self-knowledge
in man.”75 This description aptly fits Staunton, Ilive, and the author of Præexistence,
save in one crucial respect. Unlike the more typical anti-Christian Deism of the
eighteenth century—and unlike Spinoza—this gnostic Deism derives exclusive
humanism from theology and myth, not through their destruction. As protoEnlightenment figures, these authors projected a vision of human progress—fueled by
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the “continual pains” of human beings. Yet they appear to have backed the wrong
horse, believing the frontier of human progress lay in theological, instead of
scientific, political, or economic innovation. They envisioned a world of Enlightened
Ones, struck with a kind of gnosis, conscious of their cosmic origin and the grandeur
of each human being. The metaphysical decay entailed by their gnosticism leads to a
critique of the legitimacy of human institutions and sociopolitical hierarchy. What can
we trust in a world that is made evil and governed by evil lords who cannot account
for their legitimacy? Nothing, except, perhaps, ourselves, trusting in the knowledge of
“what we are and were,” knowledge that reveals the evil of the world but does not
ameliorate it. The only hope, the only freedom, lies in continual work, perhaps the
work of skepticism, critical thinking—of Enlightenment, dark or otherwise.
Seen as the work of skepticism, the fundamental insight of these early modern
Deists, like that of their ancient counterparts, is the moral crisis brought on by the
failure of Christian theology and its justification for its own hierarchy. If the Apostles
lied and Christianity is false, the moral weight of the deceit, mystifications, and
authoritarian sway over so many generations must have a price. Brokenness,
suffering, distrust, and metaphysical decay are the expression of that price. Once
refuted, the Christian hierarchy is a cabal of demiurges. Jacob Ilive and William
Staunton are both nobodies lacking credentials from the institutions of religious
formation in early modern England, unlike, say, Henry More and Thomas Traherne,
and their critique of the metaphysical-cum-ecclesiological hierarchy carries the force
of this moral failure of the religious governing class to care properly for their flock. In
this aspect of their theological character appears the radical strain of Protestant
communitarianism embodied in a figure like Gerard Winstanley during the era of the
Civil Wars.
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The priestly metaphysics, not just the priestly social structure, must be
challenged and defeated for human liberation to be possible upon any important
terms. The work of the author of Præexistence takes on this same metaphysics and
this same priestly hierarchy and battles it on new territory: not of Scripture, but of
Milton’s Paradise Lost. The deep pessimism of the poem Præexistence represents not
merely a response to the optimism of Milton’s divine comedy, but to the Christian
doctrine as a whole. For a cnostic Deist, the final and consequential freedom is not
choice of good and evil, but the rejection of the moral terms offered us even by a
benevolent God. Without this gnostic antinomianism, Enlightenment is Christianity
by other means.
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Conclusion

“The books of all the great philosophers are like so many men. Our sense of an
essential personal flavor in each one of them, typical but indescribable, is the finest
fruit of our own accomplished philosophic education. What the system pretends to be
is a picture of the great universe of God. What it is—and oh so flagrantly—is the
revelation of how intensely odd the personal flavor of some fellow creature is.”
-William James, Pragmatism1

Almost a century after the writers covered in this dissertation, the Romantic
poet William Wordsworth adopted the singular passion of Henry More, the soul’s
preexistence. In this moment from Wordsworth’s famous “Immortality Ode,” he
makes visible the crucial affective power of preexistence, its power as a resolution to
emotional and existential turbulence. The first stanzas of the “Immortality Ode” are
the description of a problem, a state of dejection in which alienation takes over from
an earlier, richer experience: “The things which I have seen I now can see no more.”2
Depressed and deprived of his previous, almost supernatural vision, the poet
languishes in his depression until stanza five, when he hits upon a solution. The
obverse of his depressed experience, and the solution to his depression, is the idea of
the soul’s preexistence. Wordsworth raises More from the metaphorical dead and as
the means of ending the existential exhaustion of the early stanzas:
Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
The Soul that rises with us, our life's Star,
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Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar.

Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home.3
In these famous stanzas, Wordsworth appropriates More’s particular
philosophy to serve his own emotional needs, as well as the needs of the poem he is
writing. Since the lyric voice has proven unable to escape the slough of despond, the
soul’s preexistence bridges the depressed quality of the early stanzas with the
modulated but real optimism of the later stanzas. The philosophical doctrine of
preexistence, which More so passionately defended, for Wordsworth becomes a
poetic element taken on for the purposes of transitioning his poem from one stage to
another and for emblematizing a certain sublime feeling that mattered greatly to him.
Believing the world to be dead matter—the tree in the field just to be a tree—is to be
alienated, while believing that we come from afar is to be restored, even to achieve a
state of elevation, like that which Plotinus believed characterized contemplation: the
soul rising above itself and recognizing its massive inheritance of glory.
Wordsworth’s poem uses the idea of preexistence as a means to move beyond
alienation, an employment that corresponds with the many uses of the same idea
observed in this dissertation. The soul’s preexistence is not simply an idea, but a
consolation, the consolation of philosophy, or theology. The porous boundary
between theology and poetry can be observed in such writers, an integration of
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aesthetic and metaphysical explanations. Theology and poetry alike contain an
achievement of closure or satisfaction after a state of alienation and confusion.
To this end, few authors have improved on John Barth’s wordy but realistic
description of narrative, “The incremental perturbation of an unstable homeostatic
system and its catastrophic restoration to a complexified equilibrium.”4 Once taken
apart, Barth’s description appears remarkably simple, even simplistic: it could be
described as a prolix elaboration of the plot triangle famous from introductory
screenwriting courses. Yet the words “perturbation,” “unstable,” and “homeostatic”
give a sense of the quality of emotional and physical disturbance that characterize the
experience of creating and ingesting literature. Literature does not entirely produce
catharsis, enjoyment, and even information, but something like a sickness that wracks
the body and soul of those under its spell. Often literature creates a sickness only
literature can cure, in the same way a joke is a problem only its punchline can resolve,
while other literature deliberately leaves its audience febrile and searching, from
philosophy or life, for a cure. Once we begin thinking physiologically about literature,
John Dewey’s Art as Experience can contextualize Barth’s scheme of narrative,
drawn from writing and reading stories, to the life of the living creature:
Life itself consists of phases in which the organism falls out of step
with the march of surrounding things and then recovers unison with
it—either through effort or by some happy chance. And, in a growing
life, the recovery is never mere return to a prior state, for it is enriched
by the state of disparity and resistance through which it has
successfully passed. If the gap between organism and environment is
too wide, the creature dies. If its activity is not enhanced by the
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temporary alienation, it merely subsists. Life grows when a temporary
falling out is a transition to a more extensive balance of the energies of
the organism with those of the conditions under which it lives.5
All living things continually pass through one state, what Dewey calls
“disparity and resistance,” to another, “balance” or resolution. These differentiated
states of being correspond to the activity of all living beings, down to the moss piglet,
and perhaps of all being itself. States of disparity and union are universal but, for
Dewey, the artist is the sole creature who “care in a peculiar way for the phase of
experience in which union is achieved.”6 All creatures seek an end to “perturbation,”
but the artist seeks the resolution pathologically, as if it were a narcotic and not a
natural part of life. Barth’s Dewey-like description of narrative applies equally to the
artist and the receiver of art, for the receiver likewise is thrown into perturbation and
moves toward resolution. Dewey therefore despairs there is no single word conveying
“artistic” and “aesthetic” experience, and he condemns the artificial, capitalist-created
barrier between them as blurring the essentially democratic character of experience,
denied to none. The confused thinker, the disturbed reader, the sick animal, the star in
nova, partake in a struggle, “through effort” or “chance,” and achieve equilibrium or
die. The ambitious (perhaps fetishistic) thinker puts off the moment of resolution, or
is forced to by the difficulty and intractability of the problem, most often in the hope
of a larger and more satisfying balance: a state perhaps of nirvana, apatheia,
enlightenment, joy, reconciliation, justification, shalom. The theologian does with all
things—or at least aspires to, by use of universal terms—what the artist does with a
few: suggest a path through which the universe as a whole passes toward some
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resolution. This resolution may be supposed permanent—as in Christianity, Islam, or
Socrates’s deathbed mythmaking—or temporary and thus permanently interinvolved
with the state of perturbation—as in the apothegms of Heraclitus, Nietzsche, the
Gnostics, or the Buddha. The theologian is not in reality more capacious than the
artist, since to use larger terms does not really mean to comprehend more; the map is
not the territory. But the theologian is more of a fetishist perhaps even than the artist,
since she cannot leave the whole universe alone but must involve everything in her
state of unease and hoped-for resolution. To do theology is to bring things to a close,
lowering the curtain and declaring one act in the universal play, at least for now,
completed.
This dissertation has attempted to read philosophy with an eye toward its
affective content, following the notion of John Dewey and William James that these
affective attachments drive philosophy and are driven by philosophy in turn. Like all
theological ideas, the concept of the preexistence of the soul results from a
consideration of the world and life as a whole, a recreation of life on new terms.
Various problems and perturbations prompt this refocusing and recreation—for Henry
More, the moral instability of a world in which God picks winners and losers, the
creeping impression of dead materiality brought on by the mechanistic sciences, but
generally the weariness, fever, and fret of daily life, the tumult of the Revolution and
end of episcopacy, the several secondhand sufferings of his beloved pupil Anne, the
polemical strife with Thomas Vaughan and Robert Boyle on issues that touched him
deeply, perhaps all summed up in the words of the poet Claudian which More
hummed to himself in “a sort of Musical and Melancholick Murmur” as a teenager
struck with universal doubts:
Oft hath my anxious Mind divided stood;
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Whether the Gods did mind this lower World;
Or whether no such Ruler (Wise and Good)
We had; and all things here by Chance were hurld.7
More never wrote anything except theodicy. For him, experience asked a
question: all for good or all for ill? More’s answer hinged on the existence of spirit,
supposed to be an answer to all questions: whether God existed, suffering mattered,
whether death was the end or a higher existence. Into this overloaded notion of spirit,
he poured all his knowledge, his sexual longings, personal friendships, and hopes for
a Millennial future, his reputation and his faith. He expressed a complete thought, a
thought to complete a life, to rest in forever. That thought was the power of his own
soul, which transcended matter and history and shook the throne of God.
Dewey’s description of experience flattens all experience together, and for that
reason becomes itself a theology. Like Anne Conway’s philosophy, Dewey’s is built
upon the linked principles of materialism and change. Conway’s vehicle of
explanation, the concept of transmigration, entails a looser idea of the boundaries
between one entity and another, suggesting a state of universal becoming rather than
being. In her works, Conway translated transmigration into the language of modern
materialistic science. In the process she anticipated, albeit in a mystical language,
articulations of the human relationship to nature and environment that embed
humanity within nature rather than as a kingdom apart. For her, the theodicy created
by transmigration made sense of her own continual suffering in the form of migraines
but also that extended, as her aristocratic society did not, meaningfulness and
importance to the lowest of creatures, including the Quaker women with whom she
found comfort in later life. The words with which her grave marker is written, “A
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Quaker Lady,” commemorate not the whole woman, but only the last transmutation of
many, into a Quaker, a status that equalizes all the others, as the Quakers themselves
did by refusing the customary distinctions of their day.
On the other hand, Thomas Traherne intensified the moment of contemplation,
for him stripped of its metaphysical entailments. He saw these moments of heightened
awareness as themselves the ends toward which a spiritual life was directed, rather
than believing them pointers to a greater reality such as God. Alienation for Traherne
is not an individual state of depression but the education enforced on the “growing
boy” by other people and finally by reality itself. For Traherne, it is reality that must
wait on the moment of contemplation rather than vice versa. Thus, Traherne wants to
insist upon the special importance of the state of union or the end of alienation. Like
Dewey’s artist, he cares particularly for the state of experience in which union is
achieved, wishing to extend it forever.
When Jacob Ilive and the author of Præexistence take up the ancient theology
of “com[ing] from afar,” they reconstruct the political critique the historical Gnostics
aimed at the early Christian Church. These early Deists drove a sociological critique
of the legitimacy of the Christian church by listening to the everyday experience of
human suffering and refusing the simple answer of suffering’s redemption at the
hands of a supernatural redeemer. Suspended through the poetry of Præexistence is an
alternate theological vision of the world, one that holds off the moment of
redemption, continuing the story of human suffering without resolution into the
optimistic Christian end. The Deists prolong the problem of negative experience in a
form that, like Buddhism, requires acceptance of suffering as an integrated and
interinvolved strand of life, granted meaning in a positive light as a substance itself.
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In historical terms, all these authors are writing at the moment when
philosophical theology of this kind became a purely private matter. King William’s
politically important Toleration Act of 1688 represents a victory for religious
toleration, and yet simultaneously the act represents the relegation of religious matters
to the private sphere. Events like this have the effect of deracinating spiritual
speculation, almost putting an end to creative theologizing altogether. When religion
becomes a private matter, public debate and innovative theology become dangerous.
Before these events, and perhaps only for a few conspicuous decades in the
seventeenth century, a different intellectual culture reigned in England, one in which
theological innovation flourished. Moreover, men and women like More and Anne
Conway could offer their own theological innovations as matters of public import,
even to the ambitious end of reforming the entire theology of the English Church—
and of all world religions, in Conway’s case—in their preferred direction. This kind
of broad and public expression of personal speculation would not be achieved again
until the Romantics, though it remained and remains a part of occult and esoteric
conversation.
Something is lost in this particular transformation, the right of the private
person to speculate about highest things and express that speculation in universal
terms that demand either assent or rejection. The different writers studied in this
dissertation reveal the importance of speaking universal terms, even if that importance
remains individual. In their several ways, More, Conway, Traherne, and the author of
Præexistence show how the attempt to understand in wholes is also the attempt to
achieve a private consolation of the value of the world as such. The thinker, to a large
degree on her own, must determine if this world is worth living in when considered in
the light of human and natural history, the permanent coincidence of suffering and
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joy, and all metaphysical possibilities and impossibilities. The answer to this question,
for the thinker, is the affliction or the consolation of philosophy.
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poems; viz. Psychozōia. Psychathanasia. Antipsychopannychia.
Antimonopsychia. Hereto is added a paraphrasticall interpretation of the
answer of Apollo consulted by Amelius, about Plotinus soul departed this life.
Cambridge: Roger Daniel, 1642.
--. Tetractys anti-astrologica, or, The four chapters in the explanation of the grand
mystery of holiness which contain a brief but solid confutation of judiciary
astrology, with annotations upon each chapter: wherein the wondrous
weaknesses of John Butler, ... his answer called A vindication of astrology,
&c. are laid open. London: J. M. for Walter Kettilby, 1681.
Mortimer, Sarah. Reason and Religion in the English Revolution: The Challenge of
Socinianism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Netzley, Ryan. “Lessons from Anniversaries: Progress, Particularity, and Radical
Empiricism in John Donne’s The Second Anniversarie.” Connotations 25.1
(2015): 19-45.
Newcomb, Thomas. Prae-existence and transmigration, or, The new metamorphoses:
a philosophical essay on the nature and progress of the soul : a poem,
something between a panegyrick, and a satire. London: M. Cooper, 1743.
Nicholson, Marjorie. “Christ’s College and the Latitude-Men.” Modern Philology
27.1 (1929): 35-53.
Norris, John. A Collection of Miscellanies, consisting of poems, essays, discourses,
and letters. Oxford: John Crosley, 1687.

220
--. A Philosophical Discourse concerning the Natural Immortality of the Soul of Man.
London, 1708.
--. Letters Concerning the Love of God between the author of the Proposal to the
ladies and Mr. John Norris, wherein his late discourse, shewing that it ought
to be intire and exclusive of all other loves, is further cleared and justified.
London: Samuel Manship and Richard Wilkin, 1695.
--. Practical Discourses upon the Beatitudes of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ,
Vol. I written by John Norris, M.A., Rector of Bemerton near Sarum; to which
are added, Reflections upon a late Essay concerning human understanding;
with a reply to the remarks made upon them by the Athenian Society. London,
1699.
--. Reason and Religion or, the grounds and measures of devotion, consider’d from
the nature of God, and the nature of man. London: Edmund Parker, 1724.
Origen. Contra Celsum et in fidei Christianae defensionem libri. Rome: Georgius
Herolt, 1481.
--. Origen on first principles. New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1966.
Pagels, Elaine. The Gnostic Gospels, New York, NY: Random House, 1979.
Paris, John. Ramillies: A Poem, Humbly Inscrib’d to His Grace the Duke of
Marlborough. London: Jacob Tonson, 1706.
Parker, Samuel. A free and impartial censure of the Platonick philosophie, being a
letter written to his much honoured friend Mr. N.B., Oxford. Oxford: Henry
Hall for Richard Davis, 1666.
--. An account of the nature and extent of the divine dominion & goodnesse, especially
as they refer to the Origenian hypothesis concerning the preexistence of souls:
together with a special account of the groundlessness of the hypothesis itself:

221
being a second letter written to his much honoured friend and kinsman, Mr.
Nath. Bisbie. Oxford: W. Hall for Richard Davis, 1666.
Partner, Jane. Poetry and Vision in Early Modern England. Cham, Switzerland:
Springer, 2018,
Passanante, Gerard. The Lucretian Renaissance: Philology and the Afterlife of
Tradition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011.
Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni. Opera Omnia. New York, NY: Olm, 2005.
--. “The Spiritualistic Cosmologies of Henry More and Anne Conway.” In Henry
More (1614-1687) Ed. Sarah Hutton. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 1990.
Plato. Essential Dialogues of Plato. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble Classics, 2005.
Plotinus. Enneads. Trans. Stephen Mackenna and B. S. Page. MIT Classics
http://classics.mit.edu/Plotinus/enneads.html.
Popkin, Richard. The Third Force in Seventeenth Century Philosophy. Leiden,
Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1992.
“Pre-birth memories page,” https://www.oberf.org/prebirth.htm
Ramelli, Ilaria. “Origen, Patristic Philosophy, and Christian Platonism Re-Thinking
the Christianization of Hellenism.” Vigiliae Christianae 63.3 (2009): 217-263.
Reid, Jasper. The Metaphysics of Henry More, New York: Springer, 2012.
Revard, Stella. “Satan's Envy of the Kingship of the Son of God: A Reconsideration
of "Paradise Lost," Book 5, and Its Theological Background.” Modern
Philology 70.3 (1973): 190-198.
--. The War in Heaven: Paradise Lost and the Tradition of Satan’s Rebellion, Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1980.
Rogers, John. The Matter of Revolution: Science, Poetry, and Politics in the Age of
Milton, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.

222
--. “The Political Theology of Milton’s Heaven.” In The New Milton Criticism.” Ed.
Peter C. Herman and Elizabeth Sauer. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2012.
Rowe, Elizabeth Singer. Divine hymns and poems on several occasions: viz, A
pastoral on our Saviour’s nativity; the wish; The description of Heaven, in
imitation of Mr. Milton, &c. London: R. Janeway for Richd Burrough, at the
Sun and Moon, near the Royal Exchange in Cornhill, 1704.
Rust, George. A Letter of Resolution concerning Origen and the chief of his opinions,
Written to the learned and most ingenious C. L. Esquire; and by him
published. London, 1661.
Schmitt, Carl. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006.
Schroeder, Steven. “Anne Conway’s Place: A Map of Leibniz.” Pluralist 2.3 (2007):
77-100.
Shuger, Deborah. Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance: Religion, Politics,
and the Dominant Culture. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1990.
Skinner, Quentin. “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.” History and
Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History 8.1 (1969): 3-53.
Smith, Lawrence, Knowledge and Vertue, the great ornaments of human nature.
London: Thomas Speed, 1702.
Staunton, William, A Familiar Discourse Shewing that the Gospel is a Comment upon
the Law of Nature, the Only Law Now in Force. London: E. Curll, 1724.
--. An Epistolary Conference with the Reverend Dr. Waterland. London: E. Curll,
1724.

223
--. Reason and Revelation Stated: Upon Reading of Two Famous Sermons, entitled,
The Wisdom of Believing, printed in 1703. London: E. Curll, 1722.
--. The Sincere Thoughts of a Private Christian, Touching the Faith of our Lord Jesus
Christ, and the Doctrine of the Apostles. Humbly Offered in Abatement of the
Socinian and Trinitarian Controversies. With a Postscript on occasion of Dr.
Mangey’s Plain Notions, London: J. Roberts, 1719.
Sterry, Peter. A Discourse on the Freedom of the Will. London: John Starkey, 1675.
Stewart, Dustin. “Angel Bodies to Whig Souls: Blank Verse after Blenheim.” In
Milton in the Long Restoration, ed. Blair Hoxby and Ann Baynes Coiro,
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016: 205-224.
Stillingfleet, Edward. Origenes Sacrae, or, a Rational Account of the Grounds of
Natural and Reveal’d Religion. London: J. Heptinstall for Henry and George
Mortlock, 1709.
Strauss, Leo. Thoughts on Machiavelli. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1995.
Styfhals, Willem. No Spiritual Investment in the World: Gnosticism and Postwar
German Philosophy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019.
Targoff, Ramie. John Donne: Body and Soul. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 2008.
Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.
Teskey, Gordon. Delirious Milton: The Fate of the Poet in Modernity. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.
Thomas, Emily. “Anne Conway on the Identity of Creatures over Time.” In Early
Modern Women on Metaphysics. Ed. Emily Thomas. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2018.

224
Tindal, Matthew. Christianity as Old as the Creation. London, 1730.
Toland, John. Christianity Not Mysterious. London, 1696.
Traherne, Thomas. Centuries, Poems, and Thanksgivings. Ed. H. M. Margoliouth.
Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1965.
Tulloch, John. Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the
Seventeenth Century. New York, NY: B. Franklin, 1872.
Van Helmont, Franciscus Mercurius. A Cabbalistical Dialogue in Answer to the
Opinion of a Learned Doctor in Philosophy and Theology, that the world was
made of nothing. London: Benjamin Clark, 1682.
--. Seder Olam, or, The order, series or succession of all the ages, periods, and times
of the whole world is theologically, philosophically and chronologically
explicated and stated also the hypothesis of the pre-existency and revolution of
humane souls together with the thousand years reign of Christ on earth… : to
which is also annexed some explanatory questions of the book of the
Revelations… : and an appendix containing some translated out of Latin by J.
Clark. London: Sarah Hawkins, 1694.
--. Two Hundred Queries Moderately Propounded Concerning the Doctrine o the
Revolution of Humane Souls: and its Conformity to the Truths of Christianity.
London: Rob Kettlewell, at the Hand and Scepter over against St. Dunstans
Church in Fleestreet, 1684.
Varney, Andrew. “Ending the War and Making the Peace: The Literary Languages of
Public Controversy in 1713,” in Guerres Et Paix: La Grande-Bretagne Au
XVIIIe Siècle, I-II, edited by Paul-Gabriel Boucé, (Paris, Université de la
Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1998): 243-254.

225
Vaughan, Thomas, Anthroposophia Theomagica: or A discourse of the nature of man
and his state after death; grounded on his creator’s proto-chimstry, and
verifi’d by a practicall examination of the principles in the great world. By
Eugenius Philalethes. London: T.W. for H. Blunden, 1650.
Vaughan, Henry. Henry Vaughan, The Complete Poems. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1981.
Von Maltzen, Nicholas. “The Whig Milton, 1667-1700.” In Milton and
Republicanism. Ed. David Armitage, Armand Himy, and Quentin Skinner.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Von Rosenroth, Christian Knorr. Kabbala denudata seu Doctrina Hebraeorum
transcendentalis et metaphysica atque theologica, Sulzbaci. Amsterdam, 1667.
Wade, Gladys. “The Manuscripts of the Poems of Thomas Traherne,” The Modern
Language Review 26.4 (1931): 401-407.
--. Thomas Traherne. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1944.
Walker, Daniel Pickering. The Ancient Theology: Studies in Christian Platonism from
the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press, 1972.
--. The Decline of Hell: Seventeenth-Century Discussions of Eternal Torment.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1964.
Ward, Richard. Life of Dr. Henry More, Parts 1 and 2. Ed. Sarah Hutton, Dordrecht,
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, 2000.
Warren, Edward. No Præexistence; Or, A Brief Dissertation against the Hypothesis of
Humane Souls. London: T.R. for Samuel Thomson, 1667.
Webster, Charles. The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine and Reform, 1626-1600.
New York: Holmes and Meier, 1976.

226
Whichcote, Benjamin. Works of the learned Benjamin Whichcote. Aberdeen: J.
Chambers, for Alexander Thomson, 1751.
White, Jeremiah. The Restoration of All Things: or, a Vindication of the Goodness
and Grace of God, to be manifested at last. London: N. Cliff and D.
Jackson, 1712.
Withers, John. The Dutch better friends than the French, to the monarchy, church,
and trade of England / in a letter from a citizen to a country gentleman.
London: John Clark, 1713.
Wordsworth, William. The Prelude: 1799, 1805, 1850. Ed. M.H. Abrams, New York:
Norton, 1979.
Yates, Frances. Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition. Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 1991.
Yovel, Yirmiyahu. Spinoza and Other Heretics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1989.

ProQuest Number: 28321270
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality and completeness of this reproduction is dependent on the quality
and completeness of the copy made available to ProQuest.

Distributed by ProQuest LLC ( 2021 ).
Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author unless otherwise noted.

This work may be used in accordance with the terms of the Creative Commons license
or other rights statement, as indicated in the copyright statement or in the metadata
associated with this work. Unless otherwise specified in the copyright statement
or the metadata, all rights are reserved by the copyright holder.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17,
United States Code and other applicable copyright laws.

Microform Edition where available © ProQuest LLC. No reproduction or digitization
of the Microform Edition is authorized without permission of ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346 USA

